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Preface  
The present report is an evaluation of what the evaluation team has found to be a 
unique and very interesting institution. International Media Support (IMS) is not yet 
another media NGO that promotes freedom of expression and free media, and issue 
alerts regarding media oppression, though it is also engaged is this type of work. It 
aims to contribute to something that is much more challenging, namely to support 
media in conflict situations, and to promote media as a tools for conflict resolution. 
To analyse the experiences and concrete activities of IMS in the short period that the 
organisation has existed has been an extremely interesting undertaking. We are very 
pleased that we were given the opportunity to undertake this exercise. It has provided 
us with new insights into international media support work, but also made us reflect 
on the various roles of media in different parts of the world. Thus the evaluation 
exercise in itself has been a learning experience to us.  
 
We hope that the evaluation also will contribute to the valuable work that IMS does, 
as well as to a deeper understanding of how similar organisations might develop, as 
well as to providing the Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs with tools and 
insights that will be of use in its work of providing support for peace and stability and 
democracy initiatives. 
 
The framework for the evaluation was ideal. We as a team were given the resources to 
be able to undertake fieldwork, consult with specialists, meet to discuss our findings 
and work together on several occasions as well as to interact with the IMS staff and 
the Board. 
 
There are many who have contributed to this report in a number of ways. But we 
would initially like to express our gratitude to the FRESTA secretariat for providing 
such an ideal framework for the evaluation and its interest in the evaluation process, 
and to the Chr. Miche lsen Institute that contracted us to undertake the evaluation. 
Then of course the work would have been impossible without the input from and the 
frank discussions with Jesper Højberg and Martin Breum of IMS. Their dedication to 
the IMS is remarkable, and their willingness to enter into proper exchanges around 
important issues has been invaluable. Tine Rasmussen, who holds the IMS secretariat 
together, also provided us with much assistance. Our reference group Vibeke 
Sperling, Astrid Suhrke and Gunnar Sørbø shared their considerable knowledge with 
us on issues and areas where they are experts. Nils Gunnar Songstad did invaluable 
work in working out the classification schemes for the IMS interventions. We have 
also consulted with many others in our work. We have found people to be genuinely 
interested in the work IMS does, and they have been willing to share their knowledge 
and their views with us. There are bound to some mistakes in a work like this. They 
are our responsibility.  
 
 
 The Hague, Oslo, Bergen,  April 24, 2003 
 
Kim Brice  Helge Rønning  Hugo Stokke 
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Executive summary 
In early January 2003 The Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) was contracted by the 
Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Peace and Stability Fund 
(FRESTA) to undertake an evaluation of International Media Support. CMI appointed 
the following team to undertake the assessment: Kim Brice, Independent Consultant, 
The Hague; Helge Rønning, Professor, University of Oslo, Hugo Stokke, Researcher, 
CMI, Bergen. Helge Rønning has served as team leader.  
 
The team presented its final report April 28, 2003. 
 
The report consists of 7 parts and 5 annexes.  
 
Part 1: Introduction 
This part begins with an overall assessment of IMS as a new, important and unique 
initiative in the area of support for media in the struggle for democracy and stability. 
This is due to seven principal characteristics of the organisation. One, IMS is more 
than a freedom of expression organisation. Two, IMS is willing to take risks. Three, 
IMS serves as a catalyst for further action. Four, IMS is flexible. Five, IMS is 
inventive. Six, IMS is both a donor and implementer. Seven, IMS is run by very 
dedicated people.  
 
This part provides an interpretation of the Terms of Reference and gives an overview 
of the methodology employed by the team. 
 
Part 2: IMS in Context 
Part 2.1 gives a brief account of IMS’ history highlighting the reason for its setting up 
namely that there was a need for an institution that could provide rapid, flexible and 
short-term assistance to media in conflict and crises situations. Furthermore the 
funding system for the two-year pilot phase is being explained. The funding comes 
from FRESTA/Danida.The cost of each intervention should not be higher than 
200.000 DKK. The interventions are to take place both in developing countries as 
well as in conflict stricken or –threatened close regions e.g. the Balkans, Caucasus, 
Central Asia. 
 
Part 2.2 consists of an analysis of the role of media in conflict situations with a focus 
on the interpretation that IMS has given of its mandate, namely  
 
(….) to promote peace and stability and democratic development by means of strengthening 
media pluralism and dialogue and by promoting the right to freedom of expression and the right 
to information. These objects shall be attained by providing emergency and short-term conflict 
prevention services to media and media organisations/institutions in areas of current or potential 
conflict. 
 
The main conclusions of this discussion are 
· That the criteria for defining what constitutes conflict scenarios and reasons 
for interventions vary and that they often are unclear. The team points to other 
models for viewing what conflicts entail than the three stages that IMS uses, 
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namely pre-conflict, overt conflict, and post-conflict. The concept of a Pre-
conflict situation is particularly problematic. 
· Interventions in conflict areas both in relation to media and other forms take 
place in three different time-frames – short-term, medium-term, and long-
term. Short-term is very often insufficient. 
· It is very difficult to do the kind of work the IMS has been set up to do in 
societies where there are full-blown conflicts. 
· It is important to take into consideration that communication is more than 
news and journalism. In relation to media and conflicts it is necessary to take 
into consideration a broad definition of communication and information 
strategies, and particularly consider how to reach different target groups and 
audiences.  
· The question of the role of media in peace building exercises is complex, and 
the indicators for how media and media support initiatives might contribute to 
peace building have not in general been worked out in a satisfactory manner. 
 
Part 3:  The Organisational Setup of IMS  
This part consists of two sections plus findings and deals mainly with an analysis of 
the respective roles of the Secretariat and the Board (3.1) and of IMS’ Working and 
decision-making procedures (3.2). The main aspects discussed are: 
· There is a measure of confusion as to the exact role of different structures 
within IMS in relation to decision-making procedures.  
· The conception that board members have of their role is not totally clear.  
· There are not sufficiently clear procedures for identifying conflict of interest 
issues.    
· Regular staff is too steeped in project management to allow room for 
monitoring and evaluation and forward- looking planning. Work performance 
was highly regarded by the board, and confirmed by the observations by the 
evaluation team through our interactions with the staff.   
· The role of the “regular consultants” is not clear in relation to their way of 
representing IMS.     
· Minutes of board meetings read more like narratives of what was being said  
than digests of decisions.  
· There is a need for more office space. But it has been a great advantage for 
IMS to be housed in the Centre for Human Rights. 
 
Part 4:  IMS’ Implementation Modalities  
This part covers five sections plus findings that discuss The IMS Mandate (4.1), IMS’ 
Framework for Interventions (4.2), IMS’ Role (4.3) IMS’ Network of Partner 
Organisations (4.4), IMS’ Comparative Advantage (4.5). The major characteristics of 
the analysis in this part are: 
· IMS has aptly and justifiably used its pilot phase to explore its options within 
its mandate. This has resulted in a broad interpretation of its overall mandate 
to include interventions in situations where media are threatened whether or 
not organised armed conflict is taking place. Practice also shows that “short-
term” does not equate a “once off” activity and “emergency” does not 
necessarily mean a “life and death” situation.  
· Though IMS has some mechanism in place for monitoring and evaluating its 
activities, they remain weak and inconclusive.   
C M I  
 x 
· With regard to networking, the list of IMS partners is impressive and 
indicative of IMS’ commitment and ability to work symbiotically with others. 
Its networking function, arguably its most important, has enabled it to achieve 
much more than would be expected from a three-person organisation in such a 
short period of time.   
· The IMS partners that were interviewed unanimously praised IMS for coming 
onto the press freedom/media development scene without “stepping on anyone 
else’s toes”. IMS has been complemented for being creative, flexible and rapid 
in its actions, having funding available with few strings attached and 
successfully connecting and forging relationships with and between existing 
organisations.   
· Its comparative advantage over other like-minded organisations lies in its 
ability to provide short-term, rapid assistance; act proactively; interpret the 
needs of media in conflict situations very broadly; have a unique overview of 
human and financial resources available at national, regional and international 
levels; and spend its funds flexibly and with few strings attached and to work 
in “low profile” countries.   
· IMS’ double role of donor and implementer risks hindering the organisation’s 
ability to learn from its activities. As a donor, it does not benefit from having 
hands-on involvement and therefore first hand learning in order to develop and 
re-adjust its approaches. Unless its evaluation mechanisms are strengthened, it 
is not able to learn from the projects it is helping implement.  
 
Part 5: IMS Projects  
This part consists of concrete analyses of IMS’ interventions both in the form of an 
overall overview and through case studies of interventions in four continents. The 
sections are Analysis of the IMS Project Portfolio (5.1) and 5.2 Case Studies detailing 
analyses of interventions in West Africa (Sierra Leone, Liberia, The Ivory Coast) 
(5.2.1), The Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan) (5.2.2), South Asia (Nepal, Sri 
Lanka) (5.2.3), Afghanistan (5.2.4), Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan) (5.2.5), Chechnya (5.2.6), Byelorussia (5.2.7), Ukraine 
(5.2.8), Haiti (5.2.9). The areas chosen for field visits and the other case studies that 
have been included in the report are representative enough to give a good impression 
of the activities conducted by IMS. This is a part of the report that covers many 
aspects of the way the IMS operates. The main discoveries of the evaluation team are: 
· Sometimes IMS seems to move in overcrowded terrains. That is in countries, 
which may be characterised as very high profile (Nepal, Sri Lanka, 
Afghanistan, Israel/Palestine, Chechnya). It is a factor that always should be 
assessed in relation to where to intervene.  
· IMS is willing to take risks, and be experimental and creative. And this is a 
great asset.   
·  IMS must conduct a proper evaluation of the quality of the workshops and 
training that it lets partner organisations undertake.      
· It is necessary with very thorough preparations for and identification of 
suitable partners particularly in situations of violent conflict.   
· The fact that IMS follows up its missions with concrete commitments and 
activities, and quickly, increases its credibility with its partners.  
· IMS’ involvement in the Horn of Africa exemplifies how IMS has broadened 
its interpretation of its mandate to include post-conflict scenarios. 
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· It is not always clear from IMS’ documents what the organisation’s overall 
objective is in each country, beyond responding to a large spectrum of 
problems faced by the media, and on what basis it believes it can have an 
impact on a particular identified problem, especially concerning the role of 
media in conflict.  
· It can be safely said that IMS’ activities in several of the “case studies-
countries” have been unique and catalytic.   
· IMS’ success also comes from its ability to rapidly link local organisations to 
international groups.   
· In general, it is very difficult to gauge the impact of many of the activities IMS 
has supported to date. For the most part, outputs are clear but  criteria for 
success have not been developed by neither IMS or by its partners. 
Furthermore, IMS largely relies on reports from its consultants and partner 
organisations to assess activities it has not directly been involved with. Of 
course, impact is also hard to gauge when many activities are still on going. 
Finally, the longer-term effect of many of IMS activities will depend entirely 
on whether they continue beyond IMS’ engagement.    
· There is a need for continued assessment of how long IMS should stay 
involved in a given country and how many resources it should invest in a 
given country over time.   
· IMS could, in some instances, consider increasing its grants to local 
organisations. This is especially true here, where IMS’ investments in 
missions almost equals its investments in concrete activities.  The scale should 
tip more in the direction of concrete activities.  
· In interventions in conflicts zones it is important to seek the media most 
effective in the local context.    
· In depth training in media monitoring issues must consist of more than what 
can be achieved at short workshops, and it is particularly important that this 
training takes into consideration local and national circumstances and 
institutions. 
· Provincial and local media are easily overlooked. 
· In some countries, there is some uncertainty about which groups to target 
(publishers, editors or journalists), creating possible problems for the 
effectiveness of the intervention. 
  
Part 6: Conclusions 
This part contains an overview of the most important findings (6.1) in the report plus 
a list of 20 recommendations (6.2) to IMS and FRESTA to consider in the next phase 
of IMS’ existence.  
 
The main conclusion is that it is very impressive what IMS has managed to achieve 
over less than two years. The number of interventions is impressive. The quality of 
the work is in general very good. The ability to cooperate with partners is fine. The 
enthusiasm for the project is great both among the staff and the board. 
And the 17 recommendations are:  
1. Clarify IMS’ organisational structure. IMS should develop a policy document 
that describes IMS’ organisational structure of IMS and, that records all, 
important procedural principles of the Association. This document should also 
define the role and responsibility of the General Assembly, the Board of 
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Directors, the Advisory Council (if applicable) and the Executive Director. It 
should also present clear policies regarding criteria for the composition of the 
General Assembly and the Board, as well as the selection and rotation policies 
for each. 
2. Define processes for dealing with conflict of interest issues. IMS should 
develop a working definition of conflict of interest and put in place procedures 
for dealing with conflict of interest issues when they arise. We recommend 
that a small committee made up of the IMS Chair and one or two other board 
members serve as the decision-making body whenever a conflict of interest 
issue should arise. This will absolve the Executive Director from taking 
responsibility for decisions on such matters.  Decisions taken by this 
committee should be recorded and signed by the IMS Chair. 
3. Improve communication with board members. In between meetings, board 
members should receive short notices on upcoming interventions, assessment 
missions or other IMS activities in order for them to be able to comment and 
provide input before an activity is undertaken.    
4. Improve record keeping of the organisation’s decisions. Minute taking should 
become an administrative responsibility and accurately describe decisions that 
are taken at meetings. Minutes from the previous meeting should be reviewed 
at each board meeting, amendments noted, and signed off by the IMS Chair. 
5. Hire additional programme and administrative staff. The Executive Director 
should be released from some of his programme responsibilities in order to 
take on a more “strategic thinking” role within the organisation. A programme 
officer, recruited on the basis of an open and international competition, should 
be hired in the very near future. This position should include a half-time 
evaluation/impact assessment function. Additional secretarial and 
bookkeeping support should also be recruited in the near future. 
6. Develop detailed job descriptions. Detailed job descriptions should be 
prepared for all staff members. 
7. Second phase. The second phase of IMS should be extended to a 3 –5 year 
period.  
8. Redefine and raise the ceiling for funding. There should be increased funding 
for IMS in order for the organisation to be able to (a) Raise the funding for 
certain select projects, and (b) Expand certain select projects into a medium-
term framework, and (c) Enter a second phase in certain cases of special 
projects. 
9. Design a project management cycle. IMS might consider separating its 
interventions into a planning and an implementation phase in order to be able 
to commit larger amounts of funds to interventions that require them. A 
guideline for expenditure could be set for a planning phase, which usually 
includes assessments missions, and for a first and any subsequent phases of 
interventions. 
10. Strategic planning. An annual strategic planning session, aided by an external 
facilitator, should be held once a year or every two years, as needed. Such a 
meeting should be held over several days and include board members, staff 
and selected IMS consultants and other relevant resource persons. 
11. Improve evaluation procedures.  As much as possible, IMS should work 
evaluation mechanisms into its projects and, when necessary, provide for an 
external evaluation process. Evaluation tools will have to be determined on a 
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case-by-case basis. If IMS is to take evaluation seriously, it will have to 
dedicate resources to it.  
12. Training partners. IMS needs to follow up their training partners, particularly 
the international training partners to whom they outsource training 
assignments. Use local partners more, couple international and local training 
expertise. Ask for proper training plans before the workshop is being 
implemented. 
13. Criteria for interventions. IMS needs to re-examine and refine its criteria for 
interventions and its definitions of stages of conflict. As part of a learning 
exercise, IMS should try to assess which types of intervention work best under 
which type of circumstances, i.e. conflict phase (escalation phase, armed 
conflict, reduction phase). 
14. Create a platform for emergency assistance/safety mechanisms. IMS should 
take a lead in bringing together organisations that manage emergency 
assistance funds or are involved in safety issues (safety training, safe havens 
etc.) in order to improve their coordination and develop overall strategies for 
this area of work.  
15. Initiate a working group on conflict conscious journalism and peace building 
media projects.  IMS could bring together groups working on conflict 
conscious reporting and peace building media projects in order to discuss 
methodologies and evaluation issues. The latter has been identified by some 
practitioners as an area in serious need of development. 
16. Documentation of activities. Documents should more consistently state its 
author. The origination of the intervention should be more clearly stipulated 
along with the objective for an intervention.  
17. Greater cooperation with organisations involved with conflict analysis. IMS’ 
work would benefit from greater cooperation with peace and conflict research 
institutes as well as governmental bodies in order to sharpen their analysis and 
methodologies in conflict situations and, in the longer term, strengthen the 
choices of their activities in overt armed conflict areas. The question of the 
role of media in peace building exercises is complex, and IMS should consider 
working out indicators for how media and media support initiatives might 
contribute to peace building. 
 
Part 7: List of select literature  
This part gives a short overview of literature consulted above and beyond the 
multitude of IMS documents supplied to the team for the evaluation. 
 
Annexes 
Annex 1 contains the Terms of Reference for the evaluation. Annex 2 is the inception 
note prepared by the team as per the TOR for the evaluation. Annex 3 provides a full 
list of people contacted and interviewed by the team during the evaluation. Annex 4 
gives an overview of IMS partners. Finally, Annex 5 contains a set of statistical 
tables, fully explained and analysed in part 5.1. 
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1 Introduction 
When five Danish media and human rights organisations came together on 27th of 
April 2001 and founded International Media Support (IMS), it signalled the start of a 
new and unique organisational initiative in the area of support for international media 
in the context of democratic initiatives and conflict resolution. When the Danish 
Parliament appropriated funding for the activities of IMS over a two-year period to 
the tune of 11.5 million DKK, it further created the basis for the remarkable 
operational work that IMS has been able to undertake in the short period of less than 
two years.    
 
The evaluation team has found that IMS has been able to carve a special niche for 
itself in the area of international media support organisations. This is due to the 
following distinctive characteristics of its mandate and work.  
 
To start with, IMS is doing more than monitoring freedom of expression violations, 
an area in which there are several other organisations that all do important work. 
Freedom of expression is a principle that forms a necessary basis for IMS’ mandate, 
but what makes it special as an organisation is that this principle is combined with a 
perspective of intervening in situations where media are in conflict seen from the 
perspective of either being threatened in their democratic function or by operating in a 
situation of organised violence. This implies that IMS see media as actors in creating 
the foundations for democracy and peace and stability at the same time. This is a 
formidable task, and in our analysis of the concrete interventions undertaken by IMS 
it is remarkable what the organisation has achieved.  
 
Secondly, IMS is an organisation that is willing to take risks and act even if the 
chances of being successful may be slim, but to act may in itself make a difference.  
 
Thirdly, this is an aspect, which may lead other actors to enter the scene, and thus 
IMS serves as a catalyst for further activities.  
 
Fourthly, IMS is flexible and unbureaucratic. It can provide support literally at the 
spur of the moment.  
 
Fifthly, IMS is inventive in its operational mode. This is due to the aspects outlined 
above, but also due to the short-term nature of interventions.  
 
Sixthly, it functions both as a donor and an implementer. This is mainly an advantage, 
but it may also create a challenging contradictory role that the organisation so far has 
been able to tackle.  
 
And finally, IMS is run by a staff and a board who are dedicated to the important role 
that it has played and hopefully will continue to play in the struggle for democratic 
media.  
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1.1 Interpretation of the Terms of Reference 
In January 2003 Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) was contracted by The Royal Danish 
Ministry of Royal Affairs to undertake an evaluation of International Media Support. 
CMI appointed the following team to undertake the assessment: Kim Brice, 
Independent Consultant , The Hague; Helge Rønning, Professor, University of Oslo, 
Hugo Stokke, Researcher, CMI, Bergen. Helge Rønning has served as team leader.  
 
Prior to starting the work on the evaluation the team worked out an Inception Note, 
which served as its interpretation of the Terms of Reference for the Evaluation. Both 
the TOR and the Inception Note are appended to this report. In the following section 
the team highlights some aspects of its work and interpretation of the TOR. 
 
The evaluation team has in line with the TOR and the inception note regarded its task 
as providing an evaluation of IMS, which is to serve as advice for the continued 
activities of the organisation. The team has not interpreted its task as to recommend 
whether the organisation should continue to operate or not. The team is aware that its 
work coincides with the planning of the next phase of IMS’s activities. The report has 
been written with this in mind. The team has thus considered some aspects of future 
funding for the organisation.  
 
The main emphasis has been on assessing whether IMS has been effective in fulfilling 
its mandate and tasks and whether it has been of relevance in its field of operations. 
 
In order to do so the team has discussed at some length the role of media in situations 
of armed conflict, and a section on this issue has been included in the report. 
 
In line with the inception note the team has put special emphasise on the report to be a 
“learning document” for both IMS and its sponsors that will provide a) an input to the 
further work of IMS (i.e. suggestions for areas for IMS to continue working in, 
possible expansion of or further focusing of its field of operations); b) a critical 
analysis of IMS’ activities; and c) suggestions for improvement of its performance.  
 
The main methodological consideration of the team has been comparative. Thus the 
report compares IMS to other organisations that work in the same area. It looks at the 
interventions performed by IMS in the light of other experiences of similar types, and 
analyses the activities on the basis of broader considerations of media in conflict 
situations. The concrete methodologies used by the team are discussed below.  
 
In the inception note there was mention of a tentative consultative workshop. The 
team decided that instead of organising this it would be more useful for the team to 
meet with the board in connection with the board’s meeting in April and to participate 
in the formal board meeting. In addition two team members attended workshops 
organised by IMS partners in their fieldwork. 
 
A Reference Group consisting of the following members served as sounding boards 
and advisors to the evaluation team on key analytical issues: Vibeke Sperling, former 
Foreign Editor, Politiken, Guest Professor University of Oslo, specialist on Eastern 
Europe and central Asia; Astrid Suhrke, Senior Researcher CMI, specialist in 
international conflict research; and Gunnar M. Sørbø, Director of CMI. 
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The team feels that the report gives a satisfactory answer to the main questions that 
the evaluation were to answer:  
  
1. What are the strengths and weaknesses of IMS’ organizational structure? 
2. What processes have IMS used to design and implement its 
interventions/activities? What has been the IMS’ interventions’ contribution to 
achieving its mandate, promoting peace and stability, and to meeting IMS’ 
target groups’ needs? What lessons have been drawn for improving future 
interventions? 
3. To what extent has IMS been able to network and partner with other 
organisations to ensure the sustainability of its interventions?  
4. What comparative advantage does IMS have over other media support 
organisations? What is unique about IMS? 
1.2 Methodology, work plan 
The team has made use of the following methods in their work:  
1. Document analysis. The documents produced by IMS and in connection with 
its setting up have formed the basis for the analysis of the work of the 
organisation and its short history. In addition a number of articles, papers, 
brochures, booklets and books that are of relevance to the area that IMS 
operates have been consulted.  
2. Interviews. The team has interviewed people that have worked with IMS, and 
have been part of the wider circle of contacts for the organisation. A list of 
people contacted is appended.  
3. Field Work. The team has travelled to three different locations and observed 
the work of IMS and its partner organisations in concrete situations. Kim 
Brice visited Nairobi in a fact- finding mission to East Africa/The Horn of 
Africa. Helge Rønning visited Accra in a fact-finding mission to West Africa. 
Hugo Stokke visited Nepal and Sri Lanka.  
4. Expert opinion. The team has contacted experts and asked them to provide 
background analysis and assessment of IMS activities in connection with   
areas and issues where the team does not possess first hand and expert 
knowledge. This is among others the case for IMS interventions in the former 
Soviet Union.  
5. Case Studies. The areas chosen for field visits and the other case studies that 
have been included in the report are representative enough to give a good 
impression of the activities conducted by IMS. They comprise two distinct 
different areas of Africa with conflicts of different kinds, ranging from media 
oppression (Ethiopia) to full scale conflicts (The Ivory Coast) of which one 
may be in the process of leading to a solution (Sudan), to post-conflict 
situations with media repression (Liberia) and/or deep emotional wounds 
(Liberia), and a state of anarchic order (Somalia). Several of the areas in 
Africa are zones that have been “forgotten” and thus constitute low priority 
conflicts. Furthermore Nepal and Sri Lanka, two Asian countries in different 
stages of a peace process, have been covered. Afghanistan with a situation of 
low-key war, but hopeful moves in the direction of peace and some sort of 
democratic system has been evaluated through the input from the Reference 
Group. Central Asia, where there is no overt conflict, but suppression of 
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freedom of expression, has been assessed with the aid of expert input. So has 
Chechnya in the Caucasus with a situation of armed conflict and oppression. 
Byelorussia and Ukraine are East European examples of restrictions on the 
media. Haiti, a country in the Americas, characterised by marked permanent 
conflict and oppression, has been included and assessed by Kim Brice who has 
previously worked there. An issue in relation to the IMS mandate is whether 
the countries of intervention may be classified as high profile or low profile 
countries. This has to do with whether the conflicts figure prominently in the 
international news and/or there is considerable international concern about the 
outcome. Of the countries chosen for case studies the team has classified the 
following as high profile: Nepal, Sri Lanka, Chechnya, The Ivory Coast. The 
rest are low profile, and some have more or less been forgotten and written off 
by the international society, e.g. Liberia, Somalia.  
6. Classification Sheets. Classification sheets have been compiled for all the 
interventions that IMS has undertaken. These have been used as background 
information for statistical analysis of IMS activities and for reaching an 
understanding of the overall picture of IMS interventions and the reasoning 
behind these. The classification schemes are appended in the electronic 
version of the evaluation report. 
 
The team started its work with a meeting with representatives of FRESTA and 
DANIDA and IMS staff on January 31. Following that meeting the inception note was 
written. The next meeting of the team took place in Copenhagen February 12 – 13, 
and consisted of discussions with the IMS staff. The team conducted its fieldwork in 
March followed by working session and meetings with IMS and FRESTA in 
Copenhagen March 21 – 24. Meetings were also held in March in Bruxelles and 
London with an array of IMS partners. On April 4 –5 the team met to discuss and 
work on the draft report, meet with DANIDA, and to discuss the evaluation with IMS 
Board. The team attended the Board Meeting of IMS on April 6. The draft report was 
submitted electronically to FRESTA with copies to IMS on April 12. In addition the 
team has conducted telephone interviews with a number of informants, and had 
several telephone conference meetings between themselves. 
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2 IMS in context 
2.1  A short history of IMS 
The history of International Media Support may be described as comprising three 
stages. First there was an exploratory stage (1999 – 2001), followed by the formalised 
setting up of the organisation and the securing of its funding (2001). The third stage is 
the operational phase (2001 -), which is the object of the present evaluation.    
 
It seems that possibly the first voicing of plans for a project of support for media in a 
situation of violent conflict came from the Danish journalist Lars Møller. Based on his 
experiences in the former Yugoslavia he aired the idea with FRESTA of establishing 
some sort of project, which could support the media that fostered peace building and 
conflict prevention, and thus serve as alternative to hatemongering. It also seems that 
The Baltic Media Centre came up with an informal proposal or idea for activities of 
this kind to be included in its portfolio of actions. On the basis of these initiatives 
FRESTA in cooperation with individual journalists with experience from work in 
conflict zones and representatives of media organisations arranged meetings and 
discussions about the feasibility of establishing a project that could provide support 
for media in conflicts.   
 
After the informal discussions of the idea, FRESTA decided to conduct an assessment 
of the needs for and the operational modalities for an organisation that would have as 
its objective to provide flexible and short term support to media in conflict zones, and 
to use media to de-escalate violence. Jesper Højberg, who later became the executive 
director of IMS, undertook the consultancy. In January 2001 an international 
conference was organised in Copenhagen to discuss whether there was need for a new 
organisation with a mandate to both act in relation to the role of media in conflict 
situations, and to support threatened and oppressed media. The conference expressed 
the view that there was no organisation that had that special combined role, and that 
there in particular was a need for a type of media support that could be flexible, rapid 
and short-term. 
 
The second stage of the IMS history starts on April 27 2001 when five Danish media 
and human rights organisations founded IMS as a Danish NGO. The founding 
organisations  were The Baltic Media Centre, The Danish School of Journalism, The 
Danish Newspaper Publishers Association, The Danish Union of Journalists, and The 
Danish Centre for Human Rights. They constituted the permanent members of the 
board of the organisation. The board was later expanded with four international 
members with a background in media organisations. On May 15 the Danish 
Parliament appropriated funding for the activities of IMS over a two-year period to 
the tune of 11.5 million DKK. This was done on the basis of the consultancy report 
and the project proposal resulting from that. In the appropriation document the 
following aspects were emphasised, within the framework of the project proposal to 
carry out approximately 65 short-term interventions within the two year period of the 
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pilot phase of the project; the cost of each intervention should not be higher than 
200,000 DKK.1 (The evaluation team will return to the implications of this ceiling 
later in the report.) The interventions are to take place both in developing countries as 
well as in conflict stricken or –threatened close regions e.g. the Balkans, Caucasus, 
Central Asia. The funding for the project is to be taken from votes for development 
cooperation (§ 06.36.04) constituting 40 percent of the total, and from various 
multilateral contributions and from the FRESTA/Democracy Fund (§ 06.11.17) 
representing 60 percent of the total vote for the project.  
 
The post as executive director was announced in early July 2001 and interviews held 
in early Augus t. Jesper Højberg was chosen to lead IMS, and later Martin Breum was 
appointed as Vice Director. The appointments were confirmed by the board at its 
meeting in September 2002. Some time later Tine Rasmussen was appointed as Head 
of Administration.   
 
IMS’ mandate states that the organisation is 
 
(….) to promote peace and stability and democratic development by means of strengthening 
media pluralism and dialogue and by promoting the right to freedom of expression and the 
right to information. These objects shall be attained by providing emergency and short-term 
conflict prevention services to media and media organisations/institutions in areas of current 
or potential conflict. 
 
The discussions of the IMS mandate has from the very beginning been centred around  
four main issues. The first concerns the tension between what could be characterised 
as the concern of the professional media organisations for a clear adherence to 
professional standards of journalism such as objective reporting, checking of sources 
etc, and no interference with the media. The second is the position of a media agenda 
representing peace activism and possibly censoring of media contributing to 
escalation of conflict. The latter relates to the balance between on the one hand only 
to intervene in direct open conflicts and on the other a broader interpretation of where 
IMS interventions could take place in situations where media freedom is under serious 
threat, but where there is no perceived conflict. The third issue has to do with the 
relationship between what could loosely be termed FRESTA regions on the one hand 
and DANIDA areas on the other. As regards both these issues it seems that IMS has 
been able to maintain a balance that takes all aspects into consideration. The relatively 
wide interpretation of the mandate used by IMS has been an advantage to the 
activities undertaken, and not the least constitutes an important aspect of the 
flexibility IMS has shown in its work. A fourth issue, which is a dilemma for IMS, is 
that it serves as both a donor to other organisations and projects, as well as being an 
operator and implementer of projects.  This issue is further developed in the section 
on IMS implementation modalities (4.1). 
 
In conclusion the first two years of IMS has shown that the organisation has 
undertaken an impressive number of activities. It has established itself as an important 
                                                 
1 In a letter to IMS June 13, 2001it was stated: Opmerksomheden henledes på, at der er fastsat et 
maximumbeløb på 200.000 kr. til den enkelte IMS intervention inkl rejseudgifter og honorarer, der 
maximalt kan udgøre 75.000 kr. En given intervention kan inden for dette beløb omfatte et 
sammenhængende forløb af flere missioner til/aktiviteter i et givet land eller konfliktområde. (brev 13 
juni 2001) 
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player in the area of media support. But IMS is also in an early phase of its existence 
and needs to create and further develop its identity in a way that sets it more clearly 
apart from other organisations. It has found a niche, but it is necessary for to it 
identify that niche even more distinctly.  
2.2  Media in conflict situations 2 
In the report that served as a background to the setting up of IMS, and in the debates 
among the founders of the organisation, as well as in the work of IMS since it started 
operating, a central aspect of its discussions has been attempts to define the role of 
media in conflict situations.  The evaluation team thus feels that it is important to 
reflect upon how this issue is being treated in different IMS documents and in what 
has been written elsewhere on the issue. It is also important to assess how the concrete 
IMS interventions function in relation to this particular aspect of its mandate. This is 
being done in order to attempt to set the framework for the continuing work of the 
organisation and as a way of reaching an understanding of the modalities of its 
operations. 
 
As noted in the short overview of the background to the setting up of IMS, it has 
never been the aim of IMS to serve as yet another duplication of the many 
international organisations that concentrate around issues of defending freedom of 
expression and monitoring threats to press freedom. This would probably be a much 
easier task to undertake than the one that IMS was set up to fulfil. While the 
protection of media freedom obviously must be a central part of IMS work, the 
organisation was established to combine this task with a special mission of supporting 
media in situations of violent conflict, and particularly to contribute to turning media 
into instruments of conflict resolution and peace building. To provide support to 
media initiatives that might serve to deescalate conflicts is a very prominent aspect of 
this mission. 
 
The focus of IMS work is ideally on how internal media can be assisted to move 
towards a positive influence on peace and conflict. The role of the media in creating 
conditions for peaceful solutions to violent conflicts may be summed up in some 
simplified reflections based on experiences with media in different forms of conflict 
areas, some of which are among those areas in which IMS has chosen to intervene. 
IMS typically concentrates on professional media, and they deal with experiences 
with local media, not the international ones. 
 
The IMS Analytical Framework and its Context 
In the period after the conflicts in the Balkan and the genocide in Rwanda attention 
and thought have been given to the role of the media and particularly the news media 
in situations of overt conflicts and especially when genocide has taken place and/or 
when grave ethnic antagonisms have arisen. The role of media in internal and regional 
conflicts seems now to be taken more seriously than before. There has been an 
expansion of institutional resources and of political attention devoted to media reform 
and development, above all in areas of actual or potential conflict. IMS is in itself an 
example of this trend. The media within regions of conflict have attracted the 
                                                 
2 As this chapter is intended more as a contribution to an on-going discussion rather than as an 
evaluation exercise it is not followed by any findings as such.  
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attention of human rights organisations, peace initiators, donors and NGOs because 
there have been several examples of how the media have been used to fuel or incite 
conflicts e.g. by broadcasting hate speech and engaging in blatant partisan reporting.  
 
With reference to particularly the infamous role of Radio-Television Libre des Milles 
Collines in Rwanda and the events in the Balkans the following questions have been 
debated among journalists, international peace and human rights NGOs, and among 
politicians and diplomats:  
 
Can the media influence and shape public opinion in times of war? To what extent 
can the media be held responsible for instigating conflict? Can journalism be 
considered as a factor in the causes of conflict? What is the role of journalists in 
covering armed conflicts? Is there such a thing as objective journalism?  And how can 
the media be used for easing conflicts when they either are about to develop, or play 
themselves out? And can media contribute to social reconstruction in the immediate 
period after a truce in an armed conflict?  
 
Such considerations have informed the work of IMS, and they have also influenced 
the analytical framework behind the interventions that IMS engage in. This is evident 
in documents such as IMS Intervention Criteria of Conflict which comprises short 
definitions of criteria for intervention, Intervention Models and an ‘IMS toolbox’. 
This and other IMS documents and considerations have been influenced by the work 
of the Canadian journalist Ross Howard, who wrote the IMS/IMPACS handbook 
Conflict Sensitive Journalism. In this context Howard’s IMPACS booklet An 
Operational Framework for Media and Peacebuilding has served as important 
inspiration. Of particular importance has been the emphasis on the role of media as 
possible peace builders and the development of a conflict- and peace-conscious form 
of journalism. Based on Ross Howard’s work IMS operates with three stages of 
conflict namely “Pre-conflict”, “Overt conflict”, and “Post conflict” and with 
corresponding examples of “Warning Signs” and of “Examples of impacts on media”.  
Based on general reflections on conflict in relation to media and the possibilities for 
media interventions, Ross Howard presents templates of five types of media 
interventions and indications of why such involvement may be necessary.  
 
The appeal of Ross Howard’s model is obvious. It is general, and it is applicable to 
different situations. He should also be credited for being one of the few international 
journalists who have attempted to create practical tools for understanding and action 
in conflicts situations. However, while this is a strength in some aspects it also a 
weakness in other. It is true that Ross Howard emphasises that it is necessary to bring 
local conditions into the analys is when one is to intervene in a conflict situation. The 
model he puts forward, however, also has traits that may be used indiscriminately as a 
tool for understanding all conflicts. It might therefore underplay the necessity of 
detailed analysis and understanding of local conflict settings and the characteristics of 
the media sector in particular societies. This problem is linked to our feeling that the 
three-stage conflict model that Ross Howard and IMS employs is too simple a 
concept of what conflicts imply. In the model that IMS refers in its documents it 
seems that conflicts are the same whether they are violent or not, and regardless of 
what their origin may be. However, it should be noted that the concrete interventions 
undertaken by IMS often are different from the model that is found in the background 
material that is being discussed here. Often it seems to us as if there may be a form of 
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discrepancy between the conceptual framework and what is taking place in the field. 
 
In order to provide a contrast to the three step conflict model, which in no way must 
be seen as the truth in regard to how to understand the relationship between media and 
conflicts, we would as an example like to draw the attention to the way Michael Lund 
perceives different conflicts. He has pointed out that conflicts can be on the one hand 
peaceful and constructive, and on the other violent and destructive. He has presented 
an instructive model of conflict parameters that is reproduced below. 3 Michael Lund 
points out that conflicts may be perceived as going through stages (cp. Figure 1 taken 
from Lund 2002: 3). They may typically encompass a variety of simultaneous facets 
including stable peace in relation to unstable peace; crisis with high levels of tension 
and confrontations, and breakdown of regular political mechanisms; war, stalemates; 
de-escalation or cessation; negotiations of settlements; settlement implementation; 
and post-settlement reconstruction and reconciliation. And several of these 
characteristics often occur at the same time. Conflicts are not unilinear phenomena.   
 
One of the problems with employing too simple a model is that there often might be a 
situation where different aspects or stages of a conflict occur simultaneously and that 
the intervention must take this into consideration. We are particularly critical of the 
concept of “pre-conflict” which seems to signify all or nothing, and which must be 
almost impossible to make operational. And it is significant that when we analyse the 
different concrete interventions that IMS has been engaged in, this concept has never 
really served any purpose in the reasoning behind the choice of intervening. And 
programmatic documents do not seem to have been the reason for concrete IMS 
interventions. They have been based on concrete analyses of specific situations. It 
nevertheless is a paradox that there seems to be a need in IMS’ thinking for simple 
models that may be put forward in more programmatic statements. 
 
Looking at the dilemmas that IMS is faced with in relation to the choices it has for 
intervening or not, it seems that rather than viewing the development of conflict in 
three stages with parallel indicators to what happens in relation to the media, IMS has 
been acting on a model that involves various combinations of the variables armed 
conflict and threatened media, and that this forms the parameters for IMS’ decisions.  
 
 
                                                 
3 Lund, Michael: “Media as an Instrument for Managing Conflicts and Building Peace – When is it 
Most Effective?” Outline of paper presented at workshop sponsored by Swisspeace, June 25, 2002. 
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Figure 1 Basic intergroup-relations in society  
 
It is possible to illustrate the factors that IMS encounters in relation to the many 
challenges it has faced in its actions through the tables 1 and 2. The tables indicate 
that there is a need for there to be a threat to the media as well as a degree of conflict 
for IMS to consider intervening. Later in the evaluation report (p.48), we have 
invested the different IMS interventions in these tables. One important aspect of our 
way of looking at the parameters for what constitutes conflicts that may call for 
interventions, as defined in the mission of IMS, is that the conflict has to involve 
organised armed violence. It is not sufficient that there is a situation of even serious 
contradictions in a society as long as they do not involve organised violence. The type 
of high incidents of violent crime, found for instance in South Africa, is not a 
sufficient reason for intervention. 
 
 
Conflict 
Media 
Threat 
Armed conflict Not armed conflict 
Media threatened Yes Yes 
 
Media not threatened Yes No 
Table 1 A simple model of IMS interventions   
  
 
Cooperation 
 
Peaceful 
conflict 
 
 
Competition 
Inter-group 
relationships 
 
Conflict 
 
Violent 
conflict 
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IMS might intervene in all situations that represent combinations of these variables 
except the one represented by the lower right hand box. 
 
 
Stage of  
conflict 
Media  
threat 
Escalation/intensification 
 
 
“pre conflict” 
Full-blown 
armed conflict 
 
“overt conflict” 
Reduction/ 
Resolution 
 
“post conflict” 
All media 
threatened 
 
 
 
  
 
  
Some media 
threatened 
  
 
 
    
Media not 
threatened 
 
 
   
Table 2 A complex model of IMS interventions   
 
This table is more complex and provides the opportunity for reflections on when 
intervention is essential, but also possibly very difficult, e.g. the top box in the middle 
column would leave little scope for intervention, or not so important, e.g. the lower 
right hand box might seem to give only a weak case for intervention. Under media 
threat, we are referring to private media, whether commercial and not. 
 
Forms of journalism, conflict conscious reporting and monitoring 
One of the most difficult issues in relation to the role of media in conflicts is the 
potential contradiction between on the one hand professional journalism and what in 
some instances has been called peace journalism. On the one hand one finds 
representatives of mainstream media and press organisations insisting on the 
professional role of journalism and the objectives and ethics associated with this role. 
On the other hand there are peace-conscious activists and communicators who have 
maintained that it is the duty of the media to report from the perspective of what 
serves the easing of tensions and the building of peace. This may ultimately imply the 
censoring of coverage of events that might incite further conflict, and the playing 
down of the reporting of issues that are central to the conflict situation. So-called 
peace journalism may introduce parameters for reporting that go beyond professional 
ethical standards and possibly imply forms of self-censorship and undue peer control.   
 
Within the configuration of professional reporting and peace journalism, there is a 
third term, which often is being understood in a number of ways, and that is conflict 
conscious reporting. Properly understood this entails an attitude to professional 
reporting, which involves more than the superficial conflict reporting where the 
emphasis is on the bare day-to-day events, the most spectacular and clear issues. 
Instead it involves a form of process oriented reporting that explains the background 
to the crisis, shows its many aspects and its often contradictory nature. This is a form 
of reporting that presupposes considerable background knowledge. This journalistic 
practice is important to analyse and to evaluate properly for its contributions to peace 
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processes. Such analyses must be based on specific experiences and concrete cases. 
We are aware that this may be extremely difficult to do because impacts of such 
activities may only be manifest after considerable time, and that reporting of this kind 
will also only be one of many factors that may have contributed to change in attitudes. 
It should be noted that IMS in its activities have insisted on working within the 
concept of conflict conscious reporting rather than from the perspective of peace-
journalism. This is an area where IMS may be said to part ways with some of the 
implications of what is found in some of Ross Howard’s writings.  
 
Media may contribute towards peace building in situations of grave conflicts by 
addressing issues concerning peace and conflict. This will include reporting that 
improves the concrete and local knowledge of the causes of conflict, inter-ethnic 
understanding, discrimination, truth commissions and war crimes. The attempts to 
create a better atmosphere by reporting on truth and reconciliation processes are 
examples of such attempts. The aim of such reporting is to provide incentives for 
changing attitudes, enabling societies to deal with the past and build a common future. 
This is not necessarily the same as building democratic media, but it may serve as an 
important initial step in the direction of the development of democracy. 
 
The media may influence the process of deescalating a conflict by providing non-
partisan news and reports that try to present news from more than one angle. Thus 
they may create alternatives to the partisan views of other biased media that fuel 
conflicts by transmitting false images or propaganda. This is, however, extremely 
difficult particularly when a conflict is escalating.  And it is important to bear in mind 
that such activities are not apolitical or neutral. Those who are in power and have 
interests in furthering the conflict would regard media that took such a line as taking 
sides. The actors in the media and peace-building sector need to clarify the role they 
attribute to journalists and other communicators. This has consequences for project 
design in the short-term perspective as well as for the long-term orientation of the 
media sector. This is equally valid for any additional tasks journalists might or might 
not take over, for example mediation, facilitation or practical local peace building. 4 
  
In a situation of intensification or deescalation of a conflict, the media typically can 
influence the situation by fostering tolerance and informing about different opinions 
and views (including the views of the “others”), and contribute to knowledge about 
politics, local concerns and conflict issues. The situation in Sri Lanka may be seen as 
an example of this. Particularly in a situation when a country is moving out of a 
conflict and there are efforts to move away from an authoritarian system to 
democracy, the role of the media would typically be to build well- informed and 
unbiased opinion, and enable people to take care of and decide on their own issues. 
Ideally the situation in Somalia might move in this direction even if it has a long way 
to go.  
 
An important tool for organisations that has as their aim to support democratic media 
                                                 
4 The situation in former Yugoslavia is often referred to, and Mark Thompson who is one of those who 
has written with greatest insight on the role of the media in conflict situations has analysed the situation 
there. He does this in the excellent book   Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and 
Hercegovina, (University of Luton Press (1999)) which analyses the role the media had in the 
destruction of Yugoslavia, by creating and fostering conditions which paved the way for war. 
C M I  
 13 
and to investigate the role of the media in conflicts is to monitor media development. 
The term, however, covers two very different forms of activities. One form of 
monitoring involves recording examples of media oppression, attacks on journalists, 
and on the media in which they work – be they perpetrators, authorities or warring 
parties. This is done systematically by local organisations devoted to media freedom 
or by special monitors that have been given the task to report on such violations in 
times of conflict. The next step in the process is to disseminate the information as 
widely as possible through alerts. This work is often performed by regional and 
international organisations whose aim it is to defend freedom of expression. Examples 
of organisations that send out such alerts are Media Institute of Southern Africa 
(MISA) and IFEX.  
 
The other form of monitoring is quite different. It is an activity that is closely related 
to the content analysis that is an important part of contemporary media research. It 
involves analyses of how the media cover specific issues over time and draw 
comparative conclusions about this coverage both in a long-term perspective and in 
the difference between the various media. The methods used are both quantitative and 
qualitative. They are based on surveying representative selections of large amounts of 
material and of close readings of select items. In relation to the coverage of wars and 
armed conflicts such monitoring aims to find out whether the media change the 
coverage as the conflict progresses, whether they favour one part over the other, what 
kind of images are being transmitted, what kind of characteristics are being used 
about the warring parties, what sources there are for the news, what methods the 
journalists use in newsgathering etc. It is obvious that if this sort of monitoring is to 
be comprehensive it is rather elaborate, costly and time-consuming research. 
However, a certain impression may be garnered from more limited exercises. Often 
there is not enough appreciation of the amount of resources that are necessary for 
proper content monitoring.  
 
With the limited resources that IMS has at its disposal it is obvious that it cannot 
contribute in any great scale to media monitoring of the second kind. However, it may 
serve as a catalyst for starting media monitoring processes of this kind. They are often 
important tools both for understanding how conflicts develop, and how the media act 
in relation to conflicts, as well as providing insights into creating new forms of proper 
conflict conscious reporting.  
 
Time frames 
As the usual context of media in peace and conflict is a country or society in violent 
conflict (latent, ongoing or shortly after the cessation of violence), the role of the 
media can work along two timeframes: a short- and medium-term perspective, or a 
long-term perspective. The first refers to initiatives between a few weeks and up till at 
most one year, while the latter applies to the development of projects that normally 
run longer than two years. A medium-term perspective might be defined as any 
intervention that lasts from one till two years. However, there is no exact boundary, 
and there is a zone of overlapping between these time perspectives. It should be 
mentioned, however, that particularly in situations where conflicts are in the process 
of “reduction/resolution” or the threat to the media is in the form of an oppressive 
regime that fears for its ability to stay in power, medium-term interventions might 
prove more relevant than short-term actions. Examples from the IMS portfolio may be 
Chechnya, Somalia, and Liberia.  
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The mandate of IMS is to work in an extreme short-term perspective and this is a 
limitation on some of its activities, as there may be examples where a somewhat 
longer time frame would have contributed to a more lasting impact of the 
intervention. This is particularly the case where the situation is such that long-term 
support and commitment is needed and it is for different reasons difficult to find other 
donors to follow up the IMS initiative at short notice. A good example of this is in 
relation to the IMS intervention in Somalia and perhaps even the Sudan.  
 
In the short- and medium-term perspective, the role of professional media is mainly to 
provide non-partisan news, report and analyse contexts of the conflict and its 
background factors, gather different views and opinions, focus on specialised peace 
and conflict issues, ensure conditions for receiving and imparting information, create 
a platform for all people to voice opinions, prevent the incitement of conflict through 
hate messages. The role of the donors in such a situation is in a short-term perspective 
to assist victims and refugees, to lay the ground for media organisations and thus 
prepare the ground for a sound media sector development in the long run. They 
should contribute to training and thus raising professional standards.  
 
In the long-term perspective, the general role of media in democracies comes into 
focus. This involves laying the ground for the development of structures for free and 
independent media and thus establishing a sector that provides a free flow of 
information ensuring that citizens have the opportunity to make informed choices 
about their future, as well as to provide a watchdog function. In this context there is a 
need for long-term media development support of the kind that IMS is not the right 
organisation to provide.  
 
Choices, outputs and impact 
For all media development initiatives the selection of the right partners is a major 
challenge, especially in countries of conflict. There are no general answers to the 
crucial questions: Which are the right media to support? Who has the potential of 
surviving in the long run without donor support? How to decide on partners in a 
different cultural setting with different models of the role of journalism? How to 
avoid relying on gatekeepers? However, the analysis and inventory of the media 
sector, due before the initiation of every major media activity, should at least provide 
better insight into the local actors and thus help to clarify the larger picture of actors, 
their interests and goals. As IMS is a global organisation this point is a formidable 
challenge, as it is easy to be drawn into situations where one has to trust second hand 
information from people who often have vested interests in the situations that IMS 
might intervene in. This is, however, a challenge that all organisations are faced with,  
and in general it is our impression that IMS in its short existence has been remarkable 
successful at identifying suitable and reliable partners.  
 
One of the most important conclusions in the Report on Media and Peacebuilding. 
Concepts, Actors and Challenges (2002) from the Swiss Peace Foundation is that 
there is a need for quality evaluation of media assistance projects and their impacts. 
The report points out that very little conceptual work on media impact has been done. 
The media support sector requires more in-depth research and improved evaluation 
methodology. Many project reports simply describe quantitative results or outcomes 
and lack data on audience, as well as qualitative indicators. They typically concentrate 
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on outputs such as number of people trained, booklets distributed etc., rather than on 
assessment of impacts that are indications of changed conditions. This is also the case 
with the reports provided by IMS. For all organisations working within the area of 
media support, but particularly for those that concentrate on conflict and freedom of 
expression work in a more short term or alert perspective, it is necessary to foster 
impact measurement in strategic projects.  
 
Projects aiming at contributing to peace building often require better links or 
orientation to the overall peace building strategy. They sometimes target minor issues, 
not the core problems of the conflict. We are aware that this is difficult to do, and 
particularly in a situation where rapid response is required there might no t be 
sufficient time to first identify the peace building strategy, and then to clarify how the 
media projects can fit into such an overall framework. This is a formidable challenge 
as it is very difficult to do proper work with media in full-blown conflict situations.  
 
One of the challenges to media initiatives in relation to peace building activities and 
plans is that in many cases the media initiatives take part outside an overall strategy 
for peace. There are several reasons for this. Maybe the most important is that the 
media will have two agendas in relation to a conflict. The first is that the media are to 
cover the conflict independently and not get involved in the agenda proposed by any 
of the actors in the conflict, including those that further a peace initiative. The other 
may be that some media side with one or more of the parties and thus are difficult to 
bring together in some sort of concerted initiative. Yet another reason is that media 
are often looked upon with suspicion by those who are engaged in the peace process 
and they are kept at arms length and only utilised to disseminate the information that 
the peacekeepers and the humanitarian organisations have an interest in. A third is 
that those working for media as a tool in the process of conflict solution have another 
agenda than the main actors in the peace effort. The lessons to be learned from the 
role of different media and actors in the conflicts in the Balkans are very interesting in 
this context.  
 
An important aspect of peace building and conflict resolution is to identify the proper 
means of communication with the local population. In much of what has been written 
on media in conflict situations the focus has been more or less solely on news media 
and journalism. It is important to be aware that also other forms of media content than 
news play a role in shaping people’s minds and attitudes. This is the case 
entertainment of all kinds, music, TV and radio shows and fiction. But it is also 
relevant to take into consideration that there are societies where there hardly exist any 
media in the sense that are associated with journalism. And this is particularly true for 
print media. In such circumstances it is necessary to find other communication 
channels, for instance through NGOs and local associations of all kinds. The situation 
in Southern Sudan is an obvious example from the IMS portfolio. And it is always 
important to remind oneself of that in Africa radio is the most important mass 
medium. This aspect obviously has to with the need to identify target groups and 
audiences when one decides to use media for conflict intervention. There is a 
tendency in the literature on the issue to concentrate on the situation of the media and 
the people working in them rather than on the audiences and their interests and 
concerns. 
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For an organisation such as IMS and those it cooperates with, it is important to be 
aware of the often very complex organisational and strategic aspects of peace building 
operations.  If media initiatives are to be of value they must be integrated in a larger 
context. The lessons learned from the interventions in Ivory Coast point in this 
direction. It seems that there is a need for more principled reflections around this 
issue. As a first step, it would be useful to create indicators for how media and media 
support initiatives can contribute to peace building. One way of initiating work along 
these lines may be for IMS to enter into closer cooperation with the prominent Nordic 
peace and conflict research institutions (PRIO, PADRIGU) with the aim of trying to 
work out indicators and parameters for analysing this.  
 
Until now, only a few efforts have been made to draw lessons from successful media 
assistance for peace building.  But maybe the experiences from concrete analyses of 
media in violent conflicts are that it is not easy or indeed useful to isolate the support 
for media as peace building tools from a more long-term principled strategy for 
building democratic media.5 This implies to struggle for laws and regulations that 
protect media freedom and freedom of expression; to support the development of 
professional standards and ethics in the media, but particularly in journalism; 
strengthen the organisational capacity of the media (trade unions, media councils 
etc.); support independent media and the transformation of state broadcasters into real 
public service institutions. Consequently, to support media that promote conflict 
resolution is to promote democratic media institutions and the principles of freedom 
of expression and information that are the basis for this development. 
 
                                                 
5 See Thompson, Mark: “Remarks in Bern”, 25 June 2002. 
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3 The organisational setup of IMS 
3.1 Relationship secretariat – board – advisory board 
Formal provisions 
International Media Support is organised as an NGO with its office located in 
Denmark. The association is founded by five Danish members, as listed above in 
section 2.1. These five associations are the founding members of IMS, and they 
constitute the permanent members of the board. 
 
Financing may come from both public and private sources, inside Denmark as well as 
outside. It is one of the tasks of the Board to ensure the independence of IMS from 
any influence by the funding sources. The basic grant comes wholly from the Danish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but the Ministry is not represented on the Board, which is 
the common practice as regards Danish NGOs.  
 
The Board, in addition to the permanent Danish member associations, shall also be 
comprised of additional four – five members “who due to their involvement in 
international organisations or institutions are engaged in journalism, publishing and/or 
promotion and protection of fundamental freedoms“. All members, whether among 
the “permanent five” or among the “additional”, are to serve in their personal 
capacity, according to the statutes. All members sit for two years, but can be 
reappointed for additional two terms.  
 
The board is to meet at least twice a year and more frequent meetings can be called by 
the Chair, the Executive Director or by one third of the Board members. Once a year 
there is to be a General Assembly.  Its functions are, among others, “discussion of 
suggestions for work programme, discussion of submitted proposals, and election of 
members of the Board and alternates”. This procedure puts the election of board 
members under the authority of the General Assembly, while “the Board shall make 
all decisions in relation to the admission of new members of the Association”. 
 
The statutes also contain provisions regarding potential conflict of interest issues, viz. 
“(m)embers of the Board shall not participate in the handling of questions relating to 
agreements between the respective Board member/the represented organisation and 
the Association, (…) if the respective Board member/the represented organisation has 
a considerable interest herein, which may be contrary to that of the Association”. The 
statutes do not specify whether agreements that are not contrary to the interests of 
IMS are thus permissible. 
 
The statutes also provide for an Advisory Council. The Council “which is to advise 
the Board in respect of questions which relate to media assistance provided by the 
Association and ensure coordination with other international initiatives within this 
area”. The Council is to meet once a year and is to be convened by a Coordinator. The 
Convener “may be invited to participate in the meetings of the Board, but without 
voting power”.  
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Finally, the statutes provide for a Secretariat: “To manage the day-to-day running of 
the Association, the Board shall employ an Executive Director. The Executive 
Director shall keep the Board informed about the day-to-day running of the 
Association. A secretariat shall be established which on the basis of a network of 
media experts shall be able to carry out assignments on behalf of the Association”.  In 
the day to day running of operations, the association is bound by the signature of the 
Executive Director. There are further provisions on financial management wherein the 
Board is legally responsible for the audited accounts of the association and signs off 
on them collectively.  Provisions also exist for the amendments of the statutes and for 
the dissolution of the association. 
 
These are the formal statutes, but practice may sometimes depart significantly from 
formal provisions. In the following, we shall look at some key points. 
 
The composition of the Board 
The board is composed of five permanent members, representing five different Danish 
associations. There are the employers’ and workers’ organizations represented, not 
unexpectedly. Mogens Schmidt represents the Danish Publishers Association and is 
also the Assistant Director General of the World Association of Newspapers. As he is 
about to take up a position with UNESCO in Paris, he will be replaced by another 
representative of the publishers. Mogens Blicher Bjerregård is the representative of 
the Danish Union of Journalists in his capacity as Chairman. There is the premier 
educational institution and there is the premier national human rights institution, 
probably because an association like IMS working on conflict and freedom of 
expression would benefit from having a human rights centre on the board. Kim Minke 
is the Director of the Danish School of Journalism and Birgit Lindsnæs is the Deputy 
Director of the Danish Centre for Human Rights. However, the fifth member, Baltic 
Media Centre, is not an institution in the sense of the other member associations, but a 
media training and production company. Simon Holberg, current Director of BMC is 
a new member of the Board, replacing Bent Nørby Bonde, the former Director. We 
have learnt that BMC came to be represented on the board for historical reasons. It 
was involved in the preparatory work, but, also, at some point, sceptical towards the 
setting up of IMS as it thought IMS objectives might as well be handled by BMC 
itself. There is thus a danger that it may see itself as a competing organization and not 
as an institutional backbone of IMS. It is clear that at the outset some board members 
saw IMS as a competitor to BMC and thus doubted its rationale. 
 
In addition to the permanent five, there are the non-permanent four which at the 
moment is Sarah de Jong, representing The International Federation of Journalists, 
Andrew Puddephat, representing Article 19, Bhorat Koirala, Chairman of the Nepal 
Press Institute and Director of the Media Services International and Methaetsile 
Leepile, former Executive Director of Southern Africa Media Development Fund. In 
addition, there is the Chair, Torben Krogh, who is also Chair of the Danish School of 
Journalism and Lars Møller, who is a journalist and the convenor of the Advisory 
Council. However, there is only Møller who can be said to be there in a purely 
personal capacity, but as the convenor, he is not a full member of the board and thus 
without voting rights. Through our discussions with board members, it is clear that 
most board members see themselves as representing their organisations.  An example 
of this is that Bettina Peters, representing IFJ, resigned from the board when she was 
no longer with the IFJ, and another IFJ representative replaced her. It is the 
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association with a partner organisation to the IMS, which is the greatest asset of board 
members, and not, it would seem, the purely personal qualities of the individual board 
member. If it were, we might expect to find, say, working journalists and academics 
with no associational linkups. Another point may be the omission of a member 
representing “the FRESTA countries”, i.e. Eastern Europe and the countries of the 
former Soviet Union. It is also seems to us that in view of the IMS mandate there 
ought to be someone on the board with considerable experience of media in conflict 
situations.   
 
One topic, which the board has started discussing, is expanding the revenue base, for 
example by seeking funding from other Nordic countries. This may have implications 
for the composition of the board, either by replacing some of the present board 
members or by extending the list. 
 
The General Assembly 
The assembly is, among other functions, entitled to elect new members to the board. 
As such there was a “brief General Meeting”, as recorded in the April 2002 minutes 
of the Board, to appoint a new member to the Board. Similarly, at the April 2003 
meeting, it was agreed that the GA would convene in June to consider potential 
changes to the board as the two-year tenure of the current board expired in April 
2003. It is not recorded in the minutes that the GA has been convened for any other 
purpose.  
 
The Advisory Council 
The Council, despite its advisory nature, has not met as such in the two-year history 
of IMS. Prior to the launching of IMS, there was a preparatory conference in January 
2001 with many key stakeholders on the international media community scene. The 
conference provided an opportunity to discuss media, conflict and emergency issues 
in general as well as to solicit suggestions and ideas as to what IMS was going to be 
and do.  A follow-up conference was organised in October 2002 on “Emergency 
Assistance to the Media”. A large number of participants assembled in Copenhagen. 
From the discussions the team has had with some of the participants, the fairly free-
form talk shop format was found congenial for discussions with no strings attached. 
Again, none of the participants met by the team thought of the conference as being in 
any way directly advisory.  
 
The Secretariat 
The Executive Director, Jesper Højberg, was hired by the Board after public 
announcement and interviews with potential candidates. The Vice Director, Martin 
Breum, was hired directly by the Board without any public announcement. Finally, 
the Administrative Assistant, Tine Rasmussen, was hired a while later, also after 
public announcement. Finally, none of the members of the Board and the Directors 
could recall any job descriptions having been prepared. The secretariat is in charge of 
the day to day running of IMS. The Executive Director normally consults with the 
Chairman of the Board in the case of doubt about how to act in a given situation and 
with the deputy chairman in the absence of the Chairman. However, some members 
of the Board requested more information on IMS project interventions, basically to be 
informed about developments, and not necessarily consulted.  
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The secretariat of three persons spends practically all its time on project management, 
allowing them little opportunity to think ahead and make strategic choices for the 
future. Evaluation and learning are similarly negatively affected by the overall focus 
on project implementation. There may be a case for expanding staff to allow room for 
these functions.  
 
We would also like to point out that the office the staff has as it disposal clearly is 
inadequate. They work from one relatively small room in the Human Rights Centre. 
When there are visitors and several telephone calls taking place at the same time, it is 
clearly impossible to perform well. The close contact with the Human Rights Centre 
is very positive, but more space is required. 
 
Furthermore, due to the smallness of the staff, consultants do the brunt of the work 
and may be “representing” IMS or to some extent see themselves as “insiders” and 
extensions of the regular staff. We are not sure whether representing can be said to 
imply “speaking on behalf of”. There may be room for clarification about the 
borderline between staff and consultant. 
 
The conflict of interest issues 
As most board members represent associations with which IMS regularly partners, the 
team was keen to find out whether any conflict of interest issues had come up in the 
course of operations so far. It has to be borne in mind that these issues emerge when 
the association feels in various ways pressured into taking action which it otherwise 
might not have or is generally compelled in various ways to act against its perceived 
self- interest. Considering that IMS has worked with most organisations represented 
on the Board, it may be quite possible that such issues may indeed have come up from 
time to time. From discussions with IMS secretariat and board and others, only one 
borderline case was mentioned, concerning Baltic Media Centre’s radio project in 
Afghanistan. According to information received by the team, the BMC used the 
assessment mission to Afghanistan for very specific project planning purposes 
whereas the purpose of the mission, at least for the other members concerned, was to 
be much more exploratory and optional with few preconceived objectives. Hence the 
perceptions of the purpose of the mission may have varied considerably among team 
members, to put it mildly. Apart from this episode, the team has not heard of any 
other episodes, which point in the direction of a conflict of interest, in the sense 
above. Even though board member associations regularly are partners with IMS in 
project execution, we are not aware, through our discussions with board members, 
that this practice has been perceived as a problem. In any case, we would recommend 
procedures established that would clear any ambiguities as to conflict of interest 
issues and, in particular, what is a conflict of interest.  
 
These are some specifications drawn from another organisation: 
· When a board or staff member takes part in a decision in which 
she/he may be unable to remain impartial or maintain objectivity in choosing 
between the interests of the organisation and his/her personal interests; 
· When a board or staff member permits others to use privileged 
information obtained in the course of the organisation’s services for personal 
benefit and use; 
· When a board or staff member or his/her family member has a 
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financial interest, or appears to have a financial interest in the  grant-making or 
contract awarding; 
· When a board or staff member has an affiliation with a grant 
recipient or other conflict of loyalties that may lead to or suggest influence in 
the foundation's decision, even if there is no personal financial gain. 
 
Of course, these specifications speak of personal gain, which in the case of 
organisational representatives may not apply as such, though represented 
organisations may benefit in this way, if not representatives personally. However, 
statutes speak of board members attending in their personal capacity, thus adding to 
the lack of clarity. 
3.2 Working- and decision-making procedures 
In assessing the procedures of the board, it has to be taken into account that the work 
of the secretariat is the most important to the running of the association. It is our 
impression that the role of the board is not that of hands-on management, but rather 
that of an advisory council. There is a close working relationship between the 
secretariat and the Chairman who are in regular contact when the need arises to 
consult the Board about whether to intervene or not or what to do in a given context. 
For many of the other board members, they tend to keep a “low profile” as described 
to us by one of them. They can similarly be consulted if and when the need arises or 
they may function as sources of information or recipients of IMS information that can 
be used for their own work and for their own organisation. The fact that IMS is 
located at the Danish Centre for Human Rights is of importance for the exchange of 
information on an informal basis and we gathered the impression during the board 
meeting the team attended in April 2003 that IMS would still prefer to be located 
inside or in close proximity to the new Danish Institute of Internationa l Affairs. The 
issue of possible relocation was discussed and even though the availability of office 
space is not an issue, being in the academic foreign policy community was considered 
an asset. 
 
As IMS is premised on taking fast action and being flexible in response, a hands-on 
type of board management is probably inappropriate for an association of this type. 
Nonetheless, some board members requested more information about interventions so 
as to continually be briefed about IMS plans and actions. The board does discuss 
interventions, both those undertaken and those at the planning stage and advises about 
whether to take action and what action to take. The minutes of the various board 
meetings attest to this advisory type of work. For many organisations of a certain size 
and complexity, the minutes will only record the actual decisions taken and often 
based on prepared drafts by the management on which discussions centre. The 
minutes of the IMS board meetings in general read like a narrative of what was being 
said by whom during the meetings and thus give a flavour of the range of opinion 
inside the board on specific policy issues and operational choices. The advantage of 
this approach is that it gives the secretariat maximum flexibility. On the other hand, it 
makes it more difficult for the board to accumulate a digest of decisions, which may 
be useful to potential new board members who might want a concise guide as to 
where the association stands and where it is heading. An updated guide or policy 
document may therefore be of use to bring new members quickly on board. As the 
pilot phase is coming to a close, some policy procedures and decisions would 
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probably have to be put down on paper once, assuming that IMS will be continued, 
the association is put on a more permanent and routine footing.  
 
Nonetheless, it was our distinct impression that the board is quite satisfied with the 
work undertaken by the secretariat and that the debate on the general thrust of IMS 
interventions is less contentious today than it was initially. Some of the initial 
scepticism, related to the conflict-sensitive reporting component of the mandate 
appears to have dissipated and also the perception from the publishers’ side that IMS 
might be too close to the foreign policy objectives of the government and in a sense 
“directing” journalists and other media workers on what and how to write. The basic 
contention between the “fundamentalists”, stressing the conflict perspective, and the 
“modernists”, stressing also the freedom of expression perspective, has been fairly 
much settled in terms of a broad interpretation of the mandate. 
 
 There were different perceptions on the general contributions of individual board 
members to the work of the board. The international board members were there as 
points of access to the wider partner network of the IMS, but those representing the 
south were either consulted (or involved) pertaining to their individual country 
(Koirala) or not personally consulted (Leepile). On the other hand, some of the 
permanent five members had less international exposure and might have less to 
contribute in terms of reasoned advice to potential IMS interventions internationally. 
This is an issue that the board may have to work out to ensure that international 
interventions are matched by the best international advice there is. 
3.3 Findings on organisational matters 
· There is a measure of confusion as to the exact role of the General Assembly 
in relation to the board on the election of members.  
· More diversified funding may imply changes in the composition of the board.  
· The board seems to act generally in an advisory way and the Advisory 
Council, which formally should have that role, does not exist as such.   
· Operational decisions are taken by the Executive Director and when the need 
arises, in consultation with the Chair.  
· Board members said to sit in their personal capacity perceive themselves as 
representing institutions. The only regular participant, except for the Chair, 
sitting in a personal capacity is not a full member of the board.  
· Conflict of interest issues are framed in terms of personal gains and do not 
speak of organisational gains accruing from board membership.   
· Regular staff is too steeped in project management to allow room for 
monitoring and evaluation and forward- looking planning. Work performance 
was highly regarded by the board, and confirmed by the observations by the 
evaluation team through our interactions with the staff.   
· There was a request from board members for more regular information on 
IMS activities between meetings.  
· Contentions between board members as to the “real” mission of IMS appear to 
have dissipated over time.   
· Consultants “represent” IMS, but it is not clear whether consultants thereby 
are entitled to speak on behalf of IMS.  
· Job descrip tions for the regular staff are still non-existent.  
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· Minutes of board meetings read more like narratives of what was being said 
than digests of decisions.  
· There is a need for more office space.  
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4 IMS’ implementation modalities 
4.1 The IMS mandate 
According to the statutes, the IMS objective is “to promote peace and stability and 
democratic development by means of strengthening media pluralism and dialogue and 
by promoting the right to freedom of expression and the right to information. These 
objects shall be attained by providing emergency and short-term conflict prevention 
services to media and media organisations/institutions in areas of current or potential 
conflict”. 
 
IMS’ overall objectives are based on several assumptions: 
· freedom of expression is a foundation for peace and stability; 
· media play either an escalating or de-escalating role in conflict; 
· IMS can contribute constructively to alleviating the consequences that a given 
conflict will have on the media; 
· IMS can positively influence media in playing a de-escalating/constructive 
role in a pre and overt conflict situations, especially in contexts where it is 
difficult to initiate long-term media development projects. 
 
IMS says that one of its key principles is to remain neutral. However, in such 
politicised contexts, inevitably some of its activities will be considered controversial, 
such as a Chechen women’s magazine or a project to bring northern Sudanese 
journalists to restricted zones in the South. It is important that IMS be able to take 
these political risks and not be tied to the political considerations of its donors. 
However, in this context it is also very clear that IMS must take into account that they 
may enter into situations where it is extremely difficult to negotiate between what is 
possible to do without coming into conflict with wider political considerations, such 
as those guiding Danish foreign policy. Sometimes an intervention may contribute to 
the escalation of a conflict rather than to ease it. This sort of the tight rope balancing 
acts is a necessary aspect of the work of an organisation that has the advantage of 
being able to act in an immediate and flexible manner. But it presupposes the ability 
to make mature decisions.  
 
IMS defines conflict as “two or more armed combatant groups engage[ing] in violent 
interaction”.6 According to IMS staff and Chair, this strict definition has been 
broadened to include situations where media are under threat, whether or not an 
organized armed conflict is underway. This accounts for IMS inclusion of pre and 
post-conflict stages in its criteria list for intervention.  
 
Some level of criteria has been developed for three IMS stages of conflict (pre-
conflict, overt conflict and post conflict). However, the criteria for pre-conflict are too 
general to be useful in our view. This argument is further developed in the section on 
“Media and Conflicts” elaborated earlier in this report.  
                                                 
6 Quoted from the IMS Intervention Processes document 
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Emergency support 
IMS project documents do not provide a clear definition of emergency support. IMS 
does say that it seeks to prioritise its support to “acute needs in acute situations”.7 
Strictly interpreted, emergency support constitutes support for “life and death 
situations” for individual journalists, media rights/press freedom NGOs or private 
media enterprises. However, the IMS interpretation of this term is broader and 
includes activities that address emergency issues in the longer-term (such as media 
monitoring), or that may prevent or de-escalate an emergency situation, or that 
preserves and strengthens alternative, independent voices in a repressive environment. 
 
Short- term support 
There is no clear definition of what constitutes “short-term support” for IMS. Its 
support is shaped by the circumstances in each country or of each project. In some 
cases, short-term is limited to a “one-off” activity when appropriate such as bridge 
funding or specific assistance to an emergency situation. In other cases, short-term 
translates into multiple activities over a period of several months or even a year.  
4.2 IMS’ framework for interventions 
Generally IMS decides to consider investigating the media context in a country or 
supporting a specific project following an alert or request from a partner organisation, 
board member or donor; or following staff’s personal initiative. From the documents, 
however, it is often very hard to know the origins of a project.  
 
During this pilot phase, IMS says it has adopted a “learning by doing” approach, at 
times knowingly engaging in projects that may not fit within a narrow interpretation 
of its mission and objectives. This said, IMS has developed distinct criteria for its 
work. 
 
Criteria for involvement 
IMS considers the following “checklist” of issues in deciding whether to get involved 
in a country or to support a specific project. These include: 
 
· An emphasis on “low profile” countries (i.e. countries that are “off the foreign 
aid highway” and have “a low degree of media exposure”);8 
· An analysis of the stage of a conflict; 
· An analysis of the media environment and conditions for press freedom; 
· An analysis of the relationship between media and conflict (positive or 
negative); 
· The sustainability of an intervention, i.e. the existence of relevant partners that 
can ensure local grounding as well as regional and international backing. 
 
                                                 
7 From IMS 2001 project proposal. 
8 It seems that the concepts of low-profile and high-profile are not necessarily very useful. Low-profile 
may imply countries that have been “forgotten” by the international press or written off even by 
international relief organisations. And high-profile may mean both high media exposure as well as 
much aid being pumped in. Neither if these sets of categories are indicative for the need for assistance 
to the media in the form of IMS interventions. 
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In addition to the criteria above, more detailed criteria have been developed for the 
three stages of conflict that IMS delineates for its work: pre-conflict, overt conflict 
and post conflict stages. These stages and criteria have (as pointed out in 2.2) in part 
been inspired from An Operational Framework for Media and Peacebuilding 
published by IMPACS and written by Ross Howard, an IMPACS associate and IMS 
consultant.  
 
Monitoring and Evaluation  
Monitoring is carried out by “management” through on-going assessments as an 
activity develops. Evaluation is based on reports written by project implementers, 
which provide narrative accounts of activities undertaken.  In some cases, IMS staff 
observes and participate in an activity, which provides an additional level of analysis 
and evaluation.  
 
IMS staff says they find it difficult to document some of their achievements because 
they are often small (though significant) and often intangible. According to the IMS 
chair, “the weakness of the organisation is that it does not assess over time the impact 
of its activities”.  In many cases, as is elaborated in our case studies below, it is very 
hard to gauge the impact of many of IMS activities and more often than not 
mechanisms are not in place to help IMS measure their achievements.  
 
Budgetary issues 
According to guidelines set by its donors, IMS should not exceed a ceiling of 
USD25.000 (or DKK200.000) for an intervention. Within this spending guideline, the 
IMS project document proposed 20 interventions in its first year of operations and 30 
interventions in its second year. While IMS has been cautious with its expenditures, a 
list of its intervention expenditures between from September 1, 2001 to April 1, 2003 
presented at an April board meeting shows that IMS has surpassed its ceiling in 8 
countries.  
 
However, as the section of this report on “Media in Conflicts” and the following 
section on our “Case Studies” explain, the ceiling may be harming IMS’ ability to 
make a difference in some circumstances. Spending should respond to the needs on a 
case-by-case basis within acceptable parameters. The spending ceiling has become 
problematic because of IMS’ interpretation of an intervention. At the moment, an 
intervention constitutes both a planning and an implementation phase. We propose 
that in special circumstances where additional funding may be difficult to find on a 
short term basis, and where the immediacy of the situation clearly indicates that there 
is real need for further IMS input in order to make the project either sustainable or to 
achieve its goals, IMS should be able to go beyond the ceiling, possibly by entering 
into a second phase of the intervention. Of the cases studied we can think of three 
examples where this might make a difference: Liberia, Somalia and Central Asia. 
 
The spending ceiling has also become problematic because of IMS’ interpretation of 
an intervention. At the moment, an intervention constitutes both a planning and an 
implementation phase. We propose that IMS consider the following project 
management cycle and that budgeting for the planning phase ought to be separated 
out from the implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases. Budgeting for 
evaluations may be incorporated into project budgets. However, in some cases, a 
special additional budget may be required.  
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Figure 2 Proposal for IMS project management cycle 
4.3  IMS’ activities  
According to IMS, “we base our intervention on an understanding of the dynamic of 
the conflict and based on an assessment of what we think we can achieve”.  This has 
translated into the following types of activities: 
 
· Assessments 
As matter of course, IMS hires consultants to conduct a rapid and thorough 
assessment of either the media situation in a country or a specific media-
related project before making decisions about what to support and how to 
support it. Though largely conducted for internal purposes, these assessments 
are made available to a wider audience via the IMS web site and are directly e-
mailed to interested parties. Though these assessments make up an important 
PHASE 1: PLANNING 
· Assessment to 
identify problems and 
recommendations for 
action 
· Develop objectives, 
expected results, 
criteria for success, 
conditions for exit  
· Allocate Resources 
· Develop monitoring 
PHASE 2. EXECUTION 
AND MONITORING 
 
· Engage consultant 
or organisations 
· Execute activity 
· Monitor on-going 
activity 
PHASE 3. EVALUATION 
· Evaluate activity 
· Disseminate results 
· Re-design 
methodology 
· Negotiate next 
phase (exit or 
continuation of 
activity) 
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part of IMS’ body of work, they are used more as a planning tool and are not 
an end to themselves.  
 
In other instances, an assessment is conducted to provide timely and detailed 
analysis, which may not be readily available, to interested NGOs and donors 
in order to compel their commitment to supporting media in that given 
context. These assessments are usually conducted at strategic moment, in time 
for a donors’ meeting on the Sudan or Angola for example. 
 
· Core administration and project funding to media organisations and private 
media enterprises  
IMS provides financial support for running costs (rent, salaries, etc.) as well as 
project activities of both press freedom organisations and private media 
enterprises.  
 
· Equipment provision 
IMS provides financial support for equipment for media organisations and 
private media enterprises. 
 
· Training  
IMS sponsors training in the following areas: 
- Media monitoring (monitoring of attacks against the press) 
- Journalists Safety  
- Conflict sensitive reporting 
 
This training is delivered via workshops, train- the-trainers sessions and on-the 
job training, which includes team reporting exercises and twinning projects 
between local and foreign media.  As part of its training efforts, IMS has 
supported the development and publication of a training manual for conflict 
sensitive journalism.  
 
· Seminars  
IMS initiates and supports seminars mainly intended to shape projects that 
they may consider funding. 
 
· Income generating activities 
Very recently, IMS has taken on a consultancy for a donor in order to raise 
operating funds for itself. For the time being, IMS does not consider this a 
core activity. And it is our opinion that it should not be. 
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4.4 IMS’ role 
IMS has three separate but linked functions:  
 
A donor. In this role, IMS provides funding to an organisation that implements a 
given activity.  
 
 
 
Figure 3 IMS as donor 
 
A donor and implementer. In some cases, IMS works both as a donor and an 
implementer of an activity, taking an active role in initiating an idea for a project as 
well as planning and executing the activity and funding it.  As part of its 
implementing role, IMS continuously seeks to identify and develop suitable 
approaches to short-term assistance.  
 
 
 
Figure 4 IMS as donor and implementer 
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C M I  
 30 
A networker. IMS consults and cooperates with a number of organisations in a variety 
of ways. 
 
 
 
Figure 5 IMS as networker 
 
In order to avoid duplication with existing organisations with similar objectives and to 
try to ensure that its activities are sustained beyond its term of involvement, IMS 
strives, whenever possible, to link up with other organisations in implementing and 
funding initiatives.  
 
IMS and its partners regularly share information and ideas. IMS is often asked to 
comment on their partner’s projects and vice versa.  IMS also creates a platform for 
partners to provide input on IMS activities through a yearly “advisory” meeting (held 
in January 2001 and October 2002).  The October meeting was consistently viewed as 
valuable by those interviewed as an important avenue for like-minded organisations to 
discuss issues of substance. IMS admits, however, that the meeting did not provide it 
with much valuable input on its activities per se.  
 
IMS often provides funds for its partners to conduct activities; plans and implements 
activities with its partners; or identifies “entry points” for its partners.  According to 
Article 19, for example, IMS has been “a useful conduit” to credible groups and 
individuals in such countries as Somalia and Sudan, two countries they plan to get 
involved with once a peace agreement is reached.  For IFJ, IMS identified their safety 
training as a useful tool and enabled the organisation to conduct many more training 
programmes than they had hoped due to lack of funding. 
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Because the evaluators feel that the networking arm of IMS work is its must vital 
function, some detail follows on IMS’ network and its position within that network.   
4.5  IMS’ network of partner organisations  
Currently, IMS partners consistently with at least 18 separate organisations, which fit 
the following categories: a) international freedom of expression and media 
development NGOs working both in conflict and non-conflict situations; b) regional 
and national freedom of expression and media development NGOs; and c) 
governmental and non-governmental donors supporting freedom of expression issues 
and media development. 
 
A detailed list of IMS partners and a description of the nature of their relationship are 
annexed to this report. The list is by no means exhaustive. For example, IMS also 
works with a number of organisations that work on a national level, some of which 
are mentioned in the case studies section of this report. IMS also works with an array 
of individual consultants that either conduct assessments on behalf of the organisation 
or implement activities such as training.  
 
· Freedom of expression and media development organisations 
The list of IMS partners attests to the fact that there are many dozens of 
organisations working in fields related to IMS’ work (i.e. press freedom, 
journalists’ safety, media development and media development specifically in 
conflict situations).  In some cases, aspects of these organisations’ missions and 
objectives overlap with IMS’. Some organisations, such as IFEX for example, 
have a membership base that much resembles IMS’ network of partners.  To our 
knowledge, this overlapping of interests and mandate became contentious in only 
two cases, with the Baltic Media Centre over activities in Afghanistan and with 
the IFJ with regard to work on safety issues. It is our understanding that these 
disagreements have been discussed and resolved between IMS and their partners.  
 
Representatives of the partner organisations we spoke with were divided in their 
perception of IMS’s core activity. Some understood the organisation to be 
working more with media in conflict situations and others saw it as an 
organisation supporting threatened media no matter the context. Some have 
collaborated with IMS in a more “donor/recipient” relationship and others on an 
“implementing partner” relationship. All agree however that IMS’s approach, 
though short-term in scope, is developmental in its nature 
 
· Emergency Funds 
According to the list of IMS partners, there are many emergency assistance 
mechanisms in place.9  Some of these funds may have negligible budgets but all 
are relatively flexible and respond rapidly to requests for assistance.  IMS does not 
duplicate such funds since it does not want to get “caught up in providing support 
to individual journalists,” though it does not exclude such an activity. IMS also 
                                                 
9 There are several other emergency funds not listed above including  the Hellman/Hammett grants 
programme administered through Human Rights Watch; International PEN’s Emergency Fund 
(USD50.000/year); and the The World Press Freedom Committee’s “Fund Against Censorship,” and 
CPJ’s Fund (USD25.000/year) for example. 
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distinguishes itself from these other funds because it works pro-actively rather 
than reactively and because it interprets its “emergency assistance” mandate in 
broader terms.  These other emergency funds can only be an asset to IMS. They 
provide IMS with sources of co-funding or with a choice to leave smaller 
emergency assistance projects to others.  
 
· Danish Organisations10 
IMS has worked with several Danish media organisations in project 
implementation, namely the Danish Association of Investigative Journalists for a 
project in the Ukraine, the Baltic Media Center in Afghanistan and India, and the 
Kristeligt Dagblad and Jyllandsposten newspapers in a twining project with 
Palestinian and Israeli journalists. In general, it is difficult to assess how IMS is 
generally viewed by related Danish organisations. The IMS board members, who 
represent some of the main representative media bodies in Denmark, view IMS in 
a positive light. The October meeting IMS organized last year received 
considerable national media attention.  
 
· Donors 
IMS has a very strong relationship with FRESTA and a more distant relationship 
with Danida staff based at its headquarters. Danida explains this by the fact that 
FRESTA staff is centralised in Copenhagen and Danida decentralised, working 
from local Danish embassies. While IMS has had several fruitful relationships 
with staff at local embassies, IMS would welcome a stronger relationship with 
Danida staff in Copenhagen. 
 
IMS has not directly sought core funding from other donors though it has initiated 
a dialogue with NORAD.  IMS is seeking to target its fundraising activities to 
other Nordic donors and possibly USAID and its sub-unit OTI. It has successfully 
raised funds for several of its activities or partners’ activities from an array of 
donors and NGOs.  
 
Weaknesses in the IMS network 
IMS does not appear to work closely with any organisations working in the field of 
conflict analysis and peace studies in Europe or elsewhere, such as the Peace 
Research Institute in Oslo or the Peace and Development Research Institute in 
Gothenburg. Though IMS is most certainly aware of many of these organisations and 
use their information and have informal contacts with some of them, a closer 
relationship might benefit the conflict analysis aspect of its work.   
 
It would also be useful for IMS to forge stronger links with governmental 
organisations. As one partner stated, “it is not enough to find funders or NGOs to take 
up their activities. In conflict situations, it is very important to have an open dialogue 
with national and international governments. IMS might benefit from getting 
international governmental agencies on board who have the structures to make 
representations to governments that are normally hard to dialogue with, especially in 
times of crisis”. 
 
                                                 
10 We distinguish Danish organisations from other organisations in order to be able to respond to 
specific items in the terms of reference for this evaluation.  
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4.6 IMS’ comparative advantage 
Though aspects of IMS’ mandate overlap with many of its partners, in sum, IMS’ 
comparative advantage comes from its ability to: 
· provide short-term, rapid assistance; 
· act proactively; 
· interpret the needs of media in conflict situations very broadly;  
· have a unique overview of human financial and organisational resources at a 
national, regional and international level in order to implement their activities;  
· spend its budget in a flexible way with few strings attached; 
· work in low profile countries. 
 
As a UNESCO representative put it,  
 
“There are various ways of supporting media in conflict situations. Facilitating 
information on humanitarian aid, implementing media projects that promote 
peace, or reinforcing vulnerable, independent local media. The latter is the most 
sensitive type of work. IMS is “quick impact” but working to strengthen local 
media at the same time. That requires a medium and longer term vision in order 
not to cause harm to the media and not to engage in useless activities. It would 
have been strange had they had not gotten involved in broader media 
development and media rights issues.”11 
4.7 Findings related to IMS’ implementation modalities   
· IMS has aptly and justifiably used its pilot phase to explore its options within 
its mandate. This has resulted in a broad interpretation of its overall mandate 
to include interventions in situations where media are threatened whether or 
not organised armed conflict is taking place. Practice also shows that “short-
term” does not equate a “once off” activity and “emergency” does not 
necessarily mean a “life and death” situation.  
· IMS needs to re-examine and refine its criteria for interventions and its 
definitions of stages of conflict.  
· Though IMS has some mechanism in place for monitoring and evaluating its 
activities, they remain weak and inconclusive. This issue is further elaborated 
in the case studies section of the report.  
· With regard to networking, the list of IMS partners is impressive and 
indicative of IMS’ commitment and ability to work symbiotically with others. 
Its networking function, arguably its most important, has enabled it to achieve 
much more than would be expected from a three-person organisation in such a 
short period of time.   
· The IMS partners that were interviewed unanimously praised IMS for coming 
onto the press freedom/media development scene without “stepping on anyone 
else’s toes”. They have been complemented for being creative, flexible and 
rapid in their actions, having funding available with few strings attached and 
successfully connecting and forging relationships with and between existing 
organisations.  Its comparative advantage over other like-minded organisations 
is clear.   
                                                 
11 Phone interview with Sylvie Coudray. 
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· This said, IMS’ double role of donor and implementer risks hindering the 
organisation’s ability to learn from its activities. As a donor, it does not benefit 
from having hands-on involvement and therefore first hand learning in order 
to develop and re-adjust its approaches. Unless its evaluation mechanisms are 
strengthened, it is not able to learn from the projects it is helping implement.  
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5 IMS projects 
5.1 Analysis of the project portfolio  
As part of the evaluation, the team undertook a classification of all 23 interventions  
undertaken by IMS by the time of the inception of the evaluation, in February 2003. 
The full information has been kept in electronic form. However, to the extent the 
information can be quantified, we have compiled statistics on some of the variables in 
the data set.12 Below are our findings. 
 
About half of the projects (12) have been initiated by IMS.  Other media 
organisations, international or domestic, have initiated the other projects, and at some 
stage included IMS in the planning and implementation process. This shows IMS to 
be quite proactive in its way of working. 
 
Close to 50 per cent of the projects are located in Africa (11).  One fifth of the 
projects are located in Asia (5), a few in Europe (3) and the Middle East (3).  Also the 
Americas (South America and the Caribbean) are represented, with one project in 
each of the regions. Clearly Africa is the dominant region in terms of interventions, 
which is also borne out by statistics on aid flows from Denmark and other 
Scandinavian countries and the number of conflicts on the continent. 
 
Approximately 90 per cent of the cases are reported to be troubled by media 
oppression or security threats to journalists, in most cases a combination of both 
problems.  Censorship, financial constraints and restricted access to information are 
other challenges faced by the media institutions. Clearly media oppression is a very 
significant cause for IMS interventions. 
 
The countries/regions are sub-divided into three stages of a problem, pre-conflict, 
manifest conflict and post-conflict, using IMS criteria.13  All three stages of problem 
are represented in the data, with manifest conflict (10) as the modal category.  Six (6) 
countries or regions are reported to be in the pre-conflict phase and eight (8) in the 
post-conflict phase.  Several cases are difficult to accurately place in the conflict or 
post-conflict category because the intervention may cover a time span in which the 
overall situation changes.  In other cases, like the Horn of Africa, the countries 
included entail both manifest conflict and post-conflict. In other words, only 25 per 
cent of cases represent the potential conflict phase, which implies that the possibility 
                                                 
12 There were some problems in the classification exercise due to the fact that in one case IMS operates 
with a region, Horn of Africa, as both an entity and as interventions in three different countries, 
Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan. In another case a region is referred to as entity for intervention and not as 
separate countries, Central Asia. Thus The Horn of Africa is not included in the classification exercise, 
while Central Asia is. 
13 As we have pointed out in Section 2, we are not happy with the classification of conflict in a linear 
three-stage model. We would have preferred a classification that was multidimensional that we have 
also suggested. However, as IMS utilised the three-stage model we have used this in our classification 
exercise. But we have also inserted the interventions in the two-by-two and the three-by-three table 
proposed in Section 2. 
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of de-escalating conflict has only been tested out in relatively few cases. Clearly, IMS 
acts when the conflict is overt or is headed towards resolution. 
 
The type of medium supported is mostly the private print and TV/radio.14  In a few 
cases also government owned media receive or are planned to receive support.   
Online media are also included in the interventions (Burma and Colombia). As could 
be expected, private media dominate, as they are more vulnerable to oppression than 
state media. 
 
In all cases the target of the IMS activity is journalists and other media workers.  A 
few interventions also focus on the readers and public at large. 
 
The modes of intervention most frequently applied are assessment (12) and training 
(12), followed by organisational support (10) and content transformation (9), 
monitoring (8), direct/indirect funding to a media outlet (8) and safety (8).  The 
remaining modes of intervention are only applied in 10 – 15 per cent of the cases. 
Training is clearly the most common type of intervention, which is not unexpected. 
 
Two dimensions of the data, stage of problem and type of intervention, offer an 
opportunity for cross tabulation and further analysis.   
 
The two most applied interventions, assessment and training, are both primarily 
applied in the manifest conflict and post-conflict phases, 10 and 11 (out of 12) cases, 
respectively.  The 10 instances of organisational support are more equally distributed 
on the stages of conflict variable, with 4 in the in pre-conflict and 3 each in the 
manifest conflict and post-conflict stages. 
 
Content transformation is predominantly applied in the manifest conflict stage.  
Interventions entailing safety training are likewise mostly applied in the manifest 
conflict stage. This again underlines our observation that these types of intervention 
are used when the conflict is all too apparent. Both assessment and content 
transformation may be instruments for heading off potential full-blown conflict by 
timely interventions, but the data, though limited, seem to tell us that these 
interventions occur too late in general for deescalating the conflict, e.g. Ivory Coast. 
 
Monitoring and direct/indirect funding interventions are spread over all the stages of 
the conflict. 
 
Finally, we have compiled data on cases where (a) other organisations have taken 
over IMS initial interventions (at least 10 out of 24) and (b) IMS has followed up with 
a second intervention (at least 7 out of 24). We do think that 10/24 is a very good 
achievement in terms of IMS objectives. 
 
Below are the results of our assessments when we fill in the two tables discussed in 
section 2.2 with the concrete IMS operations. 
                                                 
14 In the classification schemes digital media and new information systems are classified as electronic 
media. 
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Conflict 
Media 
Threat 
Armed conflict Not armed conflict 
Media threatened Iraq 
Israel-Palestine 
Colombia 
Ivory Coast 
DRC 
Liberia 
Chechnya 
Burma 
Indonesia 
Nepal 
Ethiopia 
Haiti 
Angola 
Tunisia 
Sudan 
Belarus 
Ukraine 
Central Asia 
Zimbabwe 
Sierra Leone 
Afghanistan 
Somalia 
Media not threatened   
 
Sri Lanka 
 
Table 3 IMS interventions by media threat and armed conflict 
 
 
Stage of 
conflict 
 
Media 
Threat 
Escalation/intensification Full-blown 
armed conflict 
Reduction/resolution 
All media 
threatened 
 
 
 
 
Iraq 
Israel-Palestine 
Ivory Coast 
Chechnya 
 
Afghanistan 
Somalia 
 
Some 
media 
threatened 
Haiti 
Tunisia 
Belarus 
Ukraine 
Central Asia 
Zimbabwe 
 
 
Colombia 
DRC 
Liberia 
Burma 
Indonesia 
Nepal 
Ethiopia 
Angola 
Sudan 
Sierra Leone 
Media not 
threatened 
 
 
 
 
 Sri Lanka 
 
 
Table 4 IMS interventions by degree of media threat and stage of conflict 
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Based on budget data, we have noted that in eight of our 23 interventions, there was 
expenditure well beyond the DKK 200.000  (approximately USD27.500) ceiling: 
 
Afghanistan  69.913 
Sri Lanka  31.474 
Nepal 50.025 
Middle East 38.652 
Sierra Leone 37.147 
Liberia 31.694 
Sudan 33.296 
Central Asia 49.149 
 
This would seem to indicate that budgets ceilings in general are too low when actual 
expenditure is higher in one-third of all interventions. 
 
Findings in Relation to the Project Portfolio 
· Sometimes IMS seems to be engaged countries, which may be characterised as 
very high profile and thus often also targeted by other organisations and 
initiatives (Nepal, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Israel/Palestine, Chechnya). It is a 
factor that always should be assessed in relation to where to intervene. But it is 
also important to bear in mind that the form of support that IMS provides is 
often not of a high profile character. 
· IMS is willing to take risks, and be experimental and creative. This is a great 
asset.   
· In the documents on the different interventions it is in many cases not possible 
to find out where the idea for intervention originated. 
· In the Sri Lankan case, the reason for intervention is not media threat as such, 
but specific aspects of the post-conflict situation, related to content 
transformation. It is the only case of an intervention where the media is not 
threatened. 
5.2 Case studies 
Before the team reports on the cases that have been identified for closer study, there is 
one observation regarding the planning procedures for interventions that we would 
like to make. The authors of reports or the consultants have been engaged in the 
preparatory work are usually not named in the reports, nor their affiliations. This 
makes it difficult to assess what background the consultants have, but it is also hides 
what their perspectives on and interests in the interventions may be. Consequently we 
strongly recommend that names and affiliations of the authors of reports and other 
consultants should be clearly identified at the beginning of the report. This should also 
be the case when the report has been written by IMS staff.  
5.2.1  West Africa (Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast) 
Rationale for involvement 
IMS involvement in West Africa is complex. It is linked to the close association that 
exists between IMS and the Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA) and its 
Director Professor Kwame Karikari. The three countries where IMS has had activities 
in West-Africa have all been identified by MFWA as in need of support after they 
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either are emerging out of conflicts of extreme violence - Sierra Leone, Liberia; where 
there exists oppression of the media and particularly journalists are under threat of 
being arrested, tortured, killed – Liberia, or where a civil war is going on – The Ivory 
Coast. In addition to the cooperation with MFWA, other IMS partners have been 
involved in the region – IFEX; CAF; MAI; IFJ.  
 
MFWA 
MFWA is in a minor way to West Africa what MISA is to Southern Africa. However, 
it is organised differently. It does not have national chapters, but rather relies on a 
network of regional correspondents that act as media monitors on media abuses in the 
region. It also has a regional Board of Directors, who seems to be very dedicated. A 
meeting of the MFWA correspondents and the MFWA board members took place in 
ACCRA in March 2003, and it gave the impression of an organisation that was 
consolidating and expanding. 
 
MFWA cooperates with the national press unions that are representative bodies, and 
exist in almost all West Africa countries. The journalist associations are of very varied 
influence and strength, and the West African Journalist association was not regarded 
as a very strong organisation. It was among other described as partly dormant, but we 
have had no way of confirming this. 
 
The Ford Foundation funds MFWA with USD500.000 over a four-year period and 
USD150.000 over a two-year period from IBIS. In addition there are some small 
funds coming from other sources e.g. IFEX, IMS for special programmes. IBIS 
supports the regional correspondents, MFWA regional programmes of media law 
reforms, and organisation building.  
 
MFWA is building a network of media lawyers, and is trying to establish a legal 
defence fund.  
 
MFWA is going to undertake a regional study of the labour rights of the journalists in 
the region. The journalists’ association do not function as unions, but rather as clubs. 
This is one of the reasons why MFWA cooperates with the press unions, which are 
seen as more representative than the journalists’ associations.  
 
MFWA is going to be admitted to IFEX as a full member. Currently the cooperation 
with IFEX is channelled through MISA. And it seems that MFWA is paying IFEX 
USD2000 for having its Liberia alerts disseminated through the IFEX network.15 
 
SIERRA LEONE 
IMS has supported a workshop for journalists in reporting on the activities of the 
country’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission in October 2002. Two South African 
consultants with substantial experience from the work of the South African TRC and 
with long experience in working with media in conflict areas conducted the training. 
It is, however, difficult to say whether the project has had any real impact.  There is, 
however, a serious need for training in basic journalistic skills. There seems to be a 
                                                 
15 The evaluation team is to put it mildly a bit surprised that IMS funds provided to MFWA for its 
Liberia campaign is being claimed by IFEX as a contribution to what should be a core activity of IFEX.  
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rather high degree of enthusiasm and hope for improvement in the country, but the 
obstacles seem to be formidable. 
 
LIBERIA 
IMS involvement in Liberia started with support for a workshop in July 2002 on the 
situation in Liberia organised by MFWA and the production of booklet on Human 
Rights Violations in the country from 1997 – 2002, which represented a start of the 
Liberia campaign by MFWA. This continued in the organising by MFWA of a 
programme of media monitoring in Liberia by MFWA, that took off with a workshop 
in Accra in March 2003. Furthermore the project comprises a legal defence fund and a 
safe haven for Liberian journalists in Ghana that have been forced into exile and been 
tortured. The project is financed by IMS with USD20.000 and by CAF with 
USD17.500. This is not sufficient for the implementation of the project. The situation 
for the exiled journalists is particularly critical, and the funds for media monitoring 
are too limited if the project is to continue into the planned election period at the end 
of 2003, when violence is expected to increase. 
 
The support for the monitors from MFWA is limited. There is a very small budget for 
their work, mainly in the form of covering communication costs and other very 
limited forms of support. It is the dedication of the correspondents that must be the 
driving force behind this exercise, and I was impressed by the dedication of the 
participants in the workshop. MFWA is very straightforward in emphasising that the 
work expected of the correspondents was not one, from which they could expect any 
remuneration, but must be based on their commitment to the cause. They receive a 
very small stipend to cover costs, but their living expenses are to be covered by their 
ordinary journalistic activities.  IMS might, however, consider supporting the 
activities of the local Liberian monitors. The other “official” monitors in the other 
countries receive for instance support from IBIS in the form of laptops and other 
forms of input. 
 
There is no money set aside for the correspondents in the case of an emergency. 
 
One of the most difficult challenges in relation to the Liberia situation is the need for 
a safe haven for torture victims, and their rehabilitation. This sort of work is very 
intensive and costly and it also must be followed in relation to securing asylum and 
refugee status etc.  
 
Currently at least ten Liberian journalists are in exile in Ghana, without refugee status 
and a proper residence permit. They have difficulties in finding means of supporting 
themselves and their families. They have not been recognised by the Ghanaian 
Journalists’ Association. Their situation obviously is difficult, and there is a need for 
them to obtain formal rights in Ghana and also to manage to find some sort of work. 
MFWA has plans for a six months’ project with a newsletter aimed at the 35.000 
Liberian refugees in the country.  But this is obviously not sufficient.  
 
Due to the constraints of the ceiling on IMS interventions it is not possible to provide 
more funding for the Liberian campaign though it is clearly needed, and it is difficult 
to find funding for the Liberian activities elsewhere. The situation in Liberia is a very 
forceful argument for raising the IMS ceiling in special circumstances. 
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The Monitoring Workshop 
The monitoring project started with a three-day workshop on media monitoring that 
were conducted by Nick Fillmore of IFEX, and Zoe Titus of MISA. In addition to the 
Liberian journalists two Somali partners of IMS and MFWA also attended the 
workshop. Thus the situation in both Liberia and Somalia was treated in a 
comparative perspective. The workshop on Liberia on Somalia focused on concrete 
matters of how to report, security, modes of work and communication, and 
experiences of the participants from their work. The participants came up with many 
interesting points in the discussions of the experiences and the situations in the two 
countries.  
 
The workshop itself, however, was not properly prepared. The schedule and progress 
for the work was not sufficiently planned. There was too little of a structure to the 
exercise, and much repetition of the issues. There was no prepared material, and 
experiences from media monitoring elsewhere were not utilised properly. Thus one 
must characterise the workshop as more of a seminar where various points were being 
discussed rather than a well structured learning exercise. If this workshop is 
representative of the quality of the workshops conducted by IFEX, it is necessary for 
IMS to enter into serious discussions with IFEX on how to improve the quality of 
their media monitoring training.16 
 
IVORY COAST  
The programme in the Ivory Coast was a joint programme between IMS, IFJ, CAF, 
and MAI. It comprises three inter- linking components: a safety training course, 
journalism and conflict seminars, and the facilitation of production and publication 
resources for independent print media. It was financed so that IMS and CAF together 
provided the bulk of the funding. The main implementers of the programme were IFJ 
(safety training), CAF (assessment and various logistics), and MAI (assessment and 
seminar facilitation).  
 
The evaluation team appreciates the urgency of the situation in the Ivory Coast. The 
tension is constant, and there is a situation of a subdued civil war. One of the main 
problems is that the media were all in some degree linked to the different political 
factions and that the situation was steadily being politicised. Soma analysts contend 
that the rise in hate speech was reaching proportions experienced in Rwanda during 
the period leading to the genocide. Since the onslaught of the civil war, one radio 
station had been burned down and several newspapers have voluntarily shut down 
because their staff are unable to work independently and ethically in the current 
environment. With mainly biased media operating, media is contributing rather than 
to easing the tensions that seem to fuel the crisis.     
 
IMS set out to offer support and encouragement to the silenced, independent media. 
The reports from and about the interventions of IMS may indicate that they were 
undertaken without proper and thorough assessment of an extremely complicated 
situation. IMS admits that the intervention was not as successful as they had hoped. 
They were somewhat disappointed with the training programme offered by the Media 
                                                 
16 The media monitoring training in Liberia was discussed with Jesper Højberg after the fieldwork. He 
had just come back from a similar exercise in Central Asia, and he had made the same observations on 
the quality of the monitoring workshop conducted by IFEX on that occasion.  
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Action International consultant and aspects of the agreement with CAF were not 
implemented as agreed to and planned. Furthermore, according to a post- intervention 
report prepared by CAF, the safety training course did not take the local situation 
sufficiently into consideration. 17  
 
In this case, IMS might not have identified the right partners to work with. Some 
organisations that have good insight into the country, such as PANOS West Africa for 
example which has been implementing a project for the last two years addressing 
ethical journalistic issues, could have been consulted. This intervention raises the 
question of what the relatively limited activities that IMS and its partners undertake 
can contribute in an over conflict situation and what sorts of interventions are most 
appropriate during this stage of a conflict.  
 
Findings 
· MFWA is an important and professional partner organisation for IMS. The 
contact should be strengthened.  
· It is difficult to assess the impact of the Sierra Leone intervention. There is a 
need for evaluation. 
· Liberia is a country where there is a critical need for the kind of support that 
IMS is supposed to provide. The project there is a forceful argument for 
raising the ceiling on IMS interventions. 
· IMS must conduct a proper evaluation of the workshops that it lets partner 
organisations undertake. In this case IFEX.    
· The partners chosen for the Ivory Coast intervention did not perform to IMS’ 
satisfaction. The lack of consultation with other organisations with a history of 
involvement in the Ivory Coast may have also weakened the planning and 
design of the IMS intervention. The lack of clarity around impact of the IMS 
intervention in the Ivory Coast raises the question of what effect IMS has had 
on the media situation there and what interventions are best suited for an overt 
conflict stage.  
5.2.2  The Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan) 
ETHIOPIA 
 
Rationale for involvement 
IFJ and IFEX asked IMS to consider providing bridge funding to one of its members, 
the Ethiopian Free Press Journalists Association (EFPJA), until IFEX was able to 
raise additional finance for the organisation. Lack of funding threatened the closure of 
EFPJA’s newly established offices. IMS agreed to provide this support following 
Jesper Højberg’s meeting with the EFPJA’s President, Kifle Mulat, at an IFEX 
meeting in Dakar in 2002.  Subsequently, IMS has become better acquainted with the 
organisation through Martin Breum’s visit to Ethiopia in December 2002. 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 The IFJ safety training has been similarly criticized in Israel/Palestine and IFJ and IMS have taken 
some steps to better adapt the interventions to the local context. 
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Activity 
IMS provided USD5000 to the EFPJA to cover rent, utilities, and salaries for a six-
month period. The funds were not earmarked for any particular activity.  
 
Sustainability 
IFEX has raised USD16.000 which will enable the EFPJA to continue its activities 
and maintain its office space.  The fact that IFEX has been able to step in with funds 
once IMS’ funds dry out assures the survival of EFPJA and the continuation of IMS’ 
investment at least in the immediate future.   
 
SOMALIA 
 
Rationale for involvement 
IMS’ involvement in Somalia was prompted by its interest in developing a regional 
programme for the Horn of Africa along with the MFWA,18 following an IMS 
mission in Sudan in June 2002 (see Sudan section below). IMS justifies its 
involvement in Somalia because it is a “low profile” country that receives little 
foreign aid and little international media attention. It is a country in a stage of conflict 
that is difficult to describe aptly19 with a relatively vibrant independent media, which 
work in difficult circumstances due to threats from various armed groups and 
occasional repression from the transitional government (namely its attempt to pass a 
repressive law last year).  
 
IMS’ activities in Somalia 
IMS’ overall objective in Somalia is to develop and support “protective” measures for 
independent media enterprises and journalists given the anarchic environment in 
Somalia. The activities’ primary targets are independent media organisations through 
support to the East African Media Institute – Somali chapter (hereafter referred to as 
EAMI-S).20  
 
IMS has engaged in the following activities. To date, the total amount of funds they 
have invested in activities in Somalia total USD10.974. The fact-finding mission to 
Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia totalled USD13.763. 
 
A general  assessment of the media environment. 
Martin Breum and Professor Kwame Karikari travelled to Mogadisho in December 
2002 along with Abdulahi Haider of NOVIB’s Somalia programme. This assessment 
was part of a broader regional mission to Ethiopia and Sudan with the goal of 
identifying “options for short-term support for national initiatives to promote 
independent journalism and for related professional exchanges between media 
communities in the Horn of Africa”.   
 
                                                 
18 Professor Kwame Karikari, MFWA’s Director, has a long time interest in the situation on the Horn 
of Africa. This interest has resulted in good contacts with important actors in all the countries of the 
Horn.  
19 IMS’ partners in Somalia view the situation in their country as “an anarchic state of peace” rather 
than an overt conflict.  
20 The East African Media Institute has chapters in several East African countries. The regional entity 
was established several years ago primarily with UNESCO funding. EAMI is largely inactive as a 
regional body though some of its chapters, such as the one in Somalia, are active. 
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Support to EAMI-S 
At the start of the year, IMS provided about USD9180 to EAMI-S which covered 
mainly activity-related costs for the following:  
 
· Lobbying for constitutional reforms  
IMS supported the initial steps of a lobbying campaign by EAMI-S at the Somali 
peace talks (taking place in Kenya) for the inclusion of a media clause on freedom 
of the press and freedom of expression to be included in a future provisional 
charter for Somalia’s transitional administration.   
 
Two EAMI representatives spent a month (from early February to early March 
2003) at the peace talks in Nairobi and distributed a draft media clause to many 
key Somali and international delegates, including the chair of the IGAD 
Secretariat21 which is hosting the talks.  This draft clause was prepared by EAMI-
S with the help of the Somali Bar Association and ARTICLE 19. EAMI-S also 
lobbied, with the support of the IFJ, the chair of IGAD to grant EAMI-S delegate 
status, which they have yet to receive.  
 
· Media monitoring activities 
IMS supported the attendance of Mr. Abdulkadir Walayo, EAMI-S’s coordinator, 
and Mr. Ahmed Abdisalam, owner of Horn Afric Radio and TV22 and member of 
EAMI-S, at a media monitoring training programme in Accra, funded by IMS and 
organized by MFWA (see section on West Africa for more details). This support 
is part of IMS’ broader objective to help EAMI-S develop a media monitoring 
mechanism in Mogadisho.  IMS will consider funding a follow-up proposal for 
continued lobbying activities at the peace talks and for media monitoring 
activities. EAMI-S plans to organize two workshops on how to report violations 
and distribute alerts and to strengthen its network of monitors and correspondents 
throughout the country, including Puntland and Somaliland. 
 
IMS has been closely monitoring developments with EAMI’s activities through 
regular telephone contact and frequent updates via email. An EAMI-S activity 
report will serve as a main evaluation tool for this project. 
 
Sustainability 
Both NOVIB and UNESCO are supportive of IMS’ current activities in Somalia and 
have agreed to consider support to a second phase of EAMI-S’s activities. Following 
their mission to Somalia, IMS drafted a memorandum of understanding with NOVIB, 
which spells out  the terms for a partnership between the two organisations, which has 
gone unanswered.  
 
Despite their show of interest, the possibility of funding from NOVIB and UNESCO 
remain very tentative because press freedom issues are not explicitly part of their 
programme objectives in Somalia.   
 
                                                 
21 IGAD stands for the Intergovernment Authority on Development, a regional organisations 
comprising of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. 
22 Horn Afric is the more established independent radio and television station in Somalia. 
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There is a discussion underway to involve EAMI-S in a multi-year, EUR1.5 million  
BBC training programme. Their involvement in this project has been prompted by 
IMS’ contact with the BBC and the Danish Embassy in Nairobi, which has pledged 
funds for the project.  
 
SUDAN 
 
IMS’ rationale for involvement  
IMS decided to get involved in the Sudan because of signs that the peace process was 
beginning to produce some positive results. The media, especially in northern Sudan, 
operate under the control of an authoritarian regime and in general, little attention has 
been given to media development in the country by international organisations. The 
willingness of an IMS partner, Dan Church Aid, to facilitate an IMS mission last year 
created a perfect opportunity for a first assessment. 
 
IMS’ activities  
The overriding immediate objective of IMS in Sudan is to create links between 
Sudanese media and the broader freedom of expression community in order to 
embolden and strengthen local efforts to defend media rights issues. With the 
encouragement of its local partners, IMS has undertaken an assessment to propose 
short and long-term media development strategies for the country’s peace-building 
phase.  
 
In total IMS has invested about USD14.589 in the following activities: 
 
Association Building 
Last year IMS recommended assistance for the development of an association of 
newspapers in northern Sudan. Through the World Association of Newspapers, IMS 
identified a consultant who could provide input on association building to relevant 
Sudanese partners. This project is on hold until plans for the association come to 
fruition. Despite the interests of well-respected Sudanese editors to launch this 
initiative, the continued lack of commitment of the majority of Khartoum-based 
newspaper owners to participate in such an association has frustrated its development.    
 
Enhancing capacity for monitoring abuses against the press 
In November 2002, IMS provided funds for Mr. Kamel Labidi, a freelance journalist 
and media rights activist based in Cairo, to develop a three-day media monitoring 
training programme in cooperation with the Khartoum Centre for Human Rights and 
Environmental Development (hereafter referred to as the Khartoum Centre), a leading 
human rights organisation linked to the London-based Sudanese Organisation Against 
Torture (SOAT). The participants consisted of members of the Centre’s informal 
network of young journalists, called “Journalists for Human Rights,” concerned with 
human rights and journalistic issues.   
 
From IMS’ perspective, the central aim of the activity was to widen the circle of 
individuals who have the capacity to monitor abuses against the media with the aim of 
strengthening the Centre’s existing network. IMS prioritised this activity because of 
the belief that the most effective tool currently available to protect and defend the 
media in Sudan is to bring international pressure to bear on the current government to 
change its treatment of the media. IMS argues that reliable and consistent information 
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about abuses against the press shared with the wider international freedom of 
expression and human rights community will help garner this external pressure.  
 
According to the Kamel Labidi and Faisal Elbagir, the Khartoum Centre’s media 
officer, the training was significant because it was the first time the Centre organised 
a meeting focusing specifically on media issues, instead of broad human rights issues. 
The workshop exposed the journalists to the international network of freedom of 
expression organisations. It also gave the rare opportunity for senior Sudanese 
journalists who fought for media rights in the 1960s and 1970s, to share their 
experiences with their junior counterparts.  
 
IMS evaluated this activity via follow-up conversations with participants as well as 
reporting from Kamel Labidi.  
 
Promoting reporting from the conflict zones  
Northern-based media have little to no access to conflict zones in Sudan’s southern 
and western regions due to government restrictions and the danger involved in 
travelling to these areas. Most of the information about developments with the war 
and the humanitarian situation in the conflict zones come almost exclusively from 
official press releases.  
 
In late 2002, the British Council’s Khartoum office and an independent consultant, 
Steve Negus (identified and contracted by IMS), organised and conducted a two-and-
a-half day training programme for 9 northern journalists (working for the independent 
print media including the Armed Forces newspaper) with the support of IMS. The 
training consisted of training in “techniques for constructive conflict reporting, 
humanitarian issues and personal safety measures”. This programme was to be 
followed by a trip to a garrison town in the South from where journalists would 
produce articles and establish lasting contacts for their publications for future 
reporting.   
 
The trip to the South did not take place because, at the eleventh hour, the government 
refused the group access to the area despite the Press Council’s (a governmental 
body) support for the activity and willingness to cover accommodation costs for the 
participants during their stay in the South.   
 
Immediate post-conflict media assessment 
At the time of writing, an assessment of short and long-term media development 
needs in northern and southern Sudan is being drafted by a team of consultants and a 
reference group made up of Sudanese media professionals, academics and human 
rights activists from both the North and the South of the country. The USD50.000 
assessment is being funded almost entirely by a consortium of other donors, including 
Dan Church Aid and Pax Christi, who have a keen interest in media development in 
the Sudan in the longer-term but do not specialize in this area.  
 
While IMS’ target group is mainly independent print and broadcast media and its 
journalists, in the case of Southern Sudan, where there is little to no established 
media, IMS has rightly taken into consideration other types of communication 
mechanisms such as theatre, NGO structures, traditional information mechanisms, etc. 
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Sustainability 
IFEX has agreed to offer support to the Khartoum Centre as part of its “outreach 
programme”. The specifics of that support have not yet been determined.  
 
Regional Initiative 
Kwame Karikari has developed a proposal for a regional conference on media law 
reform and other freedom of the press and freedom of expression issues in the Horn of 
Africa. The conference would be organized by the MFWA in conjunction with a local 
organisation and would include representatives of national media organisations in the 
region, individuals and representatives of media rights organisations from elsewhere 
in Africa and internationally. The proposal is currently under consideration by IMS.   
 
IMS partners from Somalia and Sudan that were interviewed maintained that it might 
be too early for a regional conference on the media.  They argued the initiative should 
rather come from the ground when local organisations felt that this would be useful 
rather than as an outside initiative. They emphasised that the situation in the three 
countries were very different, and that the relationship between Somalia and Ethiopia, 
for example, was difficult.  
 
IMS and Professor Karikari admitted that the interest in such a meeting on the ground 
was lukewarm. On the other hand they argue that there was need for some sort of 
universal perspective to be brought into the situation in the region and that creating 
links with international experts on these issues would be valuable to national 
organisations, whether or not they decide to work as a network in the future.  
 
Sustainability 
IMS admits that it would be hazardous to conduct a regional workshop unless some 
donors showed interest at the planning stage of such an event. 
 
Overall Findings for IMS activities in the Horn of Africa  
 
· Rapid response 
IMS has shown that its ability to act quickly with a mixture of fresh ideas, risk-
taking, and funds is invaluable. The value of the support to the association of 
journalists in Ethiopia, for example, was that IMS was able to release funds 
swiftly as a “stop gap” measure, even though IMS concedes that “a smart 
fundraiser may have been able to find money elsewhere”.  Furthermore, the fact 
that IMS follows up its missions with concrete commitments and activities, and 
quickly, increases its credibility with its partners.   
 
In Sudan, IMS designed a provocative programme (given the political context), 
which proposed to bring journalists from North to report on the situation in the 
South of the country. Though the entire programme was not able to go forward as 
planned, the British Council applauds IMS for coming up with the idea and for 
being willing to “push the barrier”. The fact that the Press Council and the 
military in the South initially gave IMS and the British Council permission to hold 
this seminar “was an achievement in itself.“    
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· Broadening of IMS’ mandate 
IMS’ involvement in the Horn of Africa exemplifies how IMS has broadened its 
interpretation of its mandate to include post-conflict scenarios, such as the Sudan, 
and areas where media are being oppressed, whether or not there is an overt 
organized armed conflict taking place such as Somalia and Ethiopia. According to 
IMS, for Ethiopia, “the media oppression angle weighed more heavily than the 
post conflict issue”.    
 
This said IMS also deems it important to be engaged in Ethiopia because of the 
important and detrimental role its government plays in several conflicts in the 
Horn, notably in Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia.  According to IMS, “support to the 
media in Ethiopia can have a direct impact on the potential violent conflict in the 
Horn of Africa”. However, the activities IMS has chosen to pursue in Ethiopia to 
date do not necessarily address that objective.    
 
· Relevance and effectiveness of the activities 
The activities IMS has pursued in the Horn have undoubtedly been relevant to the 
needs expressed by journalists there and to IMS’ broad mandate. The on-going 
assessment of media development needs in Northern and Southern Sudan is 
crucial, unique and timely. An announcement of the report, which was widely 
circulated at a donors meeting for the Sudan held in the Hague in April, raised a 
great deal of interest and media support was tabled as an issue of discussion. 23 
 
However, it is not always clear from IMS’ documents what the organisation’s 
overall objective is in each country, beyond responding to a large spectrum of 
problems faced by the media, and on what basis it believes it can have an impact 
on a particular identified problem, especially concerning the role of media in 
conflict.   
 
· Catalyst and networker 
It can be safely said that IMS’ activities in Somalia and the Sudan have been 
unique and catalytic. Their work in the Horn exemplifies the important catalytic 
role IMS can play in “low profile” countries.   
 
IMS’ success also comes from its ability to rapidly link local organisations such as 
EAMI-S and the Khartoum Centre, to international groups such as IFEX, IFJ and 
ARTICLE 19. These linkages have already resulted in concrete partnerships. 
Kwame Karikari’s involvement in the Horn mission was also considered 
significant because, throughout the trip, he was able to share his experiences with 
others and offer constructive advice, which was greatly appreciated.   
 
· Alternative communication mechanisms 
In some instances, such as in southern Sudan, it is important to take into 
consideration that communication is more than conventional journalism. In 
relation to media and conflicts, it is necessary to take into consideration a broad 
                                                 
23 A Danish MFA representative explained that such a report may have had even more influence with 
donors had it been prepared in time for the start of the donors discussions on support to the Sudan, 
which took place in January of this year.   
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definition of communication and information strategies, and particularly consider 
how to reach different target groups and audiences. 
 
· Impact 
In general, it is very difficult to gauge the impact of many of the activities IMS 
has supported to date in the Horn because the evaluators have no basis on which 
to evaluate them. For the most part, outputs are clear but criteria for success have 
not been developed by either IMS or its partners. Furthermore, IMS largely relies 
on reports from its consultants and partner organisations to assess activities it has 
not directly been involved with. Of course, impact is also hard to gauge when 
many activities are still on-going. Finally, the longer-term effect of many of IMS 
activities will depend entirely on whether they continue  beyond IMS’ 
engagement.  
 
In the Sudan, most of the recommendations proposed during the Khartoum Centre 
workshop were not followed-up. Now that IFEX has committed funds to the 
Centre through its outreach programme, it is more hopeful that some follow-up 
will be taking place. Given the lack of donors in Somalia and the Sudan, unless 
IMS stay engaged in their activities there, their actions may never reap tangible 
benefits in the longer-term. 
 
Here are just two examples of how some of the activities in the Horn could be 
better evaluated: 
 
· In the case of the media monitoring training for the Khartoum Centre, it would 
have been useful to request a detailed report from the Centre and not just the 
trainer. Furthermore, IMS should build into the project provisions for the 
consultant, IMS staff or another relevant individual to make contact with the 
Khartoum Centre and some participants of the training programme to 
understand what has happened since the activity took place. This could be 
done via telephone interviews and via email.  Also, in order to ensure that the 
activity meets its objectives, it is important that prior to an activity, IMS 
develop in partnership with an implementing organisation criteria for its 
success. If the workshop does not meet these criteria it would be important to 
understand why and perhaps how to do it differently in the future.  
 
·  In the case of the large assessment on the Sudan, it would be useful for IMS 
to assess whether it will have achieved the aims it set out for itself. In order to 
understand what impact such a report had, it would be important to record 
from both Sudanese sources and the international community what impact this 
report had in official circles in Sudan and among donors and NGOs. It would 
also be important to get qua litative feedback from the consultants and 
reference group members why they felt the mission was strong or weak. 
Martin Breum should also record what he thinks made the assessment a 
success and what could have been improved on. Since IMS is considering 
replicating this activity elsewhere, the impressions from all these angles are 
vital for IMS to learn how to do what they do better.    
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· Short term vs. long term involvement 
This need for continued engagement raises the issue of how long IMS should stay 
involved in a given country and how many resources it should invest in a given 
country over time. While the answer should ideally be based on a case-by-case 
analysis, stronger consideration for the necessary conditions to enable IMS to exit 
should be given at the start of an activity.  
 
· Budgetary issues 
IMS has spent a total of US$ 39.326 in the Horn of Africa. The total value of 
investments comes to about US$ 95.534 if one includes the funding they have 
received from other donors, in particular for the ongoing assessment in the Sudan. 
(IMS was able to raise US$ 56.127, almost the entire amount for the on-going 
Sudan assessment.) Of the total amount, about US$ 20.748 was spent on missions, 
and about US$ 18.579 on concrete activities on the ground and US$ 60.458 for the 
grand Sudan assessment.     
 
While it is admirable that IMS has achieved “so much with so little,” in our view, 
IMS could, in some instances, consider increasing its grants to local organisations. 
This is especially true here, where IMS’ investments in missions almost equals its 
investments in concrete activities.  The scale should tip more in the direction of 
concrete activities.   
 
In the case of EAMI-S and EFPJA in Somalia and Ethiopia, respectively, a 
slightly larger budget would have given them more “breathing space” and some 
ability to take on activities as the need arises. IMS has limited its support in the 
interest of caution but also due to the budget ceiling currently in place by its 
donors. It is not only important for this budget ceiling to be reviewed but for IMS 
to plan and budget its interventions in a different manner in order to make 
available more funds for concrete activities on the ground.  
5.2.3 South Asia (Nepal, Sri Lanka) 
NEPAL 
 
Reasons for involvement 
The initial entry point of IMS in Nepal is the mission by the Chairman of the IMS 
Board, Torben Krogh, carried out between February 20 and March 2 2002. At the 
time, there was an emergency in Nepal, declared in November 2001 and only lifted at 
the end of August 2002. The major contention, also for the media, was the ongoing 
conflict between the government and the Maoist rebels. The declaration of a state of 
emergency implied the suspension of most basic human rights and also a clampdown 
on publications propagating the Maoist cause or thought or suspected of doing so. 
Although the mainstream media were assured by the Government not to be adversely 
impacted by the emergency, it may be well be that a measure of self-censorship was 
exercised in order to avoid undue attention from the government side. In the event, a 
number of journalists were detained for more or less plausible reasons, registered by 
the monitoring apparatus of the Federation of Nepalese Journalists (and by the Centre 
for Human Rights and Democratic Studies – CEHURDES).  
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Investigative reporting and content analysis 
Accordingly, one of the lines of action suggested by the Krogh mission report was to 
intensify and improve the monitoring mechanisms, to initiate investigative reporting 
into the conditions of the media during the emergency and to seek a dialogue with the 
government and other state organs on better transparency in public affairs. Of the 
three suggestions, the second was followed up fairly soon afterwards with the Centre 
for Investigative Journalism at the Himal Association.  
 
The ensuing investigative stories, which were not primarily on the effects on the 
media of the emergency, but on the public at large, were published both in the 
vernacular as well as in the English- language press. Nepal Times published “The East 
is Red”, a story from the Sankhuwasabha district of Eastern Nepal, “Unfriendly fire”, 
a story of the killing of 17 young men working on an airport runway in Kalikot in 
Western Nepal ostensibly for being Maoist symphatisers. A longer version of the 
same story was also published in the Himal Khabarpatrika, which is a monthly 
magazine of Himal Media. Nepal Times carried further stories later in the year with 
“Famine by February” on the deplorable state of living conditions in Western Nepal 
aggravated by the food embargos and plundering by the warring parties and “Our 
descendants are doomed”, a case of “friendly fire” whereby villagers of an anti-
Maoist resistance group erroneously were shot dead by the security forces. All of 
these stories were written by Mohan Mainali of the Centre, and he also developed the 
Kalikot story into a documentary (The Living of Jogimara) which was subsequently 
shown at the Kathmandu International Mountain Festival. Interestingly, during the 
showing the narrative dropped mysteriously out for 20 seconds, at the spot when it 
was said that the army has opened fire on airfield construction workers. Officially, 
this was a pure technical error though it undoubtedly appeared odd to the spectators at 
the festival. These stories and the accompanying documentary were done under the 
Emergency Watch project with IMS funding. Mainali has more recently, under 
alternative funding, produced another documentary entitled “The Silent Emergency” 
which is also an outgrowth and extension of a newspaper story from the Nepali Times 
briefly mentioned above. 
 
The stories were one leg of the Emergency Watch, the other being a slightly different 
type of media monitoring, not of transgressions against media or journalists, but of the 
actual content of daily newspapers. Emergency Watch was fully funded by IMS. 
Binod Bhattarai, currently in an executive position at Kantipur TV, undertook a 
content analysis of Nepalese dailies during the emergency, covering the period of 
November 2001 – June 2002.24 Space does not allow a discussion of methodology and 
findings, but suffice it to say that this type of media monitoring has an important role 
to play in assessing potential changes in media coverage and attributing such changes 
to identifiable factors, though inherently difficult.  The main findings were as follows: 
(a) Biases in reporting improved somewhat in the period under review, though 
qualitative lapses remained throughout; (b) there were some improvements in the use 
of biased terminology in the period, but none of the papers could be said to fulfil an 
emergency watchdog function though some tried as the emergency wore on; (c) 
noticeable lack of “people” stories and if such appeared, they were one-sided; (d) 
                                                 
24 Binod Bhattarai, Covering the Crisis. A content analysis of six Nepali broadsheet newspapers during 
state of emergency in Nepal . Center for Investigative Journalism, Himal Association, Kathmandu, 
March 2003. 
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deficits in reporting on human rights abuses and inadequate care given to protection 
of witnesses and giving the victims a voice; (e) general lack of understanding of the 
root causes of the conflict and to experiences derived from conflict resolution and 
peace-building; (f) gradual shift from support of government actions towards a more 
critical stance; (g) op-ed writers generally followed the editorial line but often 
opinions were not attributed to identifiable writers.  
 
Monitoring of freedom of expression 
Another recommendation in the Krogh report, to intensify and improve monitoring 
mechanisms (in the other sense of documenting violations against media and 
individual journalists) was followed up by the preparation of a project document by 
the Federation of Nepalese Journalists. The Federation is more than a trade union as 
trade unions in Nepal tend to be organised along party lines. It engages in media 
policy and lobbying on behalf of the profession and it provides welfare services 
through the Welfare Fund to journalists and to dependants in the case of work-related 
death. The project document, submitted to IMS, aims to do monitoring through its 
Press Freedom Monitoring cell as well as advocacy through district-wise interactions 
with concerned journalists as well as nationally. The project is likely to be approved 
with an appropriately scaled-down budget. It should be added that the Federation is 
not the only entity to monitor press freedom or freedom of expression more generally. 
The Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Studies (CEHURDES) publishes an 
annual report on the state of freedom of expression in Nepal, but the president of FNJ 
claimed that their source material often was found at FNJ. 
 
Safety training 
The next set of activities commenced in September with the organisation of two 
training projects, both of which was with the Nepal Press Institute. One was the Nepal 
Journalists Safety Training on 20-21 September. It was conducted by AKE, a 
company specialising in safety training in conflict zones and whose services had been 
used on a previous occasion for Palestinian journalists in the West Bank and Gaza and 
in Ivory Coast, then also co-organised by the International Federation of Journalists 
(IFJ) and IMS. According to a report available to the evaluation team, the participants 
responded with a “resound ing yes” to the question whether they had learnt anything 
new and relevant during the course. The participants were reportedly “enthusiastic, 
took numerous notes, asked pertinent questions and showed their appreciation. The 
information delivered was succinct, relevant and timely”. The team did not have the 
opportunity to meet with participants individually so we have no independent 
assessments of how the training was received. The report was written by Sarah de 
Jong of IFJ who is a board member of IMS. 25 
  
Conflict-conscious journalism 
The other training course was on so-called conflict-conscious journalism implemented 
over three days and divided into separate sessions for editors and senior and mid-
career journalists. The de Jong report provides no information on how the course was 
received which is understandable considering she was co-organising the other 
aforementioned course. There is no mention of this topic or the actual course in the 
                                                 
25 The assessments of the safety training exercises that IMS has been involved in through IFJ (Ivory 
Coast, Nepal, Palestine, Afghanistan) point out that the training did not sufficiently take into 
consideration local conditions and circumstances.  
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earlier Krogh report. However, in Sri Lanka a training course was organised on the 
same topic and with the same consultant, Ross Howard of the Canadian IMPACS, 
some months before and also with IMS funding. Howard filed a report with IMS on 
the training course, which provides some insight into the proceedings. The report 
found that four days of advance preparation time were sufficient to gain 
familiarisation with the conflict in Nepal, leading to the observation that the current 
conflict is “largely ideologically driven rather than based on ethnic and religious 
motivations”.26 The report lists various speakers (and co-organisers) without actually 
naming (all but one of) them, which might have been helpful. Some length is given to 
issues of inadequate and untimely translation of course material and inadequate 
mastering of the English language by local participants. The actual content of the 
workshop was found to be appropriate, however. Some logistical problems were 
encountered in coordinating the proceedings with the national counterpart, the Nepal 
Press Institute. In the course of 2002, the NPI organised a total of 51 training courses 
in the capital or outside, of which the conflict-conscious training course was one, 
which might explain why the NPI representatives were occasionally absent. No info is 
given in the report on how the training was received or any thought given as to what 
impact it might have had. 
 
Team reporting 
The follow-up, funded by the Danish Embassy in Nepal, was conceived as a team 
reporting exercise whereby teams would combine urban and rural perspectives and 
different political perspectives and in the course of the exercise manage to rise above 
partisan divisions of various kinds. As the conflict was deemed to be ideological 
rather than based on ethnicity and caste, according to Howard, the teams should 
include members from the rural, peripheral areas and not reflect the ethnic diversity of 
the country. The editors were not entirely sold on the idea of team reporting, though a 
couple of editors of smaller publications expressed an interest, enough for the idea to 
be taken further by the NPI. The composition of the teams would include foreign 
correspondents based in Nepal, journalists in national, Kathmandu-based media and 
journalists outside the capital working in media with a provincial/regional reach. This 
composition would provide the right balance between international professional skills 
and local knowledge. The topic to be considered should, however, not be too local 
unless there is an important story which warrants national attention. Further, there 
might be some scepticism among editors and publishers against having the same story 
in several papers at once and one way around this hurdle might be to target 
publications with the minimum degree of overlap. A further progress report was 
produced by Ross Howard in early January 2003 which went a little further in 
specifying themes and identifying potential team leaders. Substantively, the ensuing 
stories are to “intentionally avoid extensive reporting of political aspects, and to not 
intentionally pursue so-called investigative exposés” and instead seek general human 
interest or a basis for identification and empathy. 
 
As it happened, the teams, which were supposed to have completed their work by the 
end of February 2003, had not got started at the time of the field mission. A major 
reason may have been that with the conclusion of the ceasefire and with the 
agreement on a code of conduct for initiating negotiations for a lasting peace, the 
                                                 
26 One member of the evaluation team knows the Nepalese situation very well and is a bit surprised that 
it is possible to gain sufficient understanding of the complex issues involved after only four days.  
C M I  
 54 
topics had to be reconsidered. A suggested topic for the first team was be the 
displacement of a village population in the Eastern Region by an ethnic rebel group 
sympathetic to the Maoists or alternatively, the mental travails of a suspected Maoist 
having to report to the District Administrative Office on a daily basis. The potential 
topics for team two were not decided at the time of the mission as that team had yet to 
meet but suggestions by the designated team leader were for long-term injuries to 
people damaged by the conflict or alternatively the children/orphans of Maoists or 
civilians affected by the conflict. As the work is yet to be done, it is of course 
premature to pass any judgement on the outcome and its potential impact. However, 
as this report is being finalised, we were informed that the first team has had their 
story published in a number of media outlets. The story was on the displacement 
issue.  
  
News management seminar 
The latest planned intervention in Nepal is similarly in the works and was scheduled 
originally to take place at the time of the field mission, but was pushed back until the 
first weekend of April. This exercise is to target senior media management in Nepal 
on conflict-conscious news management by drawing on the experience of media in Sri 
Lanka, a country, which also had concluded a ceasefire agreement and had embarked 
on a negotiation process towards a more permanent settlement. The one-day seminar 
will draw in expertise from Sri Lanka (representatives of the Centre for Policy 
Alternatives and the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission) and engage spokesmen on the 
Nepali side from both the government side and the Maoists. However, the 
documentation does not give any indication that actually practicing editors or 
publishers from Sri Lanka are being invited or which editors and publishers in Nepal 
are being specifically targeted for this exercise. In the planning of the seminar, the 
Nepal Press Institute, which was the national counterpart for earlier IMS 
interventions, appears to have been replaced by PANOS South Asia and Media 
Services International, which is an NGO run by Bhorat Koirala, a member of the IMS 
board. PANOS has also prepared a concept note that bears interesting similarities, but 
also some differences to the IMS seminar. Whereas in the IMS seminar, senior media 
persons are brought in from Sri Lanka to Nepal, the PANOS note foresees the reverse 
route whereby senior media persons from Nepal are brought to Sri Lanka for a 
workshop on pretty much the same topic, the role of media in conflict transformation. 
However, the PANOS note adds other components, including training in digital radio 
technology and a series of radio productions on various aspects of the current political 
process. At the time of finalising this report, the seminar has been held as reported 
briefly in the Kathmandu Post. 
 
Findings 
· The IMS programme in Nepal is still an on-going concern with both the team 
reporting underway and the editors’ meeting just completed. However, in any 
intervention that has the objective of effecting changes in the way armed 
conflict and post-conflict developments are reported, monitoring mechanisms 
have to be in place to judge whether the intervention has any noticeable effect 
on media reporting. Reliable reporting may not be the only factor of 
importance. In Nepal, weeklies are in many cases no more than political tracts, 
yet may have noticeable effect on popular perceptions. A regular programme 
of monitoring of content should be in place to assess effects and to target later 
interventions better.  
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· Another more general point emerging from discussions is the need to seek the 
media most effective in the local context. In Nepal, radio reaches more people 
than any other media, including print, due to the topographical peculiarities of 
the country. Even though capital media are of importance, local media may be 
as important if capital media have limited distribution.   
· Expenditure in Nepal has drastically exceeded the ceiling of DKK200.000. 
IMS has been good at following-up interventions, but has so far not handed 
over to another organisation for continuing the work though there are certain 
prospects of Panos South Asia doing so.  
· The news management seminar would probably have benefited from the 
inclusion of actually practicing editors and managers from the Sri Lankan 
media side so as to make it a genuine collegial two-way seminar.  
· All meetings and training have taken place without the IMS secretariat 
attending. As activities are implemented by external consultants, the 
possibility for first-hand experience and learning is foregone.   
· Nepal is a high-profile country with extensive aid coming in, including Danida 
which funds most of the training activities of the Nepal Press Institute. It is 
conceivable that the outputs may have been achieved under regular Danida 
funding. 
 
SRI LANKA 
 
Reasons for intervention 
The activities of IMS in Sri Lanka are closely tied in with those in Nepal in that the 
seminars and workshops on conflict-conscious news reporting in summer 2002 appear 
to have provided a source of inspiration for launching a similar initiative in Nepal. 
These meetings are at the time of writing the only completed activities in Sri Lanka. 
An assessment of the media situation in the North and East is at the planning stage 
and the Centre of Policy Alternatives, the main partner of IMS in Sri Lanka, expects 
to dispatch four persons to this part of the country in the course of April, including 
two of their own staff.  
 
The initial IMS intervention in Sri Lanka was an assessment made by IMS consultant 
Thomas Hughes in April 2002. The assessment gives a detailed account of general 
political developments including the change of government and the conclusion of the 
ceasefire agreement, the media landscape and the state of laws and legislative 
reforms, training opportunities and professional standards and imposed constraints on 
reporting. The assessment ends up recommending focusing on sub-editors as these 
often exercise a gate-keeping function in deciding what gets printed and what does 
not. The consultant recommends IMS to go ahead with the existing project proposal 
on “Promoting Conflict Conscious Coverage of the Ceasefire in Sri Lanka”. A 
training-of-trainer component is recommended as an add-on to ensure sustainability 
and a Canadian NGO, IMPACS, is mentioned as an agency for a longer-term 
engagement following on from the IMS intervention. The actual project document 
came out of preparatory work by the IMS secretariat with a visit to Norway to talk to 
the chief facilitator Erik Solheim. 
 
Conflict-conscious journalism 
There are two reports on the implementation of the workshops, by Ross Howard, an 
associate with the Canadian IMPACS, and Thomas Hughes, consultant with IMS. 
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One of the activities was a two-day workshop at a resort outside Colombo for sub-
editors/gatekeepers. Another was three separate half-day sessions for print media at 
the Renuka Hotel in Colombo and a fourth was added on, at the newsroom of 
Rupavihini Television. A third was a brief training of trainers’ session involving two 
persons from CPA and two from the Centre for Counter-Conflict Journalism. Finally, 
a brief presentation was given to a gathering of media people and civil society 
associations.  The Howard report says that the IMS mission was the “first to directly 
address media coverage of the conflict, and of the peace process”. That may not be 
entirely correct as the Centre for Counter-Conflict Journalism arranged a workshop as 
early as February 23, shortly after the signing of the MOU, on the ceasefire with 
participation from the Tamil Media Alliance from the North and the East, a military 
spokesman and Anita Pratap, an Indian journalist with experience from conflict 
reporting for CNN/Time magazine. The Centre, furthermore, arranged a study tour for 
Tamil journalists from the North to visit media institutions in the South. However, it 
can be argued that these interventions were not specifically focused on media 
coverage of the conflict, but part of an overall familiarisation process involving 
journalists from both parts of the country in an effort to identify and deal with 
common problems. Both of these activities were jointly funded by EU and the 
Norwegian Embassy. Thirdly, the EU funded a study tour of editors from the South to 
meet the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leadership in Vanni in the North 
in July 2002 and also with the objective of having editors familiarise themselves with 
living conditions in the North and report on how “the other half” lives. One of the 
editors interviewed in Sri Lanka found the study tour highly useful. 
 
The Howard report gives an outline of the various components of the training and 
some observations and assessments of the outcome. Some press coverage was 
generated with editorials ranging from those that could echo “precisely the conflict 
analysis and conflict resolution themes” (i.e. the Daily News) to those “castigating 
peace journalism” (Daily Mirror and the Island). It should be added that the Daily 
News is government-owned and should thus be expected to be favourable to the IMS 
intervention and the peace process in general. Howard notes that “a diversity of 
Sinhala-speaking reporters from several newspapers rather than one progressive 
papers” would have been an advantage. The paper in question, Ravaya, is in favour of 
the peace process, to judge from the interview conducted with its editor, so the danger 
of “preaching to the converted” is of course there unless a true cross-section of 
opinion can be mobilised for the training workshops. So is also the case for the 
broadcast media, which is, as far as news coverage is concerned, also state-owned and 
thus in favour of the government position on major issues. 
 
Among the recommendations, there is a suggestion for an assessment mission to the 
North and the East, which will be carried out by CPA, as mentioned above. However, 
there have been extensive contacts with Tamil journalists already, as documented, so 
any assessment should build upon the contacts already established. Another 
recommendation concerns the IMPACS plans. Following the workshops, Howard did 
an assessment for them, but as far as is known, including a telephone conversation of 
the team with Howard, no follow-up action is as yet in place. Assessments were also 
made by Hughes for IMS, as already mentioned, and we know of similar exercises 
done for Swedish SIDA followed up by a seminar for journalists in Colombo. In any 
“high-profile” countries, there may be a danger of crowding of actors. A third 
recommendation concerns the funding of CCCJ to produce a handbook of conflict-
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sensitive reporting based on the proceedings of the workshops. In the event, a general 
handbook has been produced, as an IMS publication, to be translated into Sinhala and 
Tamil, courtesy of CPA. Finally, there is a recommendation for liaison with Thomas 
Oommen regarding inputs on curricula and other tasks for the planned Journalism 
Training Institute. According to information received from B. Padmakumara of Daily 
News and the Editor’s Guild, there is a Sri Lanka Press Institute in place, at least in 
the sense of a physical building and work is underway on employing staff. The 
institute will comprise both a training centre and a press complaints commission and a 
code of ethics is accordingly high on the agenda of the Editors’ Guild.  
 
Evaluation 
Hughes, who made the IMS assessment, also did an elaborate on-the-spot evaluation 
of the conflict-conscious training for IMS.  With regard to relevancy, the evaluation 
found the design to be relevant and timely, noting that the prospective media training 
institute might provide an opportunity for future IMS engagement. Regarding 
efficiency, the verdict is overall positive, though “the overly attentive approach 
should be tempered by an enhanced understanding of the situation on the ground in 
Sri Lanka”. We are not sure what is meant by “overly attentive”. Concerning 
effectiveness, there was an overall satisfaction with the contents and presentations, 
though some objections to the structure and to problems of translations and English-
speaking capabilities of some of the vernacular- language journalists. Furthermore, 
attendance was not as high as planned, and the date had to be shifted once as a 
number of potential participants were on a familiarisation visit to Norway and 
secondly, the selected date collided with a similar exercise organised by the Ministry 
of Mass Communication in the North, reducing the attendance from those areas. 
Possibly of more consequence, the targeting of news managers did not succeed as 
planned as a number of senior editors and freelance journalists attended as well. 
Hence, the observation that “the In-House Seminars were a more effective structure in 
which to address journalists than the News Managers Seminar”, due to “the more 
informal atmosphere” and “presence of entire newsrooms and editorial structures” 
might give some important pointers for future exercises of this kind. One impression 
gathered during the mission is that editorial commitment is highly important. Editorial 
commitment may even in some cases not even be sufficient as editorial independence 
might be significantly constrained by the owners and publishers themselves. Finally, 
regarding impact, the evaluation recommended a discussion forum to meet regularly, 
further in-house seminars and, as mentioned, the production of a brochure of the 
proceedings. A point not touched in the recommendations is whether media 
monitoring capacities are in place, allowing future interventions to be better targeted 
at potential bottlenecks. 
 
Follow-up 
Regarding follow-up, there have not been any further in-house seminars, including 
MTV as envisaged. There has not been much contact between CPA and CCCJ 
(confirmed by both independently). However, both have separately continued 
activities with the CPA taking part in a conflict transformation workshop, organised 
by Academy of Education and Development and funded by US Aid, with the 
objective of publishing a newspaper supplement to be inserted in newspapers in all 
three languages. CCCJ is on the other hand planning a workshop in the North/East 
with working journalists from the South and also considering proposing a vote 
ceremony to the Editors’ Guild for best peace journalist of the year. 
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There will, however, be a follow-up of a similar kind. IMS is convening a one-day 
seminar in Kathmandu to draw parallels with the Sri Lankan situation, in particular 
the cease-fire and the ongoing peace process. The press officer of the Sri Lankan 
Monitoring Mission will attend, as will two persons from CPA. Unfortunately, no 
actually practising editors from the Sri Lankan side are reported to attend which might 
have created a sort of peer review of similarities and differences on the media side. 
While there may be spokesmen from both the government and Maoist side on the 
Nepalese side, there does not appear to be a similar representation on the Sri Lankan 
side.  
 
The IMS programme appears to be in limbo with no discernable follow-up in sight. It 
might be hoped that the Canadian IMPACS might pick up the slack in the future. The 
Sri Lankan media scene may also a bit crowded as many donors and agencies rush in 
to take part in the post-war phase. There is a certainly a need for a wide educational 
campaign to explain and clear up misunderstandings related to the negotiations and 
the possible outcomes of the peace process. None of those interviewed left any doubt 
about that and the government should take a forceful lead in that regard. It was the 
impression of the SLMM that some trust in their impartiality had been generated in 
the course of their operations, but that some organs will still pick and choose from 
their press releases whatever is favourable to them and disregard the rest. 
 
Findings 
· Sri Lanka represents a case for intervention built solely on the merits of 
conflict-conscious journalism. In contrast to many other countries, media and 
journalists are not under threat, at least not in South of the country where 
activities are concentrated. For sure, censorship and lack of access to 
information are constraints for media outlets, but they do not constitute threats 
as normally understood.  
· There is no built- in monitoring of media content in order to focus attention on 
the forces stacked against this type of intervention. Most media targeted were 
friendly disposed towards the training, which knowledgeable observers would 
have known in advance by looking at the list of invitees.  
· Targeting was not fully realised for the  training workshops with freelance 
journalists and senior editors attending alongside the “gate keepers”. In-house 
workshops appear better suited to training of this type. Targeting seems to 
have shifted over time with more attention turning to editors and publishers. 
This may reflect a weakness in project design concerning which level or 
stratum of an organisational hierarchy is the best target for achieving project 
objectives.  
· There is no discernable follow-up in sight, which leaves the programme in a 
state of limbo. IMPACS was presumed to take over, but there are no activities 
as of yet.  
· Sri Lanka is yet another high-profile country with many actors and donors 
interested in media activities, including its role in conflict transformation. 
Both IMS partners have separate projects with other donors so the rationale for 
IMS intervention rests on the presumed uniqueness of their contribution. 
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5.2.4  Afghanistan 
Rationale for involvement 
IMS engagement in Afghanistan started with a mission to Pakistan October 26 –  
November 9 2002, fielded jointly with Article 19 and Baltic Media Centre. The 
purpose of the mission was twofold; first, to do an assessment for an Afghan radio 
project proposed by the Baltic Media Centre, and second, to do a wider assessment of 
Afghan media in Afghanistan and Pakistan in order to identify possibilities for 
intervention. The mission built on a previous meeting in Geneva organised by Media 
Action International on humanitarian information and media development. The reason 
for engagement was thus partly to do an assessment for a highly specific project and 
partly to explore an opening for IMS intervention in a longer-term media development 
perspective. 
 
It is possible to question whether the timing of the intervention was a bit premature 
based on the presumption that the war would go on much longer than what happened. 
There also seems to be a problem with the identification of Afghanistan as a post-
conflict stage, as there clearly is a limited war going on, and thus our description as a 
situation heading towards a reduction of violence is more apt than “post-conflict”.  
 
Assessments and safety training 
The report provides an overview of the media landscape, which, due to the ongoing 
war and to Taliban- imposed restrictions previously, was more active and lively across 
the border in Peshawar, Pakistan. Among project ideas, the need for providing 
humanitarian information was identified as the most crucial undertaking, including 
the training of journalists to qualify them for this type of reporting. However, the 
Baltic Media Centre, which took part in the mission, had their own plans for a radio 
broadcaster in the Afghan community in Pakistan to be relocated to Afghanistan when 
conditions would make this possible. The report does not give any further information 
on progress on this project. Instead, the report foresees a role for IMS and Article 19 
in post-conflict advocacy and media development activities, in conjunction with 
locally based organisations and other international partners. 
  
One such initiative came from AINA, a Paris-based media organisation, which 
received favourable response from the Afghan government to their proposal to set up 
an independent media resource centre in Kabul. The next IMS report, based on Martin 
Breum’s observations in January 2002, sees a role for IMS in pursuing a common 
Afghan platform for future media developments in the country. In the meantime, IMS 
had co-funded with UNESCO a series of safety training seminars in co-operation with 
International Federation of Journalists, which was conducted by AKE, a British firm 
specialising in this type of training. For safety reasons, the seminars were held in 
Peshawar. Seven one-day sessions were held, and the evaluation admitted that the 
tight format taxed the concentration of the participants as the sessions were held as 
class-room lectures allowing little room for interactions between teacher and students 
and only to a limited degree drawing upon the real- life experiences of the 
participating journalists. The inadequate adaptation of the course to local conditions 
was seen as a weakness and the course would probably have benefited from the 
services of an instructor familiar with the local setting. Nonetheless, the participants 
felt the safety training to have been useful and the report recommended further safety 
training inside Afghanistan, possibly to be combined with conflict management 
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training. As far as is known, no further training sessions of this kind have been 
conducted or funded by IMS and their partners. 
 
Organising for media development 
The next phase of IMS engagement appears to be focused on broader matters of 
media development. A project document, co-authored with Article 19, aims at 
generally promoting “Freedom of expression and civil society impact on media 
development in Afghanistan”. The purpose is “providing a forum for professional 
exchanges leading to the articulation of common goals” by “an international 
programme of advocacy and technical support”, the common goals being, inter alia, 
“a self-regulatory system and a code of ethics”, presumably something along the lines 
of a press council/complaints commission administered by respected members of the 
profession. More specifically (or less generally), objectives include (1) advocacy 
aimed at reforms of media policy and laws in consonance with freedom of expression; 
(2)  the setting of a network for media development and policy and (3) a media 
council for the afore-mentioned self-regulatory code. The project is to last for one 
year and to be implemented by IMS and Article 19. The second objective foresees a 
roundtable of about 15 and a more fully-fledged conference within the overall frame 
of about 4 months, which is supposed to lead into a Media Council and the drafting of 
a code of ethics for the profession. The budget for the entire exercise was estimated at 
over £120.000, of which about 60 per cent was to be funded from British sources and 
the remainder from Danish MFA. The IMS Annual Report for 2001 – 2002 tells us (p. 
33) that IMS/Article 19 did not secure funding from Danish sources and that the 
“core” of the project will be implemented by Article 19, presumably from British 
sources. Which “non-core” parts fell out, we do not know. How the project has fared, 
we have not found out as yet, except to note that there is now an Afghan Media and 
Culture Centre. According to information received from Article 19, the project has 
also managed to put together an association or a forum for advancing the legal and 
organisational objectives.  
 
Overall, IMS finds that the Afghanistan intervention “created an opportunity for IMS 
to engage in organisational synchronization and information sharing” and the project 
proposal was timely as there was no other international organisation addressing 
directly the issue of “the need for strong involvement of the Afghan media 
community in the shaping of a post-Taliban media environment”. That point might be 
debatable as there certainly were a number of international organisations involved in 
media development (as listed in the joint IMS/Article 19 proposal) and secondly, 
without a number of actors on the scene, there would, it might be thought, be less of a 
need for “organisational synchronization”. IMS did contribute some minor funding to 
AINA and the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, but only at a fraction of the 
costs of the assessments. 
 
The minutes of the IMS Board meeting of April 22 – 23 2002 record that DKK 
489.391 has been spent on IMS interventions in Afghanistan/Pakistan which is 
considerably above the ceiling of DKK 200.000 for IMS interventions. This is, 
according to the minutes, justified by “the special situation caused by 11’th 
September 2001”, meaning presumably the war in Afghanistan. A large part of the 
expenditure went for the joint Baltic Media Centre/Radio Afghanistan project, more 
precisely the cost of the assessment for this specific intervention. The breakdown of 
the expenditure indicates that about one-third of total expenditure was spent on this 
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part of the assessment, twice as much as the other part of the assessment. The 
outcome is that there is now a programme called “Good Morning Afghanistan” 
running on Radio Afghanistan. Indications are that this has been a very important 
media initiative in Afghanistan. It has now been extended into an afternoon 
programme as well and it seems to have set an example for other free media 
initiatives in the country. Thus this experience illustrates on the one hand the value of 
the IMS flexible approach and the success it may entail. On the other hand it also 
illustrates the need for caution when involving board members in establishing projects 
through IMS initiatives. In this case it was a success, but one should bear in mind that 
BMC is one of the founding members of IMS and thus has a permanent place on the 
board. It might be considered a conflict of interest that permanent board members 
utilise the resources of the organisation of which they are board members for their 
own projects. However, the minutes of the Board do not give any indication that this 
relationship might be considered problematic. The minutes of September 24 – 25 
2001 Board meeting, discussing possible avenues for IMS intervention in 
Afghanistan, do not mention this specific project, though IMS should be on the look 
out for “emergent media initiatives”.  
 
Findings 
· The IMS role in Afghanistan appears to be one of “being there at the right 
time” with the possibility of funding “emergent media initiatives”. Whether 
these initiatives would have happened in the absence of IMS or happened 
more slowly is a debatable point. The IMS role appears to have been to 
provide some seed money for the formulation of longer-term activities on 
media development and on effecting changes in media policy and laws and to 
get disparate groups to work together for a common purpose. Afghanistan, 
being at the time a “high profile” country and thus attracting a number of 
media actors, might have been irresistible for some timely IMS interventions, 
but we are not sure whether these interventions were crucial to developing the 
media scene there.  
· The Afghanistan case also raises the question of a conflict of interest, as the 
team has understood that the Baltic Media Centre assessment was used to 
developing a project about which there was not full knowledge and awareness 
among other mission members and hence may have led to misunderstandings 
and misgivings. However, the radio programme which was the output of the 
project is reportedly a success and Radio Afghanistan’s “Good morning 
Afghanistan” now has a “good afternoon” extension. 
5.2.5  Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan ) 
Central Asia is a region that is a central concern of IMS. The activities have 
comprised several initiatives and actions in more than one part of the region. The 
activities started with a Fact Finding/Identification Mission Report. The report has 
been characterised by our expert on the region in the Reference Group – Vibeke 
Sperling - as a “brilliant paper”, and she adds that it 
  
(…) in an edited form could be published as a valuable introduction for a broader 
public to an area, which due to the developments in Afghanistan have gained in 
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strategic importance, but unfortunately has not yet obtained the appropriate 
international attention.  
 
The report identifies most of the international and local organisations already engaged 
in assistance to and monitoring of the media in the region, and it also outlines several 
possible and very relevant interventions. The report furthermore emphasises 
convincingly why it is so important to intervene in Central Asia because of the very 
substantial threats to freedom of expression and democracy that exist in several 
countries.   
 
The region is a difficult one for organisations such as IMS to engage in. There are 
many actors there- international as well as local ones. It is not easy to identify credible 
local partners. Many of them are more interested in pursuing private interests than 
common goals. And it is difficult to create the basis for long-term strategies. In 
Central Asia and other regions of the former Soviet Union there have over the past 
decade been many seminars and workshops concentrated on topics that in themselves 
are important enough and useful: e.g. ”Quality Journalism” and ”Financial viability”. 
A journalist from the area has expressed the problem in the following way: ”They are 
seminaring us to death”. 
 
The results of the fact finding mission so far seem to have been the attempt to 
establish a Central Asian Media Retreat whose activities according to the project 
paper will consist of among others a seminar to be organised early 2003 to be 
followed up by further acitivities concentrating around the following broad themes: 
quality journalism; financial viability, web publishing, safety, project funding.  
 
One workshop was organised in Moscow February 17 – 20 2003, and the participants 
were mainly Uzbek journalists. Another was conducted in Baku in March 20 - 22, 
organised by Open Society Institute. The workshops involved the cooperation and 
participation of, and input from, other organisations such as IFEX, Open Society 
Institute, Centre for Journalists in Extreme Situations. The general theme of the 
workshops was media monitoring in a broad sense of the word.  
 
The results of these workshops have been assessed by the evaluation team based on 
reports by the Danish journalist, Michael Andersen, who served as a consultant for the 
Uzbek project, as well input to IMS from IFEX, and discussions with the IMS staff. It 
is nevertheless not entirely clear from the papers that the evaluation team has had 
access to, what the operational side of the two workshops that IMS was involved in, 
really consisted of, and how they differed from other similar arrangements. 
 
IMS’ activities are to be followed up by FRESTA in more long-term projects. The 
Central Asia intervention is thus a good example of how IMS may serve as both an 
initiator and a catalyst for further activities. 
 
Findings  
· While workshops and seminars are important, they also have limited 
importance if they are not followed up by concrete long-term projects. These 
kinds of initiatives have somewhat unkindly at times been described as 
“parachute engagements”, and it is a question of whether the money spent is in 
proportion with the practical results. Thus it is important to move from the 
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seminar stage to a more long-term strategic stage, and it is in this connection 
that IMS ought to employ its potential as a catalyst for the bringing in of long-
term projects. And it seems that it is this direction that the project is moving, 
and it is thus a good example of an IMS project in progress.  
· In depth training in media monitoring issues must consist of more than what 
can be achieved at short workshops, and it is particularly important that this 
training takes into consideration local and national circumstances and 
institutions, e.g. the legal situation and the need for legal awareness. It is our 
impression that it is not sufficient to rely on the more general training 
framework used by e.g. IFEX. Training in legal issues related to journalism 
and monitoring must be the basis for the work. And it must be detailed and 
based on expertise knowledge of the local background.   
· It is difficult to identify the most relevant cooperating partners in the region. It 
seems that often the same participants go from one seminar organised by one 
international organisation to another arranged by yet another NGO. This is of 
course a problem that also exists in other parts of the world, but it may be 
particularly acute in this region. It partly is the result of limited knowledge by 
Western organisations. Lack of proper language competence is of course also 
an issue.  Furthermore it is easier for international actors to work with groups 
and people who already are part of a known circuit and already have 
international contacts. At the same time it appears as if there particularly in 
this region exists a certain group of people who use their contacts to further 
their particular interests rather than the course of democracy and press 
freedom.   
· If the IMS initiative in the Central Asian region is to have any lasting effect it 
must be followed by further interventions that are more focused than the more 
general and short workshops that have so far come out of the excellent report. 
This implies for instance that a series of interrelated media monitoring projects 
need to be initiated. And furthermore a concrete project of journalistic 
cooperation in the Ferghana Valley could be both innovative and of great 
importance. This is an area where IMS is trying to establish follow up 
activities.  
· There is a need for coordination and information sharing among the Western 
donors working in the area. It seems that the presence of several 
uncoordinated and even competing donors and outside actors leads to 
unnecessary duplication of initiatives as well as jealousies and competition 
between actors who should ideally have been cooperating. According to the 
reports that the team has received, this is the case in more than one instance in 
the region. According to IMS this is a problem they are aware of and that they 
are trying to address, and which they feel they by not being in the business of 
providing long-time assistance may have a tactical advantage in being able to 
solve. It seems, however, in order for IMS to be able to do so there is a need 
for long-time engagement in some form of other in the region as such.  
· The IMS support to the re- launching of the exiled Tajik newspaper Charogi 
Ruz is an excellent project with a very appropriate partner.  
· The Media Retreat planned in Kyrgyzstan seems to be a good idea. It 
presupposes very active and dedicated local and regional partners, and a 
follow-up from international partners that also may serve as coordinators of 
the project.  
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· In Central Asia as well as in several other areas where IMS has been engaged, 
the background work seems very thorough and useful. In this case it appears to 
have been of an extraordinary quality.   
· The partners that IMS has been able to cooperate with particularly from Russia 
and other areas e.g. CJES, seem to have been very capable and their input 
have been of great importance.   
· It appears that IMS has an ability to identify good local cooperating expertise.     
· There is a need for a more thorough discussion and evaluation of the impacts 
of the interventions – workshops, and how they can be followed up by IMS or 
by other actors.   
5.2.6 Chechnya 
The initial fact finding report gives a very realistic and solid assessment of the media 
situation in Chechnya, but some of the conclusions drawn for IMS support for the 
Chechen media community are questionable, apparently due to the basis defined for 
IMS engagement in the area. IMS seems too overly concerned with having its 
”apolitical status” reflected in its work. That is that IMS is wary of not promoting any 
political positions in the current war in Chechnya. This points to a principle problem 
in relation to media interventions in overt conflict situations, where gross oppression 
occurs. It is possible to be “apolitical or neutral” in such circumstances? Freedom of 
speech is a political issue. To support the right of the Chechens to free speech is to 
take side against the Russian authorities that deny them that right. Neutrality in under 
such circumstances is impossible if the aim is to support freedom of speech for the 
Chechen population (both of Chechen and Russian origin). Russian authorities will 
interpret neutrality as acceptance of their behaviour. It is therefore necessary for IMS 
to cooperate with the few journalists, who have continuously and at great risk reported 
critically on Chechnya, e.g. Anna Politkovskaya.  
   
In many ways the situation in Chechnya illustrates the dilemmas inherent in the 
double mandate of IMS as both working for using the media to de-escalate conflicts 
on the one hand and to support the struggle for freedom of expression on the other. In 
the case of Chechnya there exists an overt armed conflict, but on the other hand the 
violence is used as pretext by the Russian authorities to censor and harass both foreign 
and Russian media in Chechnya. The existing practice of self-censorship about the 
conflict in the Russian press is a result of this harassment.  Strong international 
criticism of Russian authorities is needed, and IMS should support this and promote 
the principle of freedom of expression in this context. 
  
The other side to the official restrictions and harassments are the attacks from 
Chechen criminals on freedom of speech e.g. the taking journalists as hostages etc. 
Both practices threaten freedom of expression and should be condemned.  
 
The projects that IMS suggests to support are on the one hand worthwhile and may 
contribute in a small scale to improve the situation, but it is a question whether they 
must not be focused more in a clear direction in order to avoid the dilemma of 
neutrality as described above.  
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Journal for Chechen women 
One of the IMS proposals is to provide support for journal for Chechen women. It is 
good idea to establish such a journal. As the consultant notes there is “no periodical at 
all addressed to Chechens, written by Chechens”. In this void there is, as noted by the 
consultant, a great possibility that such a journal will be read also by men. It can 
furthermore support the very secularized traditions among Chechen women and thus 
be an antidote to the imposing of sharia laws.  
 
It is stated in the report that: “The journal should not be offensive towards Russians”. 
But the Russian authorities will interpret all critical reporting and the uncovering of 
oppression as offensive. The journal shall of course contribute to dialogue by 
avoiding hate speech. It should address the population in Chechnya (ethnic Chechens 
and Russians alike) with open and honest reporting on their problems in respect for 
the professional rules of the game, without being influenced by what authorities might 
find provocative.  
 
The mission report states, that one success-criterion would be that Russian women in 
Chechnya would read it as well. They will probably be open to that, as they share the 
problems of daily life with the Chechen women. A special problem for the Russians 
(by the way a good subject for the journal) is the strong scepticism towards them from 
Russian soldiers, who do not trust them, because many of them have lived - some of 
them their whole life - in harmony with Chechens. 
 
It is correct, as stated in the report, that the knowledge of written Chechen has been 
undermined by lack of training, but estimated 750.000 (the big majority of the 
Chechens) speak their own language much more than Russian in the daily 
communication. It will no doubt raise the interest of the journal also amongst 
Chechens with difficulties reading their own language, if the journal contributes to do 
something for written Chechen with for instance the title of the journal and all articles 
in both languages and articles also in Chechen.   
 
The editorial office should not be in Moscow, but in Nazran, the capital of Ingushetia 
with the declared aim to move into Chechnya as soon as possible. A Moscow- based 
magazine will primarily appeal to the Chechen diaspora in the Russian capital, while 
its opening in Nazran will give a strong signal to the population in Chechnya that this 
is a journal for them. And of course the proximity will also mean to be near to the real 
stories and give much better opportunities for local journalists to contribute. To base 
the journal in Moscow will of course make a lot of things much easier, but it will 
make the ways to promoting local trust and dialogue so much more difficult.   
 
After the initial report was written a new IMS project document has been written 
(March 2003) where the project is moving in the direction of basing the publication of 
the journal in Nazran through the cooperation with the weekly paper Groznensky 
Rabocii. The IMS activity would consist of a capacity building seminar in Moscow 
and assist in fundraising activities. The evaluation team will emphasise the 
importance of securing long term funding for such an initiative. 
 
Information to Russian media.  
In the initial report the work of the Russian Chechen Friendship Society (RCFS) is 
being highlighted, and it is certainly worth supporting the organisation. It currently 
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receives considerable support for its activities from among other The National 
Endowment for Democracy and Open Society. IMS is planning to support the 
professionalisation of RCFS activities and the possible establishment of a news 
service on the situation in Chechnya. This will initially be done through a seminar 
organised in Moscow in April 2003 in close cooperation with Russian partners e.g. 
CJES.  
 
Findings  
· The initial assessment of IMS activities in Chechnya seems to have been 
marred by the dilemmas inherent in IMS double mandate, and this has resulted 
in a rather skewed early appraisal of how IMS might intervene. The Project 
Document of March 2003 goes a long way in the reconsideration of the initial 
problematic attitudes and comes up with two very worthwhile projects.  
· This dilemma points to a principle problem in relation to media interventions 
in overt conflict situations, where gross oppression occurs. It is possible to be 
“apolitical or neutral” in such circumstances? Freedom of speech is in itself a 
political issue. 
5.2.7 Byelorussia 
The project document is titled Problems of Information Law Byelorussia/Russia .   
Byelorussia, which is an openly authoritarian country, and where rights of the media 
and journalists are systematically being violated, in spite of the fact that the country 
has signed international treaties regarding freedom expression and information. It is 
therefore understandable that the project focuses on Byelorussia, where the situation 
is particularly serious, and the country falls within the framework for IMS 
interventions. It should, however, be borne in mind that there are regions in Russia 
where conditions for free media are no better than in Byelorussia, and that the title of 
the project thus is an indication of a broader concern.  
 
The project consists of support for the journal Media Expert, which will monitor and 
publicise violation of press freedom in particularly Byelorussia. Apart from The 
Centre for Journalism in Extreme Situation, which is part of the project, RSF, CPJ and 
many others are engaged in monitoring of the media in the country. There is a need of 
coordination and monitoring of the monitors to check discrepancies in their reporting.  
However, it seems that based on the implementation of the plans that this challenge 
may have been solved and the first issue of Media Expert has been published. The 
intervention is being followed up by The Danish Journalists’ Union and other IMS 
partners through a project of cooperation with journalists in Byelorussia. 
 
In relation to the situation in Byelorussia it is important to bear in mind that too many 
international media projects focus on the capitals in transition societies such as 
Byelorussia and Russia and thus forget the provinces, where assistance is most 
needed. While media based in capitals and other bigger cities have more access to 
legal assistance and international attention, it is not the fact in the regions. In most 
areas of the former Soviet Union local power exercise soviet like control with the 
media, although this is more systematic in Byelorussia than in Russia. 
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Findings 
· The support for the journal Media Expert is a valuable project.  
· There is a need to coordinate and observe the activities of the monitors to 
check discrepancies in their reporting. 
· There are regions in Russia where conditions for free media are no better than 
in Byelorussia. This is a finding that has implications also outside this region 
as provincial media easily are being overlooked.  
5.2.8 Ukraine 
The aim of the IMS project in Ukraine is to create “Support Structures for 
Investigative Journalism”. It has as its great advantage that it seems to be a project 
that moves a step beyond existing programmes in the Ukraine, as none of the existing 
media programmes ”actually foresee the active support for the production of 
investigative stories”. On the other hand there are and have been several training 
programmes in the country (by among others Ukraine Open Society Foundation and 
Regional Media Programme and Internews Ukraine) involving production of articles 
and broadcast programmes. It is not clear from the project papers how and if these 
experiences have been taken into consideration.  
 
The project aims to create mechanisms to overcome or minimise obstacles to 
investigative journalism. Journalistic, juridical, technical and economic support 
structures are planned. May be the most difficult aspect of conducting investigative 
and independent journalism in  the Ukraine is the safety of journalists. In this context 
it is important to reflect on the importance of having constant international attention 
being given to the situation in the country. Ukraine is vulnerable to outside criticism, 
and international alarm mechanisms and monitoring is extremely important here. It 
should be mentioned that the Council of Europe among others has done a lot to raise 
international awareness of the dangers for journalists in Ukraine. About selection 
criteria it is in this context stated: ”The investigation will not produce unacceptable 
risks to the media practitioners and institutions involved”. This is an important 
consideration and is one, where it is necessary for IMS to rely on its local partners to 
make the right judgment.  
   
The projects documents call attention to the fact that a lot of solid investigative 
journalism on issues of concern to the public, and in the interest of transparency has 
been carried out in the country (even in the papers controlled by the oligarchy).  
Networks of professionals in the field do exist. These should be targeted. The 
murdered editor Georgi Gongadze’s paper Ukrainskaja Pravda is   one of them. 
    
There is a need to choose between quantity and quality when it comes to supporting 
investigative journalism in Ukraine. To target all on the impressive long list of 
provincial newspapers is in danger of wasting a lot of efforts. There are only a few 
really independent newspapers in the country, around which the efforts in the first 
place ought to be concentrated. One ought to choose a select number of newspapers 
with experience and clear willingness to engage in investigative journalism. There 
seems to be an awareness of this fact as the project document states that there exists 
”an excessive number of outlets in the media market”.   
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After the consultancy report was delivered and follow-up activities had been 
undertaken IMS signed a Memorandum of Understanding with The Danish 
Association of Investigative Journalism with the aim of developing a more substantial 
project. This seems to be a practical and sensible way of implementing the intentions 
of the project. 
 
Findings 
· There are many organisations that have been active in Ukraine in relation to 
democracy building and supporting free media. It is important that effo rts in a 
country such as this are being co-ordinated and that previous and simultaneous 
experiences by other organisations are taken into consideration by IMS.   
· It is probably even more important in a country such as Ukraine where there 
are more actors than elsewhere, that projects are clearly focused and targeted.  
· The cooperation with The Danish Association of Investigative Journalism 
seems sensible.  
 
Conclusion concerning IMS’s activities in Byelorussia and the Ukraine 
In relation to the intervention in Byelorussia as well as in Ukraine there were 
discussions in the Board of IMS as well as among cooperating partners whether these 
projects were not bordering on what should within IMS’s sphere of activity. While 
there are clear examples of media oppression, possibly more so in Byelorussia than in 
Ukraine, there is no violent conflict, and there is no reason to believe that the society 
is moving in such a direction. Nevertheless the evaluation team feels that the 
interventions may be seen as being within the remit of IMS, because they take place 
in FRESTA countries, and they address two focused and limited issues, and the 
projects will be taken over by other partners so that IMS’s role as catalyst has been 
demonstrated.  
5.2.9 Haiti  
The mission to Haiti, conducted by the IMS Chair Mr. Torben Krogh in February 
2003 was carried out at the suggestion of Mr. Jørgen Leth, a Danish author and film 
director, who lives in Haiti. He thought IMS would be in a position to provide help for 
journalists and media outlets who are under extreme pressure from mainly powerful 
armed forces that have direct and indirect links to the ruling party and other political 
forces in the country.  IMS thought it was appropriate to consider involvement in 
Haiti because “we are responding to media under threat, which we consider to be an 
indicator of conflict”. 
 
The mission report listed several recommendations that are in the course of being 
implemented by IMS:  
 
Assistance to Radio Haiti-Inter 
Radio is by far the most important media in the country and Radio Haiti-Inter is the 
only private radio station broadcasting nationally.  Its owner (and a well-known 
journalist in his own right), Jean Dominique, was assassinated in 2000 allegedly by a 
group of henchmen linked to an armed wing of the ruling party. His wife, Michele 
Montas, took over the management of the radio station following his murder. She and 
the radio station’s staff have experienced acute threats allegedly from the people who 
wanted her husband dead.  The threats got so bad that she was forced into temporary 
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exile last year. The physical and psychological pressure on the radio’s staff are so 
grave that Montas decided in late February to temporarily suspend broadcasting for 
two to three months, as has been done in the past.  
 
In order to maintain the radio’s programme production services for a number of 
community radio stations and to provide some financial security for the radio station 
and its staff (the radio lives off advertising for its survival), IMS has agreed to provide 
funds to cover programme production costs and salaries during the period of 
suspension.   
 
Haitian Journalists Association (AJH) 
Given the number of physical attacks and legal prosecutions for defamation and 
slander against journalists and the need for journa lists to flee the country in order to 
save their lives, IMS proposes to offer support to the AJH in order to provide medical 
and legal assistance to journalists under attack. With its meagre resources, AJH, 
which represents both print and radio journalists, has been providing (as best it can) 
these types of services on an ad hoc basis. IMS will be assisting AJH to develop a 
proposal for a media support fund. IMS will be funding it and are lobbying for co-
funding from other donors, which has already gained some interest.   
 
Findings 
· These two interventions are a clear example of how and what IMS can do best. 
They have identified two very practical and substantial avenues for providing 
emergency support to a broad base of Haitian journalists as well as one of 
Haiti’s most important media outlets. The initial interest of other donors in 
supporting a Journalists Association’s legal and medical fund shows promise 
for the sustainability of what IMS will have initiated.  
5.3 Findings in relation to projects 
· Names and affiliations of the authors of reports and other consultants should 
be clearly identified at the beginning of the report 
· Sometimes IMS seems to be engaged in countries, which may be characterised 
as very high profile and thus often also targeted by other organisations and 
initiatives (Nepal, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Israel/Palestine, Chechnya). It is a 
factor that always should be assessed in relation to where to intervene. But it is 
also important to bear in mind that the form of support that IMS provides is 
often not of a high profile character.  
· IMS has shown that its ability to act quickly with a mixture of fresh ideas, 
risk-taking, and funds is invaluable. 
· In the documents on the different interventions it is in many cases not possible 
to find out where the idea for intervention originated. 
· IMS must conduct a proper evaluation of the quality of the workshops and 
training that it lets partner organisations undertake.      
· It is necessary with very thorough preparations for and identification of 
suitable partners particularly in situations of violent conflict.   
· The fact that IMS follows up its missions with rapid concrete commitments 
and activities increases its credibility with its partners.  
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· IMS’ involvement in the Horn of Africa exemplifies how IMS has broadened 
its interpretation of its mandate to include post-conflict scenarios. Sri Lanka 
and most recently Nepal are other examples of these types of intervention. 
· It is not always clear from IMS’ documents what the organisation’s overall 
objective is in each country, beyond responding to a large spectrum of 
problems faced by the media, and on what basis it believes it can have an 
impact on a particular identified problem, especially concerning the role of 
media in conflict.  
· It can be safely said that IMS’ activities in several of the “case study”-
countries have been unique and catalytic.   
· IMS’ success comes from its ability to rapidly link local organisations to 
international groups.   
· In general, it is very difficult to gauge the impact of many of the activities IMS 
has supported to date. For the most part, outputs are clear but criteria for 
success have not been developed by neither IMS nor by its partners. 
Furthermore, IMS largely relies on reports from its consultants and partner 
organisations to assess activities it has not directly been involved with.  
· The longer-term effect of many of IMS activities will depend entirely on 
whether they continue beyond IMS’ engagement. Fortunately, IMS has been 
largely successful at garnering ongoing support for the activities it initiates, at 
the least in the immediate term.  
· There is a need for continued assessment of how long IMS should stay 
involved in a given country and how many resources it should invest in a 
given country over time. Some countries register excess expenditure, due to a 
string of IMS activities in these countries, while others feature interventions 
that may be too brief to have much of an effect. While the answer should 
ideally be based on a case-by-case analysis, stronger consideration for the 
necessary conditions to enable IMS to exit should be given at the start of an 
activity. Exit points are as important as entry points. 
· IMS could, in some instances, consider increasing its grants to local 
organisations. This is especially true here, where IMS’ investments in 
missions almost equals its investments in concrete activities.  The scale should 
tip more in the direction of concrete activities.  
· In interventions in conflict zones, it is important to target media most effective 
in the local context. In general, provincial and local media are easily 
overlooked. Furthermore, in some countries, there is some uncertainty about 
which groups to target within a media enterprise (publishers, editors or 
journalists), creating possible problems for the effectiveness of the 
intervention. 
· The IMS secretariat should where possible seek to attend workshops and 
training (especially of organisations they regularly rely on) in order to observe 
the work of their external consultants and partner organisations, and gain first-
hand experience and learning.  
· While workshops and seminars are important, they also have limited 
importance if they are not followed up by concrete long-term projects.   
·  In depth training in media monitoring issues must consist of more than what 
can be achieved at short workshops, and it is particularly important that this 
training takes into consideration local and national circumstances and 
institutions, e.g. the legal situation and the need for legal awareness.    
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· Provincial and local media are easily overlooked. 
· In some countries, there is some uncertainty about which groups to target 
(publishers, editors or journalists), creating possible problems for the 
effectiveness of the intervention.  
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6 Overall conclusions and 
recommendations 
The most important conclusion that we want to draw from our work evaluating IMS is 
that we are very impressed with what the organisation and particularly the small and 
dedicated staff has managed to achieve over less than two years. The number of 
interventions is impressive. The quality of the work is in general very good. The 
ability to cooperate with partners is fine. The enthusiasm for the project is great both 
among the staff and the board. Obviously with a project such as IMS not everything 
that has been undertaken is beyond problems and criticism, and we have tried to point 
that out, but the critical points should be read in the context of our very positive 
attitude to the project. 
6.1  Overall findings 
Below are listed the most important findings of the evaluation exercise. There are 
more detailed findings in each section of the report. But the team would like to, 
referring to the general activities and operations of IMS, highlight the 44 findings that 
are listed below. They follow the structure of report 
 
Findings in Relation to IMS Organisational Setup  
1. There is a measure of confusion as to the exact role of the generally 
assembly in relation to the board on the election of members.  
2. More diversified funding may imply changes in the composition of the 
board.  
3. The board seems to act generally in an advisory way and the Advisory 
Council, which formally should have that role, does not exist as such.    
4. Board members, who are said to sit in their personal capacity, perceive 
themselves as representing institutions. The only regular participant, 
except for the Chair, meeting in a personal capacity, is not a full member 
of the board.  
5. Conflict of interest issues are framed in terms of personal gains and do not 
speak of organisational gains accruing from board membership.   
6. Regular staff is too steeped in project management to allow room for 
monitoring and evaluation and forward- looking planning. The secretariat 
is overworked and do not have time to sit down to assess and plan in 
relation to the situation of IMS. There is a need for making strategic 
decisions and planning.  
7. Work performance is highly regarded by the board, and this is confirmed 
by the observations by the evaluation team through our interactions with 
the staff.   
8. There is a request from board members for more regular information on 
IMS activities between meetings.    
9. Consultants “represent” IMS, but it is not clear whether consultants 
thereby are entitled to speak on behalf on IMS.  
10. Job descriptions for the regular staff are still non-existent.  
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11. Minutes of board meetings read more like narratives of what was being 
said than digests of decisions.  
12. There is a need for more office space. It is, however, a great advantage for 
IMS to be housed together with The Centre for Human Rights. 
 
Findings related to IMS’ implementation modalities   
1. IMS has aptly and justifiably used its pilot phase to explore its options 
within its mandate. This has resulted in a broad interpretation of its overall 
mandate to include interventions in situations where media are threatened 
whether or not organised armed conflict is taking place.    
2. There seems to be a certain inability to assess overall impact of 
interventions and how to utilise lessons to be learned for further 
interventions. There are certain difficulties in accumulating experiences 
and in developing organisational knowledge, which impacts on IMS’ 
choices of models and tools.    
3. The overall ratio between administrative and project expenditures is good. 
Activities and consultants take up more than the double of what is spent on 
administration, and of this a quarter more is spent on consultant rather than 
on activities, but since the operations consist of many small projects this is 
also a good ratio. 
4. Though IMS has some mechanism in place for monitoring and evaluating 
its activities, they remain weak and inconclusive.  
5. IMS is very good at raising co-funding and at getting others to take 
over/continue activities: At least 7 countries where IMS has supported a 
second phase of an activity; at least 10 projects where there has been a 
commitment by another party to take up the activity either through funding 
or operational manners. Among the latter, there are at least six a firm yes, 
four interested, but without binding insurance.  
6. With regard to networking, the list of IMS partners is impressive and 
indicative of IMS’ commitment and ability to work symbiotically with 
others. Its networking function, arguably its most important, has enabled it 
to achieve much more than would be expected from a three-person 
organisation in such a short period of time.   
7. The IMS partners that were interviewed unanimously praised IMS for 
coming onto the press freedom/media development scene without 
“stepping on anyone else’s toes”. They have been complemented for being 
creative, flexible and rapid in their actions, having funding available with 
few strings attached and successfully connecting and forging relationships 
with and between existing organisations.  Its comparative advantage over 
other like-minded organisations is clear.   
8. The budget ceiling is too low. 
9. IMS’ double role of donor and implementer risks hindering the 
organisation’s ability to learn from its activities. As a donor, it does not 
benefit from having hands-on involvement and therefore first hand 
learning in order to develop and re-adjust its approaches. Unless its 
evaluation mechanisms are strengthened, it is not able to learn from the 
projects it is helping implement.  
10. The annual reports seem to confuse outputs with impacts, and there is no 
real assessment in the reports of what impacts (criteria of success) have 
been the results of the IMS interventions. It is early to get a sense of 
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impacts, but they have not built in proper evaluation practices that 
determine impacts. Financial resources may have to be dedicated to this 
end  
 
Findings in Relation to Projects 
1. The assessment reports are generally of a good quality. 
2. Names and affiliations of the authors of reports and other consultants 
should be clearly identified at the beginning of the report 
3. The criteria of low-profile and high-profile do not seem to be particularly 
useful.   
4. IMS is willing to take risks and to be experimental and creative. And this 
is a great asset.   
5. In the documents on the different interventions it is in many cases not 
possible to find out where the idea for intervention originated. 
6. There is need for proper evaluation of the quality of the workshops and 
training that it lets partner organisations undertake.      
7. It is necessary with very thorough preparations for and identification of 
suitable partners, particularly in situations of violent conflict.     
8. The fact that IMS follows up its missions with concrete commitments and 
activities, and quickly, increases its credibility with its partners.  
9. IMS’ involvement in the Horn of Africa exemplifies how IMS has 
broadened its interpretation of its mandate to include post-conflict 
scenarios. 
10. It is not always clear from IMS’ documents what the organisation’s overall 
objective is in each country, beyond responding to a large spectrum of 
problems faced by the media, and on what basis it believes it can have an 
impact on a particular identified problem, especially concerning the role of 
media in conflict.  
11. It can be safely said that IMS’ activities in several of the “case studies-
countries” have been unique and catalytic.   
12. IMS’ success also comes from its ability to rapidly link local organisations 
to international groups.   
13. In general, it is very difficult to gauge the impact of many of the activities 
IMS has supported to date. For the most part, outputs are clear but criteria 
for success have not been developed by neither IMS or by its partners. 
Furthermore, IMS largely relies on reports from its consultants and partner 
organisations to assess activities it has not directly been involved with.    
14. The longer-term effect of many of IMS activities will depend entirely on 
whether they continue beyond IMS’ engagement. 
15. It would be important to get qualitative feedback from the consultants and 
reference group members why they felt the mission was strong or weak.   
16.  There is a need for continued assessment of how long IMS should stay 
involved in a given country and how many resources it should invest in a 
given country over time. Some countries register excess expenditure, due 
to a string of IMS activities in these countries, while others feature 
interventions that may be too brief to have much of an effect. While the 
answer should ideally be based on a case-by-case analysis, stronger 
consideration for the necessary conditions to enable IMS to exit should be 
given at the start of an activity. Exit points are as important as entry points. 
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17. IMS could, in some instances, consider increasing its grants to local 
organisations. This is especially true here, where IMS’ investments in 
missions almost equals its investments in concrete activities.  The scale 
should tip more in the direction of concrete activities.  
18. In interventions in conflicts zones it is important to seek the media most 
effective in the local context.    
19. The IMS secretariat should where possible seek to attend workshops and 
training in order to observe the work of external consultants, and gain first-
hand experience and learning.     
20.  In depth training in media monitoring issues must consist of more than 
what can be achieved at short workshops, and it is particularly important 
that this training takes into consideration local and national circumstances 
and institutions, e.g. the legal situation and the need for legal awareness.    
21. Provincial and local media are easily overlooked.  
22. In some countries, there is some uncertainty about which groups to target 
(publishers, editors or journalists), creating possible problems for the 
effectiveness of the intervention. 
6.2  Overall recommendations 
Below the 17 recommendations of the team have been listed in two sections. The first 
deals with organisational issues. The second concerns programmatic topics. 
 
Overall recommendations on IMS’ Organisational Setup 
1. Clarify IMS’ organisational structure. IMS should develop a policy document 
that describes IMS’ organisational structure of IMS and that records all 
important procedural principles of the Association. This document should also 
define the role and responsibility of the General Assembly, the Board of 
Directors, the Advisory Council (if applicable) and the Executive Director. It 
should also present clear policies regarding criteria for the composition of the 
General Assembly and the Board, as well as the selection and rotation policies 
for each. 
2. Define processes for dealing with conflict of interest issues. IMS should 
develop a working definition of conflict of interest and put in place procedures 
for dealing with conflict of interest issues when they arise. We recommend 
that a small committee made up of the IMS Chair and one or two other board 
members serve as the decision-making body whenever a conflict of interest 
issue should arise. This will absolve the Executive Director from taking 
responsibility for decisions on such matters.  Decisions taken by this 
committee should be recorded and signed by the IMS Chair. 
3. Improve communication with board members. In between meetings, board 
members should receive short notices on upcoming interventions, assessment 
missions or other IMS activities in order for them to be able to comment and 
provide input before an activity is undertaken.    
4. Improve record keeping of the organisation’s decisions. Minute taking should 
become an administrative responsibility and accurately describe decisions that 
are taken at meetings. Minutes from the previous meeting should be reviewed 
at each board meeting, amendments noted, and signed off by the IMS Chair. 
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5. Hire additional programme and administrative staff. The Executive Director 
should be released from some of his programme responsibilities in order to 
take on a more “strategic thinking“ role within the organisation.  
A programme officer, recruited on the basis of an open and international 
competition, should be hired in the very near future. This position should 
include a half-time evaluation/impact assessment function. Additional 
secretarial and bookkeeping support should also be recruited in the near future. 
6. Develop detailed job descriptions. Detailed job descriptions should be 
prepared for all staff members.  
  
Overall recommendations on Programmatic Issues 
7. Second phase. The second phase of IMS should be extended to a 3 –5 years 
period.  
8. Redefine and raise the ceiling for funding. There should be increased funding 
for IMS in order for the organisation to be able to (a) raise the funding for 
certain select projects, and (b) expand certain select projects into a medium-
term framework, and (c) in certain cases enter a second phase of special 
projects. 
9. Design a project management cycle. IMS might consider separating its 
interventions into a planning and an implementation phase in order to be able 
to commit larger amounts of funds to interventions that require them. A 
guideline for expenditure could be set for a planning phase, which usually 
includes assessments missions, and for a first and any subsequent phases of 
interventions. 
10. Strategic planning. An annual strategic planning session, aided by an external 
facilitator, should be held once a year or every two years, as needed. Such a 
meeting should be held over several days and include board members, staff 
and selected IMS consultants and other relevant resource persons. 
11. Improve evaluation procedures.  As much as possible, IMS should work 
evaluation mechanisms into its projects and, when necessary, provide for an 
external evaluation process. Evaluation tools will have to be determined on a 
case-by-case basis. If IMS is to take evaluation seriously, it will have to 
dedicate resources to it.  
12. Training partners. IMS needs to follow up their training partners, particularly 
the international training partners to whom they outsource training 
assignments. Use local partners more, couple international and local training 
expertise. Ask for proper training plans before the workshop is being 
implemented. 
13. Criteria for interventions. IMS needs to re-examine and refine its criteria for 
interventions and its definitions of stages of conflict. As part of a learning 
exercise, IMS should try to assess which types of intervention work best under 
which type of circumstances, i.e. conflict phase (escalation phase, armed 
conflict, reduction phase). 
14. Create a platform for emergency assistance/safety mechanisms. IMS should 
take a lead in bringing together organisations that manage emergency 
assistance funds or are involved in safety issues (safety training, safe havens 
etc.) in order to improve their coordination and develop overall strategies for 
this area of work.  
15. Initiate a working group on conflict conscious journalism and peace building 
media projects. IMS could bring together groups working on conflict 
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conscious reporting and peace building media projects in order to discuss 
methodologies and evaluation issues. The latter has been identified by some 
practitioners as an area in serious need of development. 
16. Documentation of activities. Documents should more consistently state its 
author. The origination of the intervention should be more clearly stipulated 
along with the objective for an intervention.  
17. Greater cooperation with organisations involved with conflict analysis. IMS’s 
work would benefit from greater cooperation with peace and conflict research 
institutes as well as governmental bodies in order to sharpen their analysis and 
methodologies in conflict situations and, in the longer term, strengthen the 
choices of their activities in overt armed conflict areas. The question of the 
role of media in peace building exercises is complex, and IMS should consider 
working out indicators for how media and media support initiatives might 
contribute to peace building 
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Annex 1 – Terms of Reference 
 
Copenhagen, 20 January 2003 
J.No: FRESTA, 5.X.2-11. 
 
TERMS OF REFERENCE 
FOR 
EVALUATION OF INTERNATIONAL MEDIA SUPPORT 
 
 
1. Background 
In 2001, a preparatory group of Danish actors involved in international media issues –
prominent Danish Journalists and representatives of the Danish School of Journalism, 
the Danish Union of Journalists, Baltic Media Centre and the Danish Centre for 
Human Rights –established the new international independent NGO International 
Media Support (IMS) in co-operation with international media stakeholders.  
 
IMS was established as a response to a recognized need for an emergency mechanism, 
which could channel observed needs of media in potential or actual conflict areas into 
short-term, timely and effective action. The overall objective of the IMS is stated in 
the project document of April 2001 as: “Peace, stability, democracy and freedom of 
expression and pluralism of the press in conflict and conflict threatened areas 
enhanced through emergency assistance to media practitioners/journalists and media 
institutions/associations in situations of potential or manifest conflict”. Important 
aspects of the work of IMS comprise interaction with other international media actors 
in its activities and a long-term perspective in the short-term interventions.  
 
The IMS initiative was based on a number of observations and assumptions regarding 
media and violent conflicts. Thus, the IMS project proposal of 30 April 2001 observes 
that restrictions on the editorial freedom of the press, including suppression of 
freedom of expression and the emergence of conflict- inciting journalism, is often 
among the first signs of an escalating conflict. Furthermore, it assumes, that media 
can play not only a negative, conflict- igniting role but also a positive, countering and 
constructive role in situations of latent or manifest violent conflict. As such media 
support activities should form an integral part of any conflict prevention and peace 
building effort.  
 
The need for an emergency mechanism was discussed and confirmed at an 
international conference on emergency media assistance in Copenhagen in January 
2001. A broad group of Danish, international and regional media organisations were 
present at the conference.  
 
C M I  
 81 
For the pilot phase 2001-2003, IMS receives Danida-support and FRESTA-support at 
the amount of 11.5 mill. DKK, cf. the appropriation document (aktstykke) no. 221 of 
15 May 2001). This support can be viewed as initial funding, enabling IMS to 
gradually seek other additional sources of funding.  
 
It is stipulated in the appropriation document that an external evaluation of the pilot 
phase should be carried out in the beginning of 2003 with a view to creating a basis 
for a renewed appropriation to the IMS project. Consequently, the evaluation will 
form an integral part of the process of establishing the basis for informed decisions 
regarding the future of IMS (next project phase and funding). As a consequence 
hereof, the drafting and completion of the IMS project document for the next project 
phase is also expected closely interrelated with the evaluation process. 
 
As the IMS pilot phase ends in the summer 2003, the evaluation report should at the 
latest be available by 1 May 2003.  
 
 
2. Objectives  
The main objectives are to obtain an assessment of the quality of the performance of 
IMS, primarily understood as the relevance and the effectiveness of the activities 
undertaken by IMS through its pilot phase 2001-2003, and to obtain recommendations 
regarding the mandate, the networking and the activities.  
 
 
3. Scope of work and main issues of the evaluation 
The evaluation should address both general and specific aspects of the performance of 
IMS and of its activities. Three main issues are identified as subjects for the 
evaluation in order to fulfil the objectives of the evaluation. The evaluation team 
should carry out the evaluation with due attention to the five evaluation criteria 
outlined in Evaluation Guidelines, Danida, February 1999 – relevance, effectiveness, 
efficiency, impact, sustainability – yet with main emphasis on the first two criteria. 
The evaluation should comprise but not necessarily be limited to the following issues:  
 
1) Overall approach of IMS in accordance with its mandate. 
2) Organisational capacity of IMS and method development 
3) The operational arm: Performance of specific media assistance activities 
 
1. Overall approach of IMS in accordance with its mandate 
IMS was established as a new initiative mandated to fill a specific gap within the 
international field of media assistance to local media in potential or actual violent 
conflict areas and to interact in its activities with other local, regional and 
international media organisations. Furthermore, the project document emphasise “that 
the success of IMS will be determined by its ability to operate and in practice prove 
its uniqueness” (p.17). Against this background, the first evaluation of IMS should 
address the relevance and timeliness of the overall approach of IMS. Key aspects 
include, but are not limited to the following:  
- How does IMS manage to prioritise its resources and focus its range of actions 
in accordance with its specific mandate? This includes which considerations 
the selected conflict areas for intervention are based on. 
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- The IMS role on the international media (assistance) community: To what 
degree and how does IMS interact and network with other international 
organisations/actors in the institutional context of "international media 
assistance". Important actors are obviously other international and Danish 
media NGOs and institutions including both media monitoring and media 
development organisations. The latter should oft en be taking over from the 
short-term IMS interventions. Key questions: the comparative advantages of 
IMS, IMS ability to attract partners for action, synergy of actions in 
partnerships, etc.  
- The interaction of IMS with regional and international governmental 
organisations, such as the EU and UN, e.g. use of information resources for 
selecting ‘conflict areas’ of particular relevance for IMS intervention and 
mobilisation of additional human and financial resources from the 
international organisations. .  
- A final aspect is how IMS interacts with donors, incl. the Danish MFA 
(FRESTA, Danida) and the mobilisation of other donors? 
 
2. Organisational capacity of IMS and method development  
The evaluation should touch upon issues of organisational capacity – while however 
bearing the short life span of IMS in mind – and of method development, e.g. the 
development of methods in relation experiences gained.  
Key aspects comprises: 
- The performance of and working relationship of the IMS Secretariat and the 
IMS board? This aspect should also reflect on the appropriateness of the 
internal division of labour in the organisation/ the roles of the Secretariat and 
the board as well as their access to and legitimacy vis-à-vis key people at 
various levels in other organisations.  
- The role of the annual international advisory board meeting and the 
membership structure in relation to interaction between IMS and the advisory 
board. 
- The selection, development and application of process tools and specific IMS 
tools in light of lessons learned. 
 
3. The operational arm: Performance of specific media assistance activities 
The evaluation should examine a number of country or region specific interventions 
with a view to assess the relevance and value of the activities and the relationship  
with local media in the conflict area, the co-operation with other international media 
organisations and international organisations, and regarding the impact of the 
activities.  
Key aspects of this issue include but are not limited to:  
- The relevance of the activity carried out in relation to the political context in 
the conflict area. 
- The relevance of the specific short-term IMS intervention with regard to the 
long-term strategic perspective, i.e. securing a long time-perspective in the 
short-term IMS activity.  
- The ability of IMS to identify local, regional or international actors/partners 
who can take over from/ follow-up to the short-term IMS activity. This and the 
abovementioned aspect would be expected to be crucial features of the 
sustainability of the in country activities of IMS.  
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- A fourth aspect is how and to what extent IMS interact/interrelate to other 
international media actors with activities in the specific conflict area and – to 
the extent possible or feasible – with other selected international actors 
implementing conflict prevention/ peace building activities in the conflict area. 
 
4. Method of work 
Due to the process-oriented nature of conflict prevention and peace building 
interventions, into which category the media assistance activities of IMS falls, the 
evaluation should focus primarily on the processes of work of IMS, entailing a focus 
on qualitative dimensions rather than on quantitative issues. The main method 
employed will be that of inter-subjective validation, including substantive dialogues 
and interviews with stakeholders – local and regional actors in conflict areas, Danish, 
regional and international media organisations and partners. The detailed outline of 
methodology and the selection of case studies to be undertaken will be established by 
the team and presented in the inception note (ref. below).  
 
- Consult with IMS and the Danish MFA in selecting the relevant organisations 
and country studies. For this purpose, an inception meeting with the evaluation 
team the Danish MFA and the IMS-staff will be held on the 31 January 2003. 
At the meeting the methods and choices of issues to be covered by the 
evaluation, including the country studies should be endorsed . The evaluation 
team should prepare a brief inception note (1-3 pages) based on the 
discussions and conclusions of the meeting.  
- Study the project document, the activity reports, conference reports and other 
relevant material prepared by the IMS and IMS consultants.  
- Dialogue with a representative number of the advisory board members and 
partner organisations and journalists. A meeting/ seminar, which could bring a 
number (10-15) of such actors together and give them a chance to discuss with 
the team the subject matter/ IMS, should be held in Copenhagen.  
- Consult with selected partner organisations and independent consultants 
assisting IMS in conducting a specific activity. Partners/ consultants, who 
have worked in the countries selected for a visit by the team, should be 
included in this group. 
- Select information from other relevant Danish, regional and international 
media actors in the media field on their view of IMS and its activities. 
- Visit three to five countries and carry out a field study of IMS interventions. 
The case studies should represent different conflict phases (immediate pre-
violent conflict phase, manifest violent conflict phase; post-ceasefire/peace 
agreement phase), different geographical regions (Africa, Asia, Europe) and 
different types of intervention with different degrees of success, i.e. a weaker 
and a stronger project. If the lower number of case studies is carried out, it 
could be considered to hold a workshop with a representative of a local 
implementing organisation and of the international/external partner 
organisation, which assisted in carrying out the activity, the IMS and the team.  
 
 
5. Reporting/ Outputs 
The evaluation team shall prepare the outputs stated below. All reports should be 
made available to major stakeholders and approved by the Danish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. The reports should be produced in English. 
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- Inception note. A brief inception note (1-3 pages) should be delivered to the 
Danish MFA no later than one week after the inception meeting.  
- Draft evaluation report. A draft report should be submitted to the Danish 
MFA no later than 11 April. The Danish MFA will circulate the draft report to 
IMS for their comments.  
- Final evaluation report. The final report should be submitted to the Danish 
MFA for approval no later than 30 April 2003. The final report will be 
distributed to IMS, IMS partners and other major stakeholders, and also be 
available to the general public on request. 
 
 
6. Composition of team 
The evaluation will require a balanced team, comprising consultants with expertise 
within evaluation, the media sector, and emergency and/or development assistance to 
the geographical regions, where IMS operates. 
 
The evaluation team should be composed of: 
 
- A team leader with s several years of experience in media activities, media 
research and evaluation in Africa and/or other developing countries and/or 
conflict areas.  
- One consultant with several years of experience and skills in evaluation and 
development assistance. 
- One consultant with experience in media activities and project design and 
implementation in Africa and/or other developing countries and/or conflict 
areas. 
 
A reference group representing solid expertise on evaluation, emergency and 
development assistance activities and relevant geographical regions will be 
established.  
 
 
7. Work plan/ Schedule 
The evaluation shall be carried out in the months of February, March and April. There 
will be considerable room for flexibility as regards the scheduling of steps in the 
evaluation process. The evaluation team should decide upon the detailed schedule.  
 Evaluation team Danish MFA 
January 
6/1 
  
Draft TOR 
13/1 Draft contracts  
17/1 Contracts finalised Final TOR  
Contracts finalised 
31/1 1st joint meeting: team, IMS, MFA - do 
February 
 
March 
Team works: desk studies, seminar(s), 
field studies, etc. 
 
April 
 
1st draft evaluation report 
 
C M I  
 85 
11/4 
Week 16 Easter break   
22/4 2nd joint meeting: team, IMS, MFA re. 
draft report 
- do 
28/4 Final evaluation report submitted to MFA  
30/4  Approval of final evaluation report 
 
 
8. Key documents 
- Aktstykke [Document of the Finance Committee, Danish Parliament] 221 of 
15 May 2001 
- Draft Project Proposal, Danish International Media Support, April 2001 
[30/04/01] 
- Annual Report, International Media Support, 1 September 2001 – 1 September 
2002 
- IMS report of the 1st Copenhagen Conference on Emergency Assistance to 
Media, including list of participants.  
- IMS report of the 2nd Copenhagen Conference on Emergency Assistance to 
Media 6-7 October 2002, including list of participants. 
- Minutes of IMS Board-meetings: 24-25 September 2001; 22-23 April 2002; 5 
October 2002 
- Regulations [vedtægter] for International Media Support. 
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Annex 2 – Inception note 
 
 
INCEPTION NOTE FOR 
EVALUATION OF INTERNATIONAL MEDIA SUPPORT 
 
 
I. INTERPRETATION OF THE TERMS OF REFERENCE 
 
The present phase of IMS should be regarded as a pilot phase for the organization. 
The evaluation should take into consideration that it coincides with the planning of 
the next phase of IMS’s work. 
 
Consequently the evaluation is to be seen as: 
 
· A “learning document” for both IMS and its funders that will provide a) an 
input to the further work of IMS (i.e. suggestions for areas for IMS to continue 
working in, possible expansion of or further focusing of its field of 
operations); b) a critical analysis of IMS’s activities; and c) suggestions for 
improvement of its performance.  
 
· An overall assessment of the relevance and effectiveness of IMS’s 
interventions to date in relationship to its mission and mandate, i.e. to what 
extent has IMS been able to fulfil its intended role. 
  
The evaluation is not to evaluate the appropriateness of the mandate as such and the 
assumptions on which is based only so far as it relates to the recommendations for 
future action. The evaluators are not to be preoccupied with future funding 
considerations for IMS and propose whatever recommendations they see fit. 
 
II. METHODOLOGY 
The evaluation should have an overall comparative perspective both in relation to 
comparisons between different projects supported by IMS and in relation to the 
organization’s role compared to other media support initiatives and organizations.  
 
The evaluators suggest the following methods:  
 
Document review 
Relevant documents on the operations and activities of IMS will be reviewed by the 
evaluators. 
   
Case studies 
The evaluation will provide a detailed analysis of a selected number of projects and 
interventions.  The case studies chosen should: 
· Reflect the different roles IMS plays and its methods of work: catalyst 
(initiates an activity which is then taken on by another organization), 
facilitator (involving several parties from the start), etc.    
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· Comprise of cases in pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict  situations 
· Reflect the various types of interventions IMS has been involved with to date:  
- media coverage of conflict (investigative journalism and conflict conscious 
reporting) 
- media defence (media monitoring, legal assistance, etc.) 
- direct support to media and media support organizations (equipment, running 
costs) 
- safety (safety training, safe havens, etc.) 
- interventions with a regional perspective 
 
The case studies will be conducted through a variety of methods: in-country visits, 
telephone interviews, and questionnaires with both local and international 
implementing partners as well as consultants who have been involved in determining 
recommendations for interventions.  At the time of writing, it has been decided that 
the team will travel to Nepal/Sri Lanka, Kenya and Sudan, and Ghana.   
 
Check list to be used for interviews 
The evaluation team will develop a checklist of questions and issues that will be 
raised with informants of various kinds, in order to ensure that relevant issues are 
being covered in the interviews and consultations the team will undertake. 
 
Consultative workshop 
This workshop is still tentative as its purpose has not yet been determined. 
 
Reference Group 
A Reference Group consisting of the following proposed members will serve as 
sounding boards and advisors to the evaluation team on key analytical issues: Vibeke 
Sperling, former Foreign Editor, Politiken, Guest Professor University of Oslo, 
specialist on Eastern Europe and central Asia; Astrid Suhrke, Senior Researcher CMI, 
specialist in international conflict research; and Gunnar Sørbø, Director of CMI.  
 
III. MAIN EVALUATION QUESTIONS 
 
4. What are the strengths and weaknesses of IMS’ organizational structure? 
 
Special attention should be given to the following questions for staff, board of 
directors and international advisory board respectively: 
 
· From where does a project idea come and who receives it? 
· What comments are made to a nascent project idea? 
· What decisions are made about a project, at what stage, by whom and for what 
reasons? 
· What reasons are given for intervention and what reasons are given for non-
intervention, i.e. scrapping the project? 
· Who is responsible for committing of resources, how much and for what 
reasons? 
· What are working procedures during project implementation? 
· What are the working procedures after a project’s conclusion, i.e. reporting, 
evaluation, etc. 
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· What is conflict of interest for IMS? How is it dealt with? 
 
5. What processes have IMS used to design and implement its 
interventions/activities? What has been the IMS’ interventions’ contribution to 
achieving its mandate, promoting peace and stability, and to meeting IMS’ 
target groups’ needs? What lessons have been drawn for improving future 
interventions? 
  
Special attention should be given to the following issues: 
 
Mandate 
6. What was the reasoning behind the setting up of IMS? 
7. Which interests were involved in determining its mandate? 
8. What is the role of media in conflicts? 
9. What is an emergency? And what is the role of media in relation to an 
emergency? 
10. What does the professionalisation of media entail in a crisis situation? 
 
IMS’ methodologies  
· What is the relevance of IMS activities to the political context of the countries 
they intervene in? 
· How are IMS’ short–term activities relevant to the organization’s long-term 
strategic perspective? 
· What is the relationship between emergency media assistance, short-term 
media development, and long term media development work in IMS’ 
perspective? 
· How are methods of intervention developed, selected and applied? 
· Are the methods of intervention appropriate in light of the lessons learned so 
far?  
· Which are the sources that IMS base their judgments on? 
· What are “high profile” countries? Those of the most interest to the 
international media community, not necessarily those with most media 
exposure. 
· What are “core” and “grey” areas of work in relation to IMS’ priorities? 
Analyze the reasoning behind choice of areas for intervention. 
· What is the reasoning behind the division of activities between pre-conflict, 
conflict, and post-conflict areas? How has IMS arrived at the typology for 
where to place its interventions? 
· What are IMS’ target groups in the situations where they intervene?  
· What is the relationship between media development and media monitoring in 
IMS’ work? 
· What is the relevance of training projects? And what is IMS special 
contribution in regard to this? 
· What feedback exists from the various projects? How does IMS evaluate its 
projects? 
· What is IMS’ definition of sustainability?  
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3. To what extent has IMS been able to network and partner with other 
organizations to ensure the sustainability of its interventions? 
 
Special attention should be given to the following questions: 
? What is the relationship between IMS and its various partners?  
? Are some partners more relevant and better suited to cooperation partners than 
others? 
? What is IMS’ target group in terms of their international “audience” and in 
terms of gaining legitimacy among its peers? 
? How and to what extent does IMS interact/work together with other 
international media actors who are active in the specific country or area of 
activity? 
· How does IMS interact with its current and prospective donors? 
· What is IMS’ ability to identify local, regional or international partners who 
are able to carry a short-term activity into the long-term?  
· How does the IMS take advantage of regional and international governmental 
organizations, such as the EU and the UN, in:  
- deciding what country to intervene in? 
- in mobilising human resources 
- in mobilising financial resources 
 
5. What comparative advantage does IMS have over other media support 
organizations? What is unique about IMS? 
 
IV. TIMETABLE 
? Evaluators meet in Copenhagen on evening of February 12 to finalize a working 
framework for the evaluation  
? Meeting between evaluators, IMS staff and IMS board chair on Thursday, February 
13 and possibly Friday February 14.   
? Hugo travels to Sri Lanka and Nepal in late February/early March 
? Kim travels to Kenya and Sudan in late February.  
? Helge travels to Ghana in mid-March 
? Tentative consultative meeting to be held in Copenhagen on March 24, 25. 
? Evaluators meet with donors on March 26 (if consultative meeting takes place) 
Alternative meeting with donors is April 4 or 5. 
? Evaluators to meet in Copenhagen to work on draft conclusions of report on Friday 
April 4 
? Evaluators to meet with IMS board members on Saturday, April 5 
? Evaluators to attend IMS board meeting on Sunday April 6  
? Draft evaluation due April 11 
? Meeting with IMS, donors and evaluation team to discuss draft report on April 22 
? Final evaluation report due April 28. 
 
 
 
Kim Brice 
Helge Rønning 
Hugo Stokke 
 
February 6, 2003 
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Annex 3 - List of individuals interviewed: 
Adan, Ahmed Abdisalam, HornAfrik. Somalia 
Ahmed, Hassan Mohamoud, Editor- in Chief, Sunday Independent, Mogadisho 
Andrade, Rosamelia, International Programs, IMPACS  
Atem, Yaak Atem, Deputy Director of Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission 
Aznar, Alonso, Communication Adviser for Eastern Africa, UNESCO, Nairobi 
 
Barker, John, A19, Johannesburg office  
Bhattarai, Binod, Kantipur TV, Nepal 
Bjerregård, Mogens Blicher, Chairman, Danish Union of Journalists 
Blau, Bjorn, Head of Section, Nepal, Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Breum, Martin, Deputy Director, IMS 
 
Chipare, Luckson, Regional Director, MISA 
Coudray, Silvie, Programme Specialist, Division for Freedom pf Expression, 
Democracy and Peace, UNESCO 
 
Dahal, Tara Nath, President, Federation of Nepalese Journalists 
Dal, Ebbe, Danish Daily Newspapers Publishers Association 
Davis, Alan, IWPR 
De Jong, Sarah, Coordinator, Safety Program, IFJ 
Dellem, Dr. Edmund N., African Commission of Health and Human Rights 
Deshapriya, Sunandra, Convenor, Free Media Movement and associate of CPA, Sri 
Lanka 
Dijkstra, Bart, Director, CAF 
Dixit, Kanak Mani, Editor, Himal South Asia, Nepal 
Doubleday, Paul, British Council, Khartoum 
Dyreborg, Helle, FRESTA 
 
El Bagir, Faisal – Information and Media Officer, Khartoum Center for Human Rights 
and Environmental Development 
Fernando, Upul Joseph, journalist, Lanka Deepa and member of CCCJ, Sri Lanka 
Fillmore, Nick, IFEX 
Frandsen, Kjeld, FRESTA 
 
Geevon-Smith, Wellington. MFWA 
Ghimire, Pradip, Secretary, Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Studies, Nepal 
Grollo, Celine, Solidarity Fund, RSF 
 
Hækkerup, Susanne Rumohr, FRESTA 
Haider, Abdulay, Program Officer for Somalia, Novib, Nairobi 
Hallberg, Marianne, Regional Representative, Dan Churchaid, Nairobi 
Hattatuwa, Sanjana, Research Associate, CPA, Sri Lanka 
Højberg, Jesper, Executive Director, IMS 
Holmberg, Simon, Director, Baltic Media Centre 
Hoppe, Thierry, Head of Section, Horn of Africa, Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
Howard, Ross,  independent consultant, IMPACS Associate 
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Hummaida, Ofman,  Director, Sudanese Organisation Against Torture 
Hussain, Saneeya, Director, Panos South Asia, Nepal 
 
Iwan, Victor, Editor, Ravaya and member of Editors Guild, Sri Lanka 
 
Jayasekera, Rohan, Web Editor and special projects, Index on Censorship 
John, Aruni, Deputy Director, Panos South Asia, Nepal 
 
Karikari, Kwame, Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA) 
Khanal, Chiranji, Director of Training, Nepal Press Institute 
Kharel, P., Media Advisor, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Nepal 
Koirala, Bharat D., Chairman, Media Services International, Nepal 
Krogh, Torben, Journalist, Chairman of IMS 
 
Labidi, Kamel, Independent consultant/journalist 
Lægreid, Oddvar, Minister Counselor, Norwegian Embassy, Sri Lanka 
Leepile, Methaetsile, Executive Director, Samdef 
Lindsnæs, Birgit, Deputy Director, Danish Center for Human Rights 
Locussol, Virginie, Researcher, RSF 
Lugala, Victor, Communications Officer, The New Sudan Council of Churches 
Lush, David, consultant on Sudan mission  
 
Machon, Lotte, FRESTA 
Maïga, Maitre Soyata, Chairperson MFWA. Mali 
Mainali, Mohan, Director, Centre for Investigative Journalism, Nepal 
Markiewicz, Edouard, Media Action International 
McGill, Stanley, The News, Liberia 
McIvor, Michael, independent consultant on Sudan mission 
Meinecke, Geert, Minister Counsellor, Danish Embassy, Nepal 
Mendel, Toby, Legal Officer, A19 
Møller, Lars, Journalist, Head of IMS Advisory Council 
Mørch, Joseph, Representative, UNICEF Somalia 
 
Negus, Steve, independent consultant/journalist 
Nimley, Augustus, Liberia National Democracy Monitors 
 
Ojo, Edataen, Media Rights Agenda, Nigeria 
Okeny, Albino, Panos East Africa 
Okwaci, Rebecca, BBC monitoring service (member of Sudan mission reference 
group based in Nairobi) 
 
Padmakamura, Bandula, Director Editorial, Lake House Newspapers, Sri Lanka 
Palakidnar, Ananth, journalist, Sunday Observer and member of CCCJ, Sri Lanka 
Phiri, Sam, Media Programme Officer, OSISA 
Ponnie, J. Lyndon, Liberia National Democracy Monitors 
Puddephatt, Andrew, Executive Director of A19 and IMS board member 
 
Rasmussen, Tine, Administrator, IMS 
Ringaard, Jørgen, Danish School of Journalism 
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Savaranamuttu, Dr. Pasiliasothy, Director, Centre for Policy Alternatives, Sri Lanka 
Schmidt, Mogens, Assistant Director General, WAN 
Senghor, Diana, Panos Institute for West Africa 
Skau, Nanna Skrumsager, Danida 
Sperling, Vibeke, Guest Professor, University of Oslo 
Swaray, Abdual Rahman, West Africa Magazine Correspondent, Sierra Leone 
 
Thompson, Mark, Independent consultant 
Titus, Zoe. Media Institute Southern Africa. (MISA) 
Tola, Atnafu, Program Coordinator for Somalia, UNESCO 
Torkelsson, Teitur, Press officer, Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission 
 
Wagtmann, Michael, Ambassador, FRESTA 
Walayo, Abdulkadir, coordinator of the East Afr ican Media Institute, Mogadisho 
chapter 
Walayo, Abulkadir Mahmoud, Eastern Africa Media Institute Somalia Chapter 
Warnock, Kitty, Panos London 
Wesley, Antonio Y, Press Union of Liberia 
Wesseh, Conmay, Centre for Democratic Empowerment, (CEDE) Abidjan 
White, Aidan, Secretary General, IFJ 
 
Ørnmark, Anders, Danida 
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Annex 4 – List of IMS partners 
International organisations  
ARTICLE 19 (A19). A19 is named after Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and works in over 30 countries around the world. It monitors, 
researches, publishes, lobbies, campaigns and litigates on freedom of expression 
issues and develops legal and other standards to advance media freedom. It is best 
known for its work on freedom of expression policy and legal reform issues. 
Mr. Andrew Puddephatt, A19’s Executive Director, is Vice Chair of IMS’ board of 
directors. A19 has partnered with IMS on several initiatives. They have participated in 
joined missions (paid for by the IMS), developed a joint proposal for Afghanistan and 
implemented a project, the Journalists’ Safe Haven project for Zimbabwe, with IMS 
funds. IMS planted the seed for the safe haven project, which A19 took on board and 
implemented. 
 
IMS has linked several of its partners to A19 that, in turn, has provided valuable 
policy advice.  IMS is appreciated because it “has been established without anyone 
getting resentful…. It plays a unique role because it is a disinterested party”. 
   
The Baltic Media Centre (BMC) 
The BMC, based in Denmark provides training to media professionals, provides 
training for media professionals, initiates international co-productions, provides legal 
advice and expert consultancies among other services for radio, television, print 
media and independent production companies all over the world. 
 
The BMC’s Director is a permanent member of the IMS board. The organization has 
participated in two IMS missions, in Pakistan (in relationship to Afghanistan) and 
India, which were in relationship with existing BMC projects. 
 
Index on Censorship (Index) 
Index publishes a well-established journal, entitled Index, which publishes analysis, 
reportage and interviews on censorship issues from all over the world and a country-
by-country list of free speech violations. The Index on Censorship office provides 
space for a Centre for Exiled Journalists, which is run by an RSF correspondent who 
works out of Index’s office.  
 
In addition to the journal, Index conducts occasional special projects. For example, it 
has developed a proposal for “Direct Emergency Support for Banned or Excluded 
Publications”, in partnership with former staff of the Freedom Forum in Europe and 
the Guardian Foundation, from experience they gained with a Sierra Leonean 
publication several years ago. The project largely remains an idea on paper since it 
has to raise funds on a case-by-case basis.  
 
Index and IMS regularly share information and ideas. For example, IMS has provided 
Index with advice and input into the support for banned publications project.  Index 
has successfully sought support from IMS for one of its partner organizations. For 
Index, IMS “took up the challenge of working in partnerships” and has succeeded. 
Index explained that it often works hard and unsuccessfully at trying to get funding 
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for small, practical projects on the ground. IMS helps fill this funding gap because 
“they are able to act quickly, and without an agenda, removing some of the obstacles 
for quick action”.   
 
International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX) 
IFEX runs an international urgent alerts network that ensures the rapid dissemination 
of information about abuses against freedom of expression to its 40 member 
organizations and other interested organizations. IFEX also runs an “outreach” 
program which consists of training in monitoring attacks against the media, small 
grants to member organizations, and ICT equipment provision among other activities. 
IFEX’s sister organization, the Canadian Journalists for Free Expression (CJFE), 
disburses about USD20,000 a year through its “Journalists in Distress Fund,” which 
consist of grants ranging from USD500 to USD2000 for medical, relocation and/or 
living costs as well as occasional legal fees for journalists under threat. 
 
IFEX and IMS share information regularly and has helped IFEX initiate activities that 
they did not have the ability to launch due to lack of funding. IMS has commissioned 
IFEX to provide training programs in media monitoring.  In at least one instance, IMS 
provided bridge funding to cover the running costs of an IFEX member, until IFEX 
was successfully able to raise longer-term funding.  IFEX has also been helpful to 
IMS in identifying appropriate consultants for implementing various projects. 
 
IFEX commended IMS’ role as a catalyst for initiatives in relation to crisis situations. 
They are impressed with IMS’ network of consultants around the world, and its ability 
to build partnerships.  
 
Institute for Media, Policy and Civil Society (IMPACS) 
Impacs runs an International Media Program which conducts research and policy 
development, conflict mediation and journalist training. They have worked in 
Cambodia, Guyana, and South Asia to date. 
 
IMPACS and IMS have co-funded (IMS covering the lion’s share of the costs) 
conflict sensitive reporting projects in Sri Lanka and Nepal (see section on Sri Lanka 
and Nepal below for more details) and have co-published a practical training manual 
entitled Conflict Sensitive Journalism.  
 
IMPACS is a significant partner for IMS.  Mr. Ross Howard, an IMPACS associate, 
has conducted a series of training programs in Nepal and Sri Lanka and has written 
the training manual theyhave just published. Mr. Howard also wrote An operational 
framework for media and peacebuilding (published by IMPACS) which has inspired 
some of IMS’ criteria for its interventions.   
 
IMPACS view is that there is need for an organization like IMS because it usually 
takes too long for organizations to take action: “The advantage of IMS is that it 
spends more time doing something than thinking about it ”. 
 
Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) 
IWPR seeks to strengthen local journalism in areas of conflict by training reporters, 
facilitating dialogue and providing reliable information via its award-winning website, 
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www.iwpr.net, and electronic publications in nine languages. IWPR is best known for 
its work in Eastern Europe, and especially the Balkans. 
 
IMS and IWPR regularly exchange information and seek mutual advice. IMS has 
supported some IWPR activities, namely in Afghanistan, and IMS has engaged IWPR 
staff to conduct assessments on their behalf. From IWPR’s perspective, IMS’ 
approach is “fresh. They are here to facilitate and complement. They bring creative 
thinking to the table and are efficient. Because of their attitude and vision, they were 
able to play a sheep dog role in Afghanistan by bringing the various groups working 
on similar issues to speak with each other”.  
 
International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) 
IFJ, with headquarters in Brussels, is the world's largest organization of journalists 
with 450.000 members in more than 100 countries. The IFJ promotes international 
action to defend press freedom and social justice through strong, free and independent 
trade unions of journalists. The IFJ manages a Safety Fund, with a budget of about 
USD750.000, which provides emergency cash to journalists and their families in 
circumstances where medical or legal aid is needed or situations where journalists 
must go into hiding. On average, they provide no more than USD1000 to one 
individual.  
 
Sarah de Jong, who is in charge of IFJ’s safety program, is an IMS board member. 
IMS has provided financial support for the IFJ to implement safety training courses in 
Pakistan (for Afghan journalists), Palestine, Ivory Coast, and others.  The two 
organizations share ideas about how to address journalists’ safe ty issues and are 
developing a concept of combining technical safety training with broader professional 
issues such as conflict reporting, investigative journalism and broader human rights 
considerations for example. IMS has also brought IFJ in contact with some of its 
newer partners.   
 
IFJ says IMS “helped pick up the momentum of what we had started” in the safety 
training area…. IMS has been a breath of fresh air because it has been innovative and 
are bringing to the mainstream certain fast tracked activities…. IMS support has 
helped shift the perception that safety of journalists is more than just groups being 
able to monitor attacks against the press”. IMS has also “added texture to the range of 
partners we draw from”.  
 
Media Action International (MAI)   
MAI “promotes the effective use of credible, independent media for the benefit of 
vulnerable populations in crisis and post-crisis situations”. It sponsors and implements 
media content development projects in countries in crisis. 
 
IMS have funded MAI to conduct a conflict sensitive reporting training in the Ivory 
Coast and is funding inputs into a follow-up conference which is being organized by 
MAI. MAI is also participating on an assessment mission to Angola with IMS 
funding. 
 
For MAI, “IMS is one of our best collaborators. They create the process for putting 
media projects in place and leave it up to others to take it on board. They help us 
initiate projects which then will help us get support from others”. 
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Reporters Sans Frontieres (RSF)   
RSF researches, denounces and publicizes press freedom violations. The organization 
works with “correspondents” in various countries around the world that provide up to 
date information on freedom of expression issues. RSF manages a Solidarity Fund 
which offers support to individual journalists, journalists associations and private 
media enterprises that are in need of emergency assistance whether financial, legal or 
medical. The Fund has an annual budget of about EUR100.000.  
 
RSF called upon IMS last year to consider offering support to a struggling, opposition 
newspaper in Tunisia. IMS consults with RSF in areas of mutual interest. For 
example, RSF is grateful for IMS having facilitated the identification of a 
correspondent for the Sudan. 
 
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
Among other areas, UNESCO oversees a communications and information program 
which has a freedom of expression component. They have co-funded a number of 
safety training activities with IMS namely in Pakistan (for Afghan journalists) and in 
Palestine. 
 
IMS and UNESCO regularly share information and seek mutual advice. UNESCO 
finds IMS’ reports “professional, of a high quality and useful since we are not able to 
go into countries as quickly as they are”. IMS is especially relevant for UNESCO 
because “we are not able to operate in conflict areas due to our more bureaucratic 
nature”. 
 
World Association of Newspapers (WAN) 
WAN represents 71 national newspaper associations, individual newspaper executives 
in 100 nations, 13 news agencies, and nine regional press organizations. Mr. Morgen 
Schmidt, WAN’s assistant Director General and the Chair of the Danish Union of 
Journalists, serves on the IMS board of directors.  
 
IMS attended a meeting in Colombia co-organized by WAN which led to IMS’ 
support to several projects there.  IMS also contracted, via WAN’s network, a 
consultant who could help offer advice to a fledgling Sudanese newspapers 
association. 
 
Regional Organizations  
 
Media Institute for Southern Africa 
Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) is a non-governmental organization with 
member organizations in 11 of the Southern Africa Development Community 
(SADC) countries. It engages in advocacy, a news exchange project, and capacity 
building for its members and the independent media. 
 
MISA represents an important source of information for IMS on matters in southern 
Africa and represents an important model of a successful regional media association.  
IMS provided support to MISA for various activities related to media law reform in 
Zimbabwe as well as for participation in an assessment mission to Angola. MISA has 
also delivered media monitoring training in West Africa with support from IMS.  
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For MISA, “IMS is more than a donor because they get involved with the issues and 
bring ideas to the table. Their quick turn around time is appreciated because they 
enable you to do what you need to do, when you need to do it”.  
 
Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA) 
MFWA defends and promotes the rights of the media throughout West Africa through 
advocacy, monitoring, alerting and publicizing violations of and attacks on freedom 
of expression, training to build media capacity and facilitating debates on relevant 
issues. MFWA relies on a network of regional correspondents that act as media 
monitors on media abuses in the region. It also cooperates with the national press 
unions throughout the West African region. 
MFWA is a key IMS partner in West Africa. Given IMS’s interest in promoting 
learning across borders and the MFWA Director’s knowledge and contacts in the 
Horn of Africa, MFWA has participated in an IMS assessment in the Horn of Africa. 
A proposal developed by MFWA for the Horn of Africa is under consideration. IMS 
has also supported several stages of MFWA’s activitie s in Liberia as well as a training 
course in Sierra Leone (see section on West Africa and the Horn of Africa for more 
details).  
 
MFWA “appreciates IMS’ professionalism, competency and expediency”.  
 
Panos Institute in East Africa and South Asia 
The Panos Institutes work to ensure that information is effectively used to foster 
public debate, pluralism and democracy. In South Asia, Panos prioritizes its work on 
media pluralism, public health, the environment and conflict issues. In East Africa, 
one of its components is a “Media for Peace” Program.  
 
Panos and IMS have collaborated with Panos South Asia on its activities in Sri Lanka 
and Nepal and with Panos East Africa on an assessment of media development needs 
for northern and southern Sudan.   
Panos East Africa considers IMS’ work in the Sudan “very brave” because many 
groups have postponed activities due to the political situation in the country. “They 
promised to the media community in Sudan that they would do something and they 
have”. The first IMS Sudan assessment helped Panos define its own strategies and 
activities in the Sudan.  
 
 
Donor organizations  
 
Communications Assistance Foundation/Stichting Communicatie 
Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (CAF/SCO)  
CAF was founded by the Netherlands Association of Journalists; the Society of Chief 
Editors; and the Dutch Newspaper Association and is entirely funded by the Dutch 
Government. CAF supports independent media development in developing countries 
around the world, including Africa, Latin America and Asia. 
 
CAF manages an emergency assistance fund that provides “emergency relief” for 
media emanating from a natural disaster or a conflict situation. They dispose of  
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EUR150,000 a year which is made available in grants of about EUR20,000 each for 
journalists, media enterprises or journalists associations in need. They also make use 
of the Dutch Journalists Union fund which provides computers (lap tops for about 
€2,000 each) for journalists on an emergency basis. If CAF does not have sufficient 
funds available to respond to an emergency, they can make applications to the Dutch 
Government for additional support. 
 
CAF co-funded and implemented an activity in Ivory Coast. CAF welcomes this 
“donor coordination in media support”.  
 
Danida 
Danida funds 40 per cent of IMS’ budget.  As a matter of course, IMS meets with 
Danida representatives in the local embassies and, on occasion, interacts with the 
country officers in Copenhagen. IMS has managed to successfully raise funds from 
several Danish Embassies for their partner’s activities.  IMS tried to raise funds from 
Danida for an activity in Afghanistan, unsuccessfully.  
 
FRESTA  
FRESTA funds 60 per cent  of IMS’ current budget. They have a dynamic and 
symbiotic relationship. IMS and FRESTA conducted a joint mission to Central Asia 
in order to identify opportunities for short and long-term media support. FRESTA 
turn to IMS to provide input on certain proposals they receive and, on occasion, IMS 
forwards proposals from its partner organizations to FRESTA for possible funding. 
IMS is currently supporting an array of activities in Central Asia that they plan to 
develop into a proposal to be submitted to FRESTA for possible funding.  
 
The Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA)  
OSISA is a private non-profit foundation that is part of the Open Society network of 
foundations established by George Soros. OSISA supports, among other areas, 
projects that enhance freedom of expression and the development of independent 
media throughout the southern Africa region. 
 
To date, the IMS and OSISA have co-funded a safe haven project in Zimbabwe and 
an assessment of media development needs in Angola. For OSISA, the IMS has 
“taken the lead in bringing organizations groups together in order to work together. In 
the case of the Angola assessment, if they had not speeded up the process, it would 
have never taken place”.  
 
The Open Society Institute’s Regional Media Program (OSI) 
OSI is a network of private, non-profit foundations that support the development of a 
more open society mainly in Eastern and Central Europe and the Caucasus. The 
regional media program works in cooperation with Open Society’s national 
foundations to support a wide array of freedom of expression and media development 
projects. 
 
OSI has called upon IMS to provide emergency support to one of its partners in 
Georgia. OSI has also co-funded activities with IMS in Eastern and Central Europe 
and have an ongoing dialogue about activities in the Caucuses. 
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Annex 5 - Statistical tables 
 
5. 1 Frequency tables 
 
Note: The frequency tables give a percentage breakdown of those entries in the 
classification schemes that could be easily quantified. 
 
 
ORIGINATION OF PROJECT  
 
 Frequency Percent 
IMS 12 52,2 
other media 
organisation 
11 47,8 
Total 23 100,0 
 
GEOGRAPHICAL AREA  
 
 Frequency Percent 
Africa 10 43,5 
Asia 5 21,7 
Europe 3 13,0 
Middle East 3 13,0 
South America 1 4,3 
Caribbean 1 4,3 
Total 23 100,0 
 
 
TYPE OF PROBLEM 
 
Media oppression  
 
 Frequency Percent 
YES 20 87,0 
NO 3 13,0 
Total 23 100,0 
 
 
Security threat to journalists  
 
 Frequency Percent 
YES 21 91,3 
NO 2 8,7 
Total 23 100,0 
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Censorship  
 
 Frequency Percent 
YES 16 69,6 
NO 7 30,4 
Total 23 100,0 
 
 
Financial constraints  
 
 Frequency Percent 
YES 20 87,0 
NO 3 13,0 
Total 23 100,0 
 
Restricted access to information 
 
 Frequency Percent 
YES 22 95,7 
NO 1 4,3 
Total 23 100,0 
 
 
 
STAGE OF PROBLEM  
 
Note: This table uses IMS terminology, but elsewhere in the report we have suggested 
alternative terms 
 
 Frequency Percent 
pre-conflict 6 26,1 
manifest conflict 9 39,1 
Post-conflict 8 34,8 
Total 23 100,0 
 
 
 
TYPE OF MEDIUM SUPPORTED  
 
Private print  
 
 Frequency Percent 
YES 19 82,6 
NO 4 17,4 
Total 23 100,0 
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Private TV/radio  
 
 Frequency Percent 
YES 16 69,6 
NO 7 30,4 
Total 23 100,0 
 
 
State print  
 
 Frequency Percent 
YES 1 4,3 
NO 22 95,7 
Total 23 100,0 
 
 
State TV/radio  
 
 Frequency Percent 
YES 2 8,7 
NO 21 91,3 
Total 23 100,0 
 
 
Electronic media  
 
 Frequency Percent 
YES 2 8,7 
NO 21 91,3 
Total 23 100,0 
 
 
TARGET OF IMS ACTIVITY 
 
Journalists and other media workers 
 
 Frequency Percent 
YES 23 100,0 
 
 
Readers/public at large  
 
 Frequency Percent 
YES 3 13,0 
NO 20 87,0 
Total 23 100,0 
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TYPE OF INTERVENTION 
 
Assessment  
 
 Frequency Percent 
YES 11 47,8 
NO 12 52,2 
Total 23 100,0 
 
 
Monitoring  
 
 Frequency Percent 
YES 8 34,8 
NO 15 65,2 
Total 23 100,0 
 
 
Training  
 
 Frequency Percent 
YES 12 52,2 
NO 11 47,8 
Total 23 100,0 
 
 
Content transformation  
 
 Frequency Percent 
YES 9 39,1 
NO 14 60,9 
Total 23 100,0 
 
 
Legal assistance  
 
 Frequency Percent 
YES 3 13,0 
NO 20 87,0 
Total 23 100,0 
 
 
Organisational support  
 
 Frequency Percent 
YES 10 43,5 
NO 13 56,5 
Total 23 100,0 
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Equipment/infrastructure  
 
 Frequency Percent 
YES 4 17,4 
NO 19 82,6 
Total 23 100,0 
 
 
Facilitation/catalyst  
 
 Frequency Percent 
YES 3 13,0 
NO 20 87,0 
Total 23 100,0 
 
 
Direct/indirect funding  
 
 Frequency Percent 
YES 8 34,8 
NO 15 65,2 
Total 23 100,0 
 
 
Advocacy/lobbying  
 
 Frequency Percent 
YES 4 17,4 
NO 19 82,6 
Total 23 100,0 
 
 
Safety  
 
 Frequency Percent 
YES 8 34,8 
NO 15 65,2 
Total 23 100,0 
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5.2 Crosstabulations: Stage of problem by type of intervention 
 
 
Note: We were interested in finding out how the type of intervention was distributed 
across the three stages of conflict, using IMS terminology. The tables below set out 
the results. 
 
 
 
v17 Assessment * v9 STAGE OF PROBLEM  
 
v9 STAGE OF PROBLEM  
 Pre-conflict manifest conflict post-conflict 
 
Total 
YES 2 3 6 11 v17 Assessment 
NO 4 6 2 12 
Total 6 9 8 23 
 
 
v18 Monitoring * v9 STAGE OF PROBLEM  
 
V9 STAGE OF PROBLEM  
 Pre-conflict manifest conflict post-conflict 
 
Total 
YES 3 3 2 8 v18 Monitoring 
NO 3 6 6 15 
Total 6 9 8 23 
 
 
v19 Training * v9 STAGE OF PROBLEM   
 
v9 STAGE OF PROBLEM  
 pre-conflict manifest conflict post-conflict 
 
Total 
YES 1 6 5 12 v19 Training 
NO 5 3 3 11 
Total 6 9 8 23 
 
 
v20 Content transformation * v9 STAGE OF PROBLEM   
 
v9 STAGE OF PROBLEM  
 pre-
conflict 
manifest 
conflict 
post-
conflict 
 
Total 
YES 2 5 2 9 v20 Content 
transformation NO 4 4 6 14 
Total 6 9 8 23 
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v21 Legal assistance * v9 STAGE OF PROBLEM   
 
v9 STAGE OF PROBLEM  
 pre-conflict manifest conflict post-conflict 
 
Total 
YES 2 1  3 v21 Legal assistance 
NO 4 8 8 20 
Total 6 9 8 23 
 
 
V22 Organisational support * v9 STAGE OF PROBLEM   
 
v9 STAGE OF PROBLEM  
 pre-
conflict 
manifest 
conflict 
post-
conflict 
 
Total 
YES 4 3 3 10 v22 Organisational 
support NO 2 6 5 13 
Total 6 9 8 23 
 
 
v23 Equipment/infrastructure * v9 STAGE OF PROBLEM   
 
v9 STAGE OF PROBLEM  
 pre-
conflict 
manifest 
conflict 
post-
conflict 
 
Total 
YES 1 2 1 4 v23 
Equipment/infrastructure NO 5 7 7 19 
Total 6 9 8 23 
 
 
v24 Facilitation/catalyst * v9 STAGE OF PROBLEM   
 
v9 STAGE OF PROBLEM  
 pre-conflict manifest 
conflict 
post-conflict 
 
Total 
YES  1 2 3 v24 
Facilitation/catalyst NO 6 8 6 20 
Total 6 9 8 23 
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v25 Direct/indirect funding * v9 STAGE OF PROBLEM   
 
v9 STAGE OF PROBLEM  
 pre-
conflict 
manifest 
conflict 
post-
conflict 
 
Total 
YES 3 2 3 8 v25 Direct/indirect 
funding NO 3 7 5 15 
Total 6 9 8 23 
 
 
v26 Advocacy/lobbying * v9 STAGE OF PROBLEM   
 
v9 STAGE OF PROBLEM  
 pre-conflict manifest 
conflict 
post-conflict 
 
Total 
YES 2  2 4 v26 
Advocacy/lobbying NO 4 9 6 19 
Total 6 9 8 23 
 
 
v27 Safety * v9 STAGE OF PROBLEM   
 
v9 STAGE OF PROBLEM  
 pre-conflict manifest conflict post-conflict 
 
Total 
YES 2 5 1 8 v27 Safety 
NO 4 4 7 15 
Total 6 9 8 23 
 
 
Final note : The information in the tables in Annex 5.1 and 5.2 is based on qualitative 
entries into the classification schemes which are appended as a separate text file to the 
report. The statistical tables, compiled using SPSS software, have been extracted from 
an Excel spreadsheet file, also separately appended to this report. 
 
 
  
Summary 
 
The report was commissioned by the Royal Danish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and a team was put together comprising Helge 
Rønning and Kim Brice as external consultants and Hugo 
Stokke from CMI. International Media Support is an 
international NGO, based in Copenhagen, which provides 
support to media in conflict. The mandate covers media 
reporting on conflict situations, in particular armed conflict. 
Threatened media organisations are also covered by the 
mandate. The evaluation credited IMS for being experimental, 
innovative and willing to take risks in an often uncertain 
environment. Among critical points, there were uncertainties 
about the criteria for intervention, the organisational setup of 
IMS and their monitoring and evaluational capacity. The 
evaluation team concluded positively that IMS should be 
extended with additional funding and made a number of 
specific recommendations.  
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